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Zusammenfassung 
Die Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen verschiedener Politikoptio-
nen auf den Weltzuckermarkt. Dazu wird ein räumliches Preisgleichgewichtsmodell wie von 
Takayama und Judge vorgeschlagen mit hoher Abdeckung von Regionen und Politiken er-
stellt. Der Vorteil dieses Modelltyps gegenüber den in bisherigen Analysen verwendeten 
besteht in seiner Fähigkeit, die Annahme der Ursprungshomogenität (im Gegensatz zu Mo-
dellen, die auf dem Armington Ansatz basieren) mit der Möglichkeit zu kombinieren, bilate-
rale Handelsströme explizit abzubilden. Ein wesentlicher Nachteil ist die quasi-normative 
Natur des Ansatzes. 
Nach der Einführung wird zunächst in Kapitel zwei der Weltzuckermarkt detailliert 
beschrieben und von anderen Agrarmärkten abgegrenzt sowie die Anforderungen an ein 
Gleichgewichtsmodell des Weltzuckermarktes diskutiert. Dann wird im dritten Kapitel eine 
Übersicht über verschiedene in der Vergangenheit verwendete Modellansätze gegeben und 
deren Ergebnisse ausgewertet. 
Im vierten Kapitel wird ein Überblick die theoretische Entwicklung des Modellansat-
zes gegeben und schließlich das in der Dissertation verwendete Modell beschrieben. Das 
Modell umfasst 104 Zucker produzierende und 90 Zucker konsumierende Regionen. Natio-
nale Handels- und Agrarpolitiken sowie eine Vielzahl regionaler und präferentieller Han-
delsabkommen sind im Modell berücksichtigt. Im zweiten Teil von Kapitel vier wird eine 
Analyse von vier Szenarien mit dem Modell durchgeführt. Diese umfassen eine Fortführung 
gegenwärtiger Politiken, ein WTO Abkommen, eine einseitige Liberalisierung des Zucker-
marktes der EU sowie eine Liberalisierung der Zuckermärkte aller im Modell vertretenen 
Länder. 
Im Abschlusskapitel werden einige Kernergebnisse zusammengefasst und eine Wei-
terentwicklung des Ansatzes diskutiert. Hier wird insbesondere auf das Problem der Quasi-
Normativität eingegangen. 
Schlagwörter:  
Zucker, Partielle Gleichgewichtsmodelle, Räumliche Gleichgewichtsmodelle, Agrar-
politik 
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Abstract 
The Dissertation at hand investigates the effects of different policy options on the 
world sugar market. A Spatial Price Equilibrium Model as suggested by Takayama and 
Judge is established. This model type has one considerable advantage over previously ap-
plied types which is its ability to combine the assumption of homogeneous goods regardless 
of origin (as opposed to Armington-based models) with the possibility to model bilateral 
trade flows explicitly. One major drawback of the approach is that is behaves in part like a 
normative model. 
After the introductory chapter, a detailed description of the world sugar market and 
how it distinguishes from markets for other agricultural commodities is given. In this frame-
work requirements of a valid equilibrium model of the world sugar market are discussed. In 
the third chapter various studies of the world sugar market based on equilibrium models are 
surveyed. 
In the chapter four the development of the approach of spatial equilibrium modeling 
finally the model applied in this dissertation are described The model covers 104 sugar pro-
ducing and 90 sugar consuming regions. National agricultural and trade policies as well as 
numerous regional and preferential trade agreements are accounted for. In the second part of 
chapter four, four scenarios are simulated with the model. These are a reference scenario in 
which current policies are maintained, a WTO agreement, a unilateral liberalization of sugar 
policies on the part of the EU as well as a multilateral liberalization of the sugar markets of 
all countries. 
In the final chapter, some core results are summarized and further development of the 
applied approach especially possible solutions for the problem of quasi-normativity are dis-
cussed. 
Keywords:  
Sugar, Partial Equilibrium Models, Spatial Price Equilibrium Models, Agricultural Pol-
icy 
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1 Introduction 
Sugar is one of the most protected agricultural commodities world-wide. Many coun-
tries support their domestic markets by trade barriers and domestic policies. These are not 
only industrialized countries, like the European Union (EU), the USA and Japan where sugar 
prices are supported to be a multiple of the world market price (Mitchell, 2004), but also 
some developing countries such as South Africa or India and, of course, planned economies 
like Cuba and to some degree still China have highly distorting policies in place. Frequently, 
these are blamed to depress the world market price for sugar considerably, which is also con-
firmed by scientific analyses (Mitchell, 2004). While producers in the countries which pro-
tect their sugar markets are generally the beneficiaries and thus in favor of these policies, 
those countries which currently produce to world market conditions like Brazil, Thailand and 
Australia are hit by these distortions in their export interests and hence oppose them. Also 
consumers in the countries with high levels of protection are adversely affected, as well as 
the sugar using industry. Another group of beneficiaries of the protection of primarily indus-
trialized countries are producers in countries which have preferential access to these markets 
and can sell their sugar for the high prices prevailing there. However, also some developing 
countries have granted preferential access to their sugar markets to other countries.  
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) did not bring about major 
changes to this situation. Trade barriers for imports in excess of possible tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs) are still prohibitive in the countries mentioned above. In recent years, however, sev-
eral steps towards reforming the sector have been embarked upon by some of the protecting 
countries, most notably by the EU. The first substantial step towards opening the EU market 
for sugar was the adoption of the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) Initiative by the Council of 
the European Union1 in 2001, which extended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
to duty and quota free market access for sugar from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from 
2009 onwards with an implementation period with gradually increasing duty free TRQs and 
tariff reductions.2 The first major reform of the Common Market Organization (CMO)3 for 
sugar followed after a long process of discussion in 2006 after it had been virtually immune 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) 416/2001 (OJ L60, 01.03.2001, pp. 43-50). 
2 In the so-called Presidency Compromise for the 2006 CMO reform the Council agreed on a clause to ‘auto-
matically open the procedure to decide whether measures such as suspension or temporary withdrawal of trade 
concessions, surveillance or other safeguard measures need to be applied’ in case the annual increase of a coun-
try’s sugar exports under EBA exceeded 25%. Commission officials state, however, that this clause is not to be 
interpreted as a safeguard for EU market balance, but as an effort to tackle fraud in the form of triangular trade. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) 318/2006 (OJ L58, 20.02.2006, pp. 1-31). 
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in all former rounds of reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Also the 
USA took in recent years steps in the direction of more openness by granting increased mar-
ket access to its neighbors under several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). It is, however, 
questionable whether the next farm bill will bring major changes to the overall current US 
sugar policies (Sapp, 2007).  
In addition to the reform steps by single countries, the current round of WTO (World 
Trade Organization) negotiations has the potential to greatly impact sugar markets, although 
it is uncertain if and when such an agreement will be signed. If the July proposal by Chair-
man Falconer is taken as a benchmark for a possible agreement (Agra-Europe Weekly, 
2007), the envisaged tariff cuts would bring an end to the prohibitive effect of Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) tariffs in all major distorting industrialized countries. Various external and 
internal pressures could furthermore lead countries to liberalization beyond a possible WTO 
agreement. 
Any major steps of liberalization in the sugar market can be expected to have rela-
tively great impacts on production, consumption, and prices. This is since the levels of pro-
tection in the sugar market exceed those in markets for other agricultural products signifi-
cantly, and thus liberalization will have larger consequences. Besides the effects of 
liberalization on the global sugar market and the positions of big players like the EU, the 
USA or Brazil therein, it is especially interesting to look at the impacts it may have on the 
sugar sectors of countries which are beneficiaries of preferential trade arrangements. Trade 
preferences for sugar account for the bulk of the value of all agricultural trade preferences 
granted to developing countries (Grethe, 2005), which is due to the high gap between pro-
tected and world market prices. If these prices fall, the value of preferential market access 
will erode or may vanish completely for these countries.  
Both the EU and the USA have a long tradition of preferential access commitments to 
their sugar markets and both are currently extending the number of beneficiaries and the 
overall quantities which they import on a preferential basis. In the case of the EU, preferen-
tial sugar imports started with the sugar protocol attached to the first Lomé Treaty with Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which granted thirteen former colonies TRQ 
restricted access of a total of 1.3 million tons white sugar equivalents (WSE) to the EU mar-
ket at guaranteed prices. Further market access will be given to the group of LDCs, which is 
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to become unrestricted from 2009 onwards.4 In the case of the USA, sugar has been im-
ported under a quota system as a form of development aid for a long time.5 The overall 
amount of preferential market access is currently expanded under the Central America-
Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (USDA, 2006).  
                                                
Some of the countries which are beneficiaries of these agreements sell their entire 
production under preferential conditions and their industries are highly threatened by the 
erosion of these preferences. Others are competitive sugar producers and their sectors will 
though being negatively affected not shrink, because they can export their production to 
other importers. In many cases, this is likely to happen again under bilateral preferential 
agreements, which also exist in great number among developing countries and also include 
preferential market access for sugar. Due to the complex system of preferential trading ar-
rangements governing the world sugar market, the result of a significant liberalization of 
trade will be the termination of many current trade flows and the establishment of new ones.  
The results of possible liberalization scenarios on the world sugar market have been 
analyzed in various studies with equilibrium models.6 Some of these studies used net-trade 
models, in which sugar is regarded a homogeneous good. In this category of models a coun-
try is either an importer or an exporter of sugar, but not both at the same time. Furthermore, 
it is not specified in such a model to which country an exporter exports or from where the 
imports of an importing country come. Preferential trade and how it is affected by policy 
changes must, therefore, be ignored by these models. All other model-based studies, which 
are unlike the former able to depict these situations, rely on the Armington Approach 
(Armington, 1969) and treat sugar from different origins as imperfect substitutes. The expec-
tations expressed above, the termination of current preferential trade flows and the creation 
of new ones, which are shared by most experts, could not be reproduced by these models. A 
study which combines the strengths of both approaches, the treatment of sugar as a homoge-
neous good on the one hand and the ability to account for bilateral trade flows on the other 
hand, has not been published so far. In Nolte (2006) the attempts which were made by other 
modelers to overcome the problems of the Armington Approach are surveyed. As an alterna-
tive, the study suggests the application of the Spatial Price Equilibrium (SPE) modeling ap-
 
4 Besides these two, there are some other preferential market access commitments in place which are of less 
importance in terms of quantities. 
5 The system of import quotas has been converted in a TRQ system after being challenged successfully in the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1990 (Mitchell, 2004). 
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proach (Takayama and Judge, 1971), which in fact is able to depict bilateral trade flows un-
der the assumption of homogeneous goods. The author constructs a small SPE model of the 
world sugar market and shows that under a liberalization scenario the results could comply 
with the expectations.  
To be a useful tool for economic analysis, however, an equilibrium model should 
have the potential to provide insights which go beyond the ad hoc estimations of experts. 
Due to the rough regional aggregation and policy coverage, the model used by Nolte (2006) 
necessarily failed to do so. For this study, the SPE model is extended to the coverage of 90 
consuming regions and 104 producing regions of sugar with a detailed depiction of domestic 
and trade policies. A special functional form for the supply curve of some producers which 
was developed by Nolte and Grethe (2007) is chosen to be able to depict the situation that 
these countries entirely stop the production of sugar in case the price falls too much. The 
objectives of this study are to analyze with the help of this model the following research 
questions: 
• How will the situation on the world sugar market in the next decade develop, if no fur-
ther policy changes are expected?  
• In particular, what will be the situation after the implementation of those reforms which 
are already on the way, i.e. the full market access for LDCs to the EU from 2009 on-
wards, the 2006 reform of the CMO, and the implementation of increased market access 
under several FTAs by the USA? What will the situation on the EU market be? Which 
internal price will prevail? Which of the current and future preferential exporters will still 
be present on the market and what will be the overall amount of imports? What will be 
the overall amount of domestic production in the EU and what will be the shares of indi-
vidual member states? How much will sectors which are affected by preference erosion 
shrink and what will be the new destinations of exports of former preferential suppliers? 
• How will the potential further steps of unilateral or multilateral liberalization affect these 
outcomes? What will, for instance, the effects of a possible WTO agreement be? What 
will be the effects of a liberalization of the policies of the EU alone? How will the world 
sugar market look like if all global distorting policies are abolished? 
                                                 
 
6 A selection of these will be surveyed in this study. 
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The study is structured as follows: In chapter two, the world sugar market is de-
scribed qualitatively and quantitatively. A special focus is put on the elaboration of proper-
ties which distinguish it from the markets for other agricultural commodities. The sugar mar-
kets and policies of thirteen major players are reviewed. With this information, the second 
part of the chapter discusses what preferable and necessary features of an equilibrium model-
based analysis of the world sugar market would be. Chapter three provides a rough classifi-
cation of equilibrium models which have been used to analyze the world sugar market before 
and reviews the structure and results of some model-based studies published in recent years. 
In the fourth chapter, the analysis with the SPE is intensively discussed by first giving an 
introduction of the underlying theory, then describing the methodological structure and em-
pirical base of the SPE model used in this study, and finally describing and interpreting pro-
jections for different policy scenarios simulated with the model. Chapter five summarizes the 
core results and draws some conclusions. Finally, weaknesses and drawbacks of the SPE 
method are discussed and an outlook is given about how the analysis can be improved in 
future studies.7 
                                                 
7 Throughout the whole text, the word ‘chapter’ refers to the highest level of outline structuring of the text. The 
word ‘section’ refers to all lower levels. 
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2 The World Sugar Market and its Peculiarities 
2.1 Overview and Characteristics of the World Sugar Mar-
ket  
2.1.1 The Global Sugar Production and Markets 
2.1.1.1 Sugar Production 
Sugar is, like cereals and oilseeds, a tradable agricultural commodity. There are, 
however, a number of factors by which the world sugar market differs from the markets for 
other agricultural products. In this chapter the global sugar market is described and the char-
acteristics which distinguish it from markets for other agricultural products are explained. 
Sugar is, unlike for instance cereals, not a crop, but a processed product. It is pro-
duced chiefly from two crops which are sugar beet and sugar cane. Sugarcane accounts for 
around 74% of the sugar produced globally, the remainder coming from sugar beet. Figure 
2.1 shows the global distribution of beet and cane production. Sugar beet is grown in tem-
perate regions such as Europe and North America. The only country in the southern hemi-
sphere with a sizeable beet production is Chile. Sugar cane is cultivated in tropical and sub-
tropical regions. This regional distribution leads to sugarcane being produced mostly in 
developing countries and sugar beet mainly in industrialized countries (Illovo, 2006). An-
other consequence of that geographical distribution is that beet sugar is usually protected and 
subsidized by the governments of beet producing countries whereas cane sugar is often com-
peting without any such measures. The level of producer support for sugar in industrialized 
countries is, however, usually considerably higher than it is for other crop products like, for 
instance, cereals (Mitchell, 2004)(see also section 2.1.2).8  
 
8 Cereals in the European Union are currently protected at a level which, if at all, only marginally exceeds 
world market level, while sugar even after full implementation of the 2006 reform is still protected at a level of 
double the world market price. Before the EU embarked on its first major reform of its agricultural policies in 
1992 the protection level of cereals was about 50% above world market prices whereas that for sugar was three 
times the world market price. 
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Figure 2-1: Map of Sugar Beet and Cane Production Areas 
Source: Illovo (2006); own adjustments. 
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The first step of processing is closely linked to the place of agricultural production 
since both crops are highly perishable and the transportation costs are high. Cane juice is 
usually first processed to raw sugar which contains a certain share of molasses giving it a 
brown colour and a different taste. In a second stage, usually in a different factory, it is fur-
ther processed to white sugar, which is referred to as refining.9 Beet juice, on the other hand, 
is always processed to white sugar in the factory. This difference in the production process 
has several reasons. First, beet molasses has an unpleasant taste for which reason raw beet 
sugar is not suitable for human consumption. Furthermore is the process to refine beet juice 
directly into white sugar more efficient than a two stage process. Cane molasses, on the other 
hand, has a pleasant taste. Thus, cane sugar can be consumed in the raw stage.10 Further-
more, the two stage process is more efficient for cane sugar, since the direct refining of cane 
juice is more expensive than that of beet juice (Mitchell, 2004). In addition, transportation of 
raw sugar is much cheaper than that of white sugar, which makes it advantageous to carry 
out the refining close to the point of final consumption ((ISO, various years), see also section 
2.1.1.4).11 To escape the high cost of refining raw sugar into white sugar, in many develop-
ing countries less costly refining technologies are employed producing lower qualities of 
refined sugar referred to e.g. as “plantation white” or “mill white” (Mitchell, 2004). This 
makes it sometimes difficult to compare prices and production costs among different coun-
tries and qualities.  
2.1.1.2 Supply, Demand, Trade and Prices 
Table 2-1 shows the sugar balances of the most important countries in terms of pro-
duction consumption and trade. Global sugar production in the years from 2003/04 to 
2006/07 was 138 million metric tons WSE. The top five producers are Brazil, the European 
Union, India, China and the United States, accounting for 58% of global production. The 
same countries though in a different order are the world’s largest consumers of sugar. The 
most important net exporters are Brazil, Australia, Thailand, Guatemala and the EU, Brazil’s 
exports being much larger than those of all the rest. The biggest importers are Russia, the 
USA, Indonesia, Japan and India. 
                                                 
9 The white sugar yield of raw sugar is generally stated with 92%. 
10 The raw sugar available in retail stores in industrialized countries, however, is for hygienic reasons, usually 
refined sugar to which cane molasses is added. 
11 A numerical example shall be shown in section 4.1.2.2.5. 
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Table 2-1: Sugar Balances of Selected Countries in Thousand Tons WSE, Average from 
2003/04 – 2006/07 a 
 Supply Demand Net Exports 
Brazil 27,499 (20%) 9,813 (7%) 17,685
EU-25 18,507 (13%) 17,243 (13%) 1,264
India 17,244 (13%) 18,547 (14%) -1,303
China 9,770 (7%) 10,777 (8%) -1,008
USA 6,786 (5%) 8,555 (6%) -1,769
Thailand 5,669 (4%) 2,110 (2%) 3,559
Australia 5,001 (4%) 1,100 (1%) 3,901
Russia 2,494 (2%) 5,879 (4%) -3,385
Indonesia 2,156 (2%) 3,806 (3%) -1,650
Guatemala 1,888 (1%) 595 (0%) 1,293
Japan 852 (1%) 2,171 (2%) -1,318
Others 39,837 (29%) 53,112 (40%) -13,276
Total 137,702 133,708
Source: F.O. Licht(2007), own calculations; a Numbers in brackets are percentages of global values. 
The prices for sugar are somewhat volatile as it is the case for many agricultural 
products, whose consumption levels are quite stable, but whose production is dependant on 
annually changing weather conditions. The complete isolation of some large countries’ sugar 
markets from world market price signals may have increased this volatility. Figure 2-2 in the 
next section shows the development of the world market price of sugar (raw, fob) in the last 
decade. On average it has been slightly below US$ 200 per ton. In February 2006, however, 
it rose to US$ 425 (see next section), whereas in May 1999 it faced a low of US$ 104. 
2.1.1.3 Markets connected closely to the sugar market 
The substitutes for sugar in consumption can be broadly categorized in caloric and 
non caloric sweeteners. The most important of the caloric sweeteners is high fructose corn 
syrup (HFCS)12 which is produced from Maize starch. The production costs of HFCS are 
competitive with sugar produced by the major exporters if Maize is available at average 
world market prices and economies of scale are sufficiently exploited and the substitution 
possibilities are excellent in a number of applications, the most important being the produc-
tion of soft drinks. This has led to the market share of HFCS almost reaching that of sugar in 
the United States by 2000. The USA remains, however, the only country where HFCS and 
other starch based sweeteners could capture a considerable market share. The limiting factors 
in other countries are high transportation costs (HFCS is liquid), limited availability of maize 
at low prices, inability to benefit from economies of scale and (in the EU and Japan) produc-
 10
tion quotas for HFCS (Mitchell, 2004). There are other caloric sweeteners, starch-based, 
such as maltodextrins and non-starch-based such as inulin syrup and sugar alcohols/ polyols, 
which are, however of minor importance as sugar substitutes for several reasons. The same 
holds for non-caloric sweeteners (European Commission, 2004b; Van der Linde et al., 2000).  
Substitutes in supply of sugar are naturally all agricultural products competing with 
sugar crops for land and other factors of production, but since sugar is a processed product 
also alternative uses of the sugar crops have to be considered. The principal alternative use 
for sugar crops is the production of ethanol. Ethanol can be used for several purposes, the 
most important being vehicle fuel. The demand for ethanol from sugar crops and other crops 
has proven to be able to impact agricultural world markets substantially in seasons of high 
oil prices. Figure 2.2 shows the co-movement of world crude oil and sugar prices in the pe-
riod from 1997 to 2007. While in the first years the integration of both series seems quite 
loose, it becomes very tight by mid 2002. When the oil price peaked at around 70 US$ per 
barrel in 2006, the sugar price also rose to a high of 400 US$ per ton and above. By the end 
of 2006 the oil and the sugar price both had declined. Since then, however, the tight co-
movement seems to have come to an end. While the sugar price continued to fall the oil price 
reached another peak in October 2007, even higher than that in 2006. The ability of biofuels 
in general and sugar cane based ethanol in particular to serve as a long-term sustainable and 
economically viable substitute for fossil fuels and to be an appropriate means for reducing 
carbon emissions is intensively debated, especially after the peak of sugar prices in 2006 and 
those of other agricultural commodities which in some cases still persist. To present a com-
prehensive overview of that discussion exceeds the scope of this study by far. It is, however, 
important to notice that any future analysis of the world sugar market would be incompre-
hensive without taking into account the effects of ethanol based processing demand for sugar 
crops (Bureau et al., 2007).  
                                                 
 
12 In Europe usually referred to as Isoglucose. 
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Figure 2-2: Movement of World Sugar and Crude Oil Prices a 
Sources: EIA (2007); Intercontinental Exchange (2007); own calculations. a Oil price: All countries spot price 
fob, weighted by estimated export volume. Sugar price: No. 11 Contract (raw sugar fob), 1st nearby future 
contract. 
2.1.1.4 Transportation Costs  
13Sugar is traded internationally mainly in the form of raw sugar and white sugar.  
Most of the internationally traded sugar is transported over the ocean. Only minor distances 
are operated by road or rail. Raw sugar is transported in Bulk vessels. White sugar, on the 
other hand, is transported in 50 kg bags. Different sources contradict each other about the 
exact mode of transport of white sugar. While one states that the bags are loaded in a bulk 
vessel (House of Lords, 2005), others state that the bags are (more and more) stored in 
twenty foot containers (August Toepfer & Co. KG, 2006). As mentioned before, the trans-
portation of white sugar is more expensive, which is mainly so since the loading and unload-
ing costs are higher. White sugar has, however, only 92% of the weight of raw sugar (meas-
ured in WSE), which drives the transportation costs of white sugar down as compared to raw 
sugar. In total the transportation cost of white sugar including loading and unloading costs 
exceed those of raw sugar measured in WSE by around US$/t 25 on the route Brazil to East-
ern Europe, which is equivalent to 75% (House of Lords, 2005). This leads to raw sugar 
                                                 
13 Other forms of minor importance are iced sugar, sugar confectionary and, of course, products of the soft 
drink and candy industry. The transportation cost of those shall be neglected here although they may substan-
tially and systematically be different from the above mentioned forms in terms of transportation costs. 
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shipments being the dominant form of international sugar transportation. Shipments of white 
sugar, though more expensive, occur if the exporting country is, as the EU a beet producer 
and does thus not produce raw sugar or if the importing country does not have a refining 
industry. The economics of raw cane sugar production together with cost advantages of some 
countries’ refining industries lead to the interesting phenomenon of those countries being at 
the same time large scale importers and exporters of sugar, which they process to white sugar 
and re-export it to countries without a refining industry (or sufficient capacity). Examples for 
these countries are currently South Korea, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates.  
In the following, only transportation costs of raw sugar shall be regarded since this is 
the form in which the largest share of international sugar trade takes place. They will also be 
used as parameters in the quantitative analysis in chapter 4. 
 The costs of supply of raw sugar can be categorized as in table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: Cost Components for the Supply of Raw Sugar 
Cost position Incoterms a 
Production cost exw (ex works) 
 + Transportation from factory to the port fas (free alongside ship) 
 + Loading on vessel fob (free on board) 
 + Ocean transport to port of destination 
(fio: free in and out) 
cif (cost insurance freight) 
 + Unloading from vessel cif landed 
 + Transportation to buyer/wholesaler wholesale price 
Source: TIS (2007), own compilation; a “International Commercial Terms”, published by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC). In this table tariffs and export subsidies as well as any other measures of trade 
policy are ignored. 
When costs of production of sugar are compared in literature, it is not always the 
exw-costs which are referred to. If one wanted to compare, e.g., the costs of European and 
Brazilian producers of sugar to supply the EU market it would make sense to compare the 
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exw price of the European producer to the cif landed price of the Brazilian producer in a 
suitable European port.14  
Transportation costs from the place of production to the next sea port can make up for 
a high share of the total supply costs for bulk agricultural commodities such as sugar, de-
pending on the conditions of the rail and road network in the country in question and, of 
course, on the distance between the production area and the exporting port.15 Data on inter-
nal transportation cost is hard to obtain. Indian Press (The Hindu Business Line, 2006d) 
quotes transport costs from southern mills to the ports with 400-700 Rupees (Rs) per ton, 
which is equivalent to around US$ 9-15 (OANDA, 2007). The same newspaper also reports 
a subsidy granted to Indian sugar exporters to cover their internal transportation expenses of 
about US$ 10 – 12, depending on their location (The Hindu Business Line, 2002). State-
ments about the transportation costs from a factory in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which is 
located more remote from the coast, to the port amount to as much as US$ 29 (The Hindu 
Business Line, 2006c). Data on inland transportation costs for raw sugar from other countries 
could not be retrieved from the available literature. The USDA (Salin and Faust, 2006), 
however, published information about costs of inland transport of Soybeans in Brazil. Soy-
beans can, as raw sugar, be classified as an agricultural dry bulk commodity and ocean 
freight rates for both are rather similar. Therefore, transport costs of soybeans from the place 
of production to an exporting port, can be assumed to be similar to those for raw sugar as 
well. The costs stated in the report range from about 13 US$ to US$ 80 per ton. For a route 
which is also used for sugar (Riberão Preto, SP – Santos) they amount to about US$ 24 (Av-
erage 2005).  
iness Line, 2006d) stating the costs of 
port handling with 300 Rs, corresponding to US$ 6-7. 
                                                
Loading the sugar on vessels happens with grabs. It cannot be treated as suction cargo 
like other agribulk commodities, e.g. cereals, as the equipment would be contaminated 
(August Toepfer & Co. KG, 2006). Data on loading cost is very rare. The only available 
source is an Indian newspaper article (The Hindu Bus
Ocean freight costs for sugar are highly volatile depending on utilization of capacities 
on the bulk shipping market. Sugar is a price taker in the market for bulk ocean transporta-
tion, the main commodities there being iron ore, coal and cereals. Unlike the latter, sugar is 
 
14 Under the assumption that costs of transportation from factory to the wholesaler are more or less the same as 
from the port to the wholesaler 
15 For Ukrainian grains they are reported to account for up to 20-30% of the fob price (Striewe, 2006). 
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chiefly transported in vessels of the Handysize (10,000 – 35,000 deadweight tons (dwt)) or 
Handymax class (35,000 – 50,000 dwt) (Striewe, 2006). The availability of ocean freight 
rates for sugar is somewhat better than that for the other cost components discussed in this 
chapter. The ISO publishes on weekly base bulk ocean freight rates for sugar, raw and white, 
on major routes. The average transportation costs for raw sugar on those routes in the base 
period of the model to be applied in this study (2004-2005) are presented in table 2.2 below. 
le 2-3: Average Ocean Freight Rates for Raw Sugar (2004-2005) in $ per Ton Raw 
Ven ela US lf Baltic Mo o Eg Bla ea S. a Ja  S. a I
Tab
Sugar 
 ezu Gu rocc ypt ck S Chin pan Kore ran 
Cuba 24 - 36 34 36 37 52 56 53 58 
N.Brazil 23 28 32 29 31 32 49 53 50 55 
Santos 25 29 34 31 33 34 49 53 50 55 
Pto. Que-
tzal 21 27 38 35 38 39 41 43 40 52 
B’Ventura 22 27 39 36 38 39 41 44 40 52 
Thailand 35 36 35 31 34 35 17 20 18 30 
Durban - 35 - 31 35 36 34 37 36 33 
Source: ISO (various years); own calculations. Santos: South Brazilian Port, Puerto Quetzal: Guatemalan Pa-
cific Coast; Buenave
e be-
low those in industrialized countries in some cases (August Toepfer & Co. KG, 2006). 
ntura: Columbian Pacific Coast; Durban: South African Port. 
For unloading a vessel the same applies as for loading. There is, in fact, no reason to 
believe that the costs for both are - ceteris paribus - significantly different from each other. 
Different sources state the unloading costs per ton of raw sugar with US$ 7 (HOUSE OF 
LORDS, 2005) in an industrialized country as the UK and with US$ 10 (The Hindu Business 
Line, 2006a) in a developing country such as India. Port handling charges depend to a high 
degree not only on infrastructure, but also on labour costs and administrative regulations. 
They might, therefore differ significantly among developing countries and might also b
Transportation costs from the port to the wholesaler or buyer are rarely cited in litera-
ture. Indian press (The Hindu Business Line, 2006b) quotes cost for unloading raw sugar 
from a ship and transporting it to a refinery with 800 Rs, corresponding to roughly US$ 18. 
Corrected for port handling charges (see previous paragraph) net transportation costs would 
be US$ 8. Under the assumption that transportation cost from the factory to the wholesaler 
match roughly those from a port to the wholesaler, one could rely on wholesale margins for 
standard agricultural dry bulk commodities, which are published e.g. in the documentations 
of agricultural sector modelling studies, such as Banse et al. (2005). The wholesale margin 
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for cer
various size classes on 22 key routes (Baltic Exchange, 2007). If one compares the BDI to 
the time series for the ocean freight costs on one route, say from Brazil to the Baltic Sea, as it 
is done in figure 2-3, one notices that both show a high degree of co-movement. 
eals and oilseeds there are 6% in the EU-15 and the US and go to up to 25% in some 
Eastern European countries. 
Of all the components of transportation costs surveyed above, ocean freight rates 
seem to occupy the largest share in total transportation costs. They are reported, however, 
only for some routes, though the most important ones in international sugar trade. Since in a 
spatial analysis transportation costs play a major role, and for a the model to be applied in 
chapter 4 a comprehensive set of transportation costs is necessary to make useful estimates 
of future trade flows, in the following it is attempted to provide estimates for ocean freight 
rates on other routes. To be able to infer from the information available by ISO information 
on freight rates on other routes the determinants of freight costs in the available data set are 
analysed. First, the distance (World News Network, 2007), the loading capacity of the port of 
origin (ISO, various years), and dutiable passages through the Panama Canal and Suez Canal 
have been identified as determinants of ocean freight rates. One further determinant is the 
Baltic Dry Index (BDI) which is published by Baltic Exchange Ltd. in London and captures 
the above mentioned fluctuations. It is calculated from dry bulk shipping rates of vessels of 
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Figure 2-3: Baltic Dry Index and Freight Costs from Brazil to the Baltic Sea per Ton of Raw 
Sugar. 
Source: ISO (various years). EuroInvestor (2007). 
One caveat must be added in this context. Some ports, mostly in developing coun-
tries, are restricted to the docking of vessels below a certain size. If the demand of ocean 
transportation services from or to those ports increases stronger than the demand for dry bulk 
ocean transport as a whole, the daily charters and therefore the per ton rates on this segment 
may increase at a rate above the BDI (Striewe, 2006).16  
To estimate the influence of the various determinants identified in the previous para-
graph, a multiple linear regression (Ordinary Least Square (OLS)) has been performed. After 
the influence of the loading capacity of the originating port was found to be not significant, 
the variable has been deleted from the model and a regression with the reduced model has 
carried out.17 The source of freight cost (ISO, various years) stated, that the reported vessels 
would be loaded within three to four weeks after publication of the freight costs. For that 
reason the same regression was undertaken again with a BDI as independent variable that 
was four weeks ahead of the publication date. As expected, the explanatory power could be 
                                                 
16 The opposite is not true: One vessel can always be substituted by two others of half the size, but not vice 
versa. 
17 The calculation of the BDI includes all costs arising on the routes out of which it is calculated, also the canal 
passages. Given this it would make sense to employ a regression model in which all independent variables are 
multiplied by the BDI. Such a model, however, proved to have a smaller explanatory power than the one used 
here. 
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Table 2-4: Results of Regression of Ocean Freight Rates for Raw Sugar in US$ per Ton a 
 Full Sample Santos Morocco 
Constant 2.3*** (0.4) -7.7*** (0.8) 14.1*** (0.9)
BDI 0.00598*** (0.00008) 0.00727*** (0.00015) 0.00572*** (0.00016)
Distance 0.00301*** (0.00003) 0.00372*** (0.00006) 0.00074*** (0.00011)
Panama 1.5*** (0.2) - - 6.3*** (0.4)
Suez 5.3*** (0.2) 15.9*** (0.5) - -
R2 0.62 0.80 0.59 
F Test 4544.49 
(0.000) 
2310.35 
(0.000) 
561.34 
(0.000) 
Number of 
Observations 
11,197 1,780 1,165 
Source: ISO (various years); EuroInvestor (2007); World News Network (2007); a * significant at the 0.1 level, 
** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. Numbers in brackets at the right hand side of the 
coefficients are the standard errors. 
Table 2-4 shows the results of the regression for the whole sample and for two of the
regional sub-samples.
 
are worth discussing about the results of the 
table. The first is the high regional difference with regard to the influence of canal passages. 
This is
for the freight rates to Morocco, which can also be observed for other ports in Europe and the 
18 Most coefficients estimated are significant at the 0.01 level, in fact 
all coefficients in the table above. Two points 
 counterintuitive, since the passage duties should be the same for any vessel of the 
same type and size and as pointed out above, raw sugar is mainly transported in bulk vessels 
of the same size class. And there seems to be, unfortunately, no apparent other explanation 
for the emergence of the numbers. The second is the relatively low coefficient of the distance 
                                                 
18 Santos in southern Brazil and Morocco are chosen as one importing and one exporting region. The results for 
Annex. all regional sub-samples are listed in the 
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Mediterranean in the sample surveyed. A plausible explanation for this is in contrast quite 
easily found: The distances to all supplying ports in the sample show a lower variance than 
the distances from, say, South Korea to those ports. This could have lead to an underestima-
tion of the influence se 
coefficients.  
 and Policies of Major Players on 
the World Market 
gar production and con-
mption are d riefly  of th t size olices o their 
ors. The c overe EU and the USA followed by the mo ant 
rters Braz and, A  Guate uba, C and So ica 
 most important importers  China  and Japan. The order follows the 
e exports and imports and shall be maintained in chapter 4.1.2.3 where the im-
plementation of national policies in the model is described. 
06 2006/07 Average 
of the distance in an estimation of ocean freight rates applying the
A similar regression as the one described above is performed for all routes for which 
freight costs are specified explicitly by the data. Since distance and canal passages do not 
change on these routes, the only explaining variable in the regression was the BDI.19 In 
chapter four, where the data base for the model is constructed, the coefficients which were 
estimated in this section are used to estimate ocean freight rates for all necessary routes in 
the model.  
2.1.2 Sugar Markets
In this chapter the most important countries in terms of su
su escribed b  in terms eir marke  and the p  applied t
sugar sect ountries c d are the st import
sugar expo il, Thail ustralia, mala, C olombia uth Afr
and by the  Russia, , India20
size of averag
2.1.2.1 European Union 
Table 2-5: Sugar Balance of the EU-25 in Thousand Tons WSE 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/
Supply 18,587.2 20,192.8 19,349.8 15,899.3 18,507.3
Demand 17,249.1 17,311.7 17,212.7 17,200.1 17,243.4
Imports a 1,901.9 2,169.5 2,258.2 2,340.9 2,167.6
Exports a 4,683.0 3,912.7 6,153.7 6,149.5 5,224.7
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), Eurostat (2007), own calculations. a Extra EU-25 trade recorded for calendar years 
2003 till 2006. 
                                                 
mpetitive exporter and is thus listed here among the 
19 For results refer to the Annex tables 
20 India’s net trade position changes from year to year and trade is tightly controlled by government agencies. 
At average world market prices, however, India is not a co
importing countries (USDA 2007, GAIN Report IN7035). 
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The EU as the only country in the world is due to its sugar market policies at the 
same time as well a major exporter and importer of sugar as can be seen from table 2-5 
above. The EU CMO for sugar has been reformed in 2006 (Council Regulation (EC) No 
2006/318 (European Union, various issues)).21 The old system and the basic measures of the 
reform is described briefly in the next paragraphs.  
Under the old system the price of sugar in the EU was protected to approximately 
three t
 
rbia, for a quantity of 0.25 million tons. In 2001 
the EU started the EBA Initiative for LDCs with a quota for duty free sugar imports from 
LDCs 
imes world market level. An intervention price for sugar and a minimum price for 
beets to be paid to farmers were installed as a bottom to the internal price level. The market 
price for sugar was, however, almost during the whole duration of the CMO considerably 
above those prices which was provided for by the quantity restricting instruments of the 
CMO. Production of sugar was limited by national quotas. These were divided into A and B 
quotas. The basic difference between both was the effective producer price that was paid to 
farmers, i.e. the price minus the levies collected. The effective producer price for B-Sugar 
was considerably lower than that for A-Sugar. Sugar produced in excess of the quota, so-
called C-Sugar, was not subject to any producer support and had to be exported at world 
market prices (European Commission, 2004b).  
Since tariffication of its import regimes after the UR, the EU has levied a tariff of 
€ 419 per ton of white sugar to which an additional duty could be added depending on the 
level of world market prices under the special safeguard clause (SSG). Throughout the whole 
period since then, the EU made use of this possibility thus total border protection was around 
€ 500 per ton at which imports were effectively prohibited. Under preferential import
schemes, however, substantial quantities of sugar could enter the EU market at reduced or 
zero tariffs. The most important of these schemes was the sugar protocol attached to the 
Lomé and Cotonou treaties which provided for duty market access of 1.3 million tons (WSE) 
for some ACP countries and India. With the accession of Finland, the EU opened a quota 
(usually referred to as CXL) of roughly 85 thousand tons of raw sugar which could enter the 
EU market at a reduced rate of duty (€ 98 ton of raw sugar) in order to allow the former ex-
porters to Finland to maintain their market access. Under the Balkans Initiative market ac-
cess is granted to some countries, mainly Se
gradually increasing from 74 thousand tons (WSE) in 2001/02 by 15% annually until 
in 2009/10 all import duties and quantity restrictions are removed. Finally, there are prefer-
                                                 
21 Council Regulation (EC) 318/2006 (OJ L58, 20.02.2006, pp. 1-31). 
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ential imports under the SPS (Special Preferential Sugar) regime. These imports serve the 
purpose to ensure the refineries in the EU can utilize their full capacity, by sufficient avail-
ability of raw sugar. The amount of raw sugar imported under SPS is the balance of the re-
fineries capacity and the raw sugar which is produced in the French Overseas Departments 
and which enters the EU m
tem the external pressures were the dominating ones. The first major external factor 
were the imports expected to enter the EU after the phasing in of full market access for 
LDCs 
arket under the preferential schemes mentioned above. This quan-
tity is usually around 0.2 million tons, which is distributed between ACP countries and India. 
With increasing quantities of sugar imported under EBA, the SPS quantities will, however, 
decrease (European Commission, 2004b). 
With quota production and preferential imports the community market would be 
oversupplied at a price of € 700 per ton. To balance the market a sizeable share of the EU 
sugar production is exported with subsidies to fill the gap between the community price and 
the fob world market price.22 Since the quantity and volume of subsidized exports is limited 
by the URAA a certain share of A- and B-sugar can be declared as C-sugar which has to be 
exported without refunds, which is called reclassification (European Commission, 2004b). 
Multiple forces putting pressure on the EU sugar sector lead finally to a reform in 
2006. Next to internal forces such as consumers and processors of sugar suffering from the 
old sys
under EBA from 2009/10 onwards. Various sources give numbers for expected im-
ports in a range between 2 and 3 million tons (BUREAU ET AL., 2007; FISCHER-BOEL, 2005, 
MITCHELL, 2004).23 Those quantities would have to be re-exported with subsidies to sustain 
a balanced EU market which would have required additional funds from the EU budget and 
would have brought the EU into conflict with its limit on export subsidies. The second major 
external issue was the decision of the WTO Appellate Body over a complaint by Thailand, 
Australia and Brazil that the EU would exceed its export subsidy limit by exports of C-sugar 
which was considered cross-subsidized on the one hand and by the re-exports of ACP sugar 
on the other hand. In the view of the EU both amounts were considered unsubsidized. The 
Appellate Body, however, supported the view of the complainants (European Commission, 
2006). 
                                                 
22 The quantity for which export subsidies were actually paid is only 1.3 millions tons plus another 1.3 million 
tons of ACP re-exports. Additionally, some 3 million tons were exported without receiving subsidies (see ex-
port data in table 2-5), so called C-sugar. However, the latter wa
see next paragraph). 
s considered cross-subsidized by a WTO panel 
(
23 Much lower Figures are stated by Van Berkum et al. (2005). 
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The reform, which was finally decided upon in 2006, introduced some major changes 
to the system the most important of which are described in the following paragraph.24 The A 
and B quota are merged into one quota, whose overall level was left unchanged. Former C-
Sugar producers were even given the possibility to purchase an overall amount of 1.1 million 
tons of sugar quota within national limits. The production of sugar in excess of the quota, 
formerly C-Sugar, will be, though not forbidden, effectively prohibited by a surplus amount 
levied on such sugar and a carry forward mechanism which allows companies to declare 
sugar as being produced in the following marketing year. The intervention price system is 
replaced by a reference price system. The reference price will gradually decrease by 36% 
from € 
 
By May 2007 a net of slightly more than one million tons of quota had been sold to 
the restructuring v y however, a reduction in the order of 6 million tons must 
be s from EBA or Economic 
artnership Ag (EPA ed cu ith A ries. O  coun-
venia, Irelan tvia, ed pro omple  new C gar 
 commission to cut quota y in al ates if after 2010 insufficient 
 been sold tructuring fund, and the commission ned t To 
posed some changes to the restructuring rules to ensure 
enough quota will be sold by 2010 (Bureau et al., 2007). At the moment it is, however, not 
possible
                                                
631.90 per ton (WSE) to € 404.40 (European Commission, 2006)(Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/318). Once the reference price is undercut, a private storage scheme is trig-
gered. The minimum beet price for farmers is cut over four years by 42% to a final level of 
€ 26.29 per ton. The price decrease for farmers is partially compensated by a direct payment
covering 64.2 % of the price cut. This payment is to become part of the single payment 
scheme. As mentioned above there are no mandatory quota cuts. The necessary reduction of 
quotas is to be achieved by the installation of a restructuring fund to which producers can sell 
quotas (European Commission, 2006). The amount they receive will be gradually reduced 
from € 730 to € 525 per ton of quota in 2009/10 (European Commission, 2006)(Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/318).  
 fund.25 E entuall
 achieved even without accounting for additional future import
P reements ) negotiat rrently w CP count nly three
tries, Slo d and La had ceas duction c tely. The MO su
allows the s linearl l member st
quota has to the res er threate o do so. 
avoid such a step, the commission pro
 to estimate whether that will be sufficient to achieve a balanced EU market by 
2009/10. 
 
24 For a more detailed description the reader is referred to European Commission (2006), Bureau et al. (2007), 
and Council Regulation (EC) No 2006/318 (OJ L58, 28.02.2006, pp.1-31). 
25 This means quota sold to the fund minus quota bought by formerly C-sugar producing enterprises.  
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2.1.2.2 USA 
Table 2-6: Sugar Balance of the USA in Thousand Tons WSE  
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 7,219.0 6,573.5 6,176.4 7,176.0 6,786.2
Demand 8,231.2 8,526.0 8,699.5 8,762.1 8,554.7
Imports 1,413.6 1,676.7 2,913.4 1,656.0 1,914.9
Exports 122.1 196.2 181.5 248.4 187.1
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
The sugar market of the USA is on of the biggest in terms of production as well as 
consumption. Table 2-6 shows that average annual production and consumption in the period 
from 2003/04 to 2006/07 were 6.8 and 8.6 million tons WSE, respectively, which makes it 
the fifth largest consumer and producer of sugar in the world. The USA produces sugar from 
both beet and cane on a large scale. Like the EU, the US has a protected sugar market which 
provides a sizable profit margin to domestic producers and preferential importers. In contrast 
to the EU, sugar exports only take place on a minor scale and without subsidies. 
The basic tool to provide price support to US sugar farmers are nonrecourse loans. 
These 
                                                
are granted to processors of sugar per quantity of production provided they pay a 
minimum price for beet and cane to farmers. The loans being nonrecourse means the USDA 
has to accept sugar instead of repayment of the loans. This way an effective minimum price 
is established. To avoid such forfeitures26 of sugar which pose a burden to the federal 
budget, the USDA has several possibilities to limit the market availability of sugar and by 
that to increase the domestic price of sugar to a level at which forfeitures are discouraged. 
The most important of those is the installation of marketing allotments for sugar producers 
based on past production. The overall allotment quantity determined each year is divided 
between cane and beet processors at fixed proportions, the former receiving 45.65% and the 
latter 54.35%. 
The USA has several schemes under which preferential imports of sugar take place. 
The most important in terms of quantity is the raw sugar TRQ which is distributed to 40 
countries. The largest shares of quota are held by Brazil, the Dominican Republic and the 
Philippines. The raw sugar TRQ is not fixed but can be adjusted to meet the requirements of 
the market. The minimum national quantity which cannot be undercut by a downward ad-
justment of the TRQ is a so-called minimum boatload of 7,258 tons raw value (= 8000 short 
 
26 To forfeit sugar means to deliver sugar to government agencies instead of repaying the loan. 
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tons). Imports inside the raw sugar TRQ and a small refined sugar TRQ on average 
amounted to roughly 1.1 million tons in recent years. Besides those TRQs there are provi-
sions of market access for Mexican sugar under NAFTA and for some Central American 
countries and the Dominican Republic under CAFTA-DR. NAFTA came into effect in 1994 
with market access for Mexican sugar to the US gradually increasing until it is unrestricted 
from 2008 onwards (USDA, 2006). There is lots of concern about NAFTA market access for 
Mexico threatening the balance of the US sugar market. However, Mexico’s sugar surplus is 
relatively small and protection of the domestic sugar market and, thus, prices are rather 
higher in Mexico than in the USA. (USDA, various years)(GAIN Report MX 7031). CAFTA-
DR provides TRQs to six countries which will increase gradually over a 15 year period from 
107,000 tons (raw value) to 151,140 tons. The annual growth rate thereafter will be 2,460 
ton w sugar TRQ was adjusted 
ostly downw n nec  balan mand and supply at the desired price 
level. It can, therefore, be assumed, that it will be adjusted further downwards at the same 
ich NAF AFTA ts are increasing. FAPRI (Food and Agricul-
cy Research Instit ) projections or the next decade (FAPRI, 2006) do not show a 
ption. Imports of 
sugar can also enter the US market duty-free under two re-export programs which ensure that 
an equi
s (Kennedy and Dufour, 2007). In previous years, the ra
(m ards) whe essary to ce US de
rate at wh TA and C -DR impor
tural Poli ute  f
significant change i mporn overall i ts in the USA which supports that assum
valent amount of sugar is re-exported to the world market either as refined sugar or in 
sugar containing products (USDA, 2006).  
2.1.2.3 Brazil 
Table 2-7: Sugar Balance of Brazil in Thousand Tons WSE 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 24,049.5 25,514.7 30,026.0 30,404.4 27,498.7
Demand 9,643.7 9,763.3 9,843.9 10,002.2 9,813.3
Imports - - - - -
Exports 14,698.9 17,620.5 15,516.8 18,514.9 16,587.8
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
Table 2-7 shows the Brazilian sugar balance in the years from 2003/04 to 2006/07. 
Brazil is the world’s largest sugar producer and exporter the fourth largest consumer and is 
one of the world’s most efficient producers. Production was on average 26.5 million tons and 
consumption 9.8 million tons WSE. Both show an increasing tendency, the production much 
stronger than consumption, though. The strong increasing trend in production and hence ex-
ports is persistent, in the last decade the country more than doubled its sugar output (FAPRI, 
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2006). Brazil levies an ad valorem tariff of 17.5% on imports from non MERCOSUR 
(Mercado Común del Sur, Southern Common Market) countries, which however does not 
have any effect as Brazil does not import sugar and would not do so even in absence of the 
tariff (Elobeid and Beghin, 2005). Sugar is entirely produced from cane which is concen-
trated in two regions, Centre-South and Northeast. Production is less efficient in the North-
east region. The government supports producers in the Northeast by allocating the US raw 
quota entirely to that region and by a small subsidy (Elobeid and Beghin, 2005; Mitchell, 
2004). 
licy since the 1970’s when 
ude oil prices showed a histo . The ortant ts of t  are 
ptions and d sidies nol pro om sugar cane and a 
y share of gasol o be blend with gasolin ld in Braz his policy 
nfluence the of sug irected to ethanol production and thereby the 
availability of Brazilian sugar on the world markets. On average half of the annual cane har-
vest is 
SE 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
The Brazilian Government has been operating a biofuel po
cr rical peak most imp instrumen his policy
tax exem irect sub for etha duced fr variable 
mandator ine t ed e so il. T can 
strongly i  amount ar cane d
processed to ethanol the other half being used for the production of sugar (Mitchell, 
2004).  
2.1.2.4 Australia 
Table 2-8: Sugar Balance of Australia in Thousand Tons W
Supply 5,349.9 4,145.9 5,758.8 4,749.8 5,001.1
De 1,106.9 1,100.4mand 1,102.3 1,094.8 1,097.7
Im 3.5 6.7ports 8.8 8.9 5.6
Exports 37.5 56.1 50.1 56.4 0.03,5 3,9 3,8 3,4 3,70
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), lations. 
ble 2-8 shows t Australia’s sugar production in the period from 2003/04 to 
as on avera  five m ns WS uite so ations
demand in the same period was around 1.1 million tons. Australia is with 3.7 million tons the 
world’s
 own calcu
Ta hat 
2006/07 w ge about illion to E with q me fluctu  and its 
 second largest exporter of sugar. Policies regulating the sugar market have been 
abolished in the past decades (Elobeid and Beghin, 2005). 
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2.1.2.5 Thailand 
Table 2-9: Sugar Balance of Thailand in Thousand Tons WSE 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 6,698.8 4,990.5 4,673.6 6,311.2 5,668.5
Demand 2,054.4 1,969.2 2,141.0 2,275.5 2,110.0
Imports 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exports 4,700.2 3,117.4 1,957.9 3,058.4 3,208.5
Sou
Thailand round ion to years 3/04  as 
table 2-9 on world’  export petitive actor 
markets. Production and thus exports underlie st  fluctuation oduction 
n on 2.  tons in od. De
competitiveness, the Government of Thailand protects the sector by import quotas and tar-
iffs, 65
Table 2-10: Sugar Balance of Guatemala in thousand tons WSE 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
rce: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
 is with a  3.2 mill ns in the  from 200 to 2006/07
shown in e of the s leading ers of sugar and is a com
on world rong s. Pr aver-
aged on 5.7 million to and conns WSE sumptio 1 million  that peri spite its 
% ad valorem for in-quota imports, 99% for above quota imports (Elobeid and 
Beghin, 2005). The government operates a quota system which regulates which sugar may 
be sold on the internal market (Quota A) and under long-term export contracts (Quota B). 
The restriction of quota A together with the import policies lifts the Thai price level for sugar 
over world market prices (USDA, 2005; GAIN Report TH 5035).  
2.1.2.6 Guatemala 
Su 2,027.7 1,888.2pply 1,835.6 1,935.1 1,754.4
Demand 535.4 92.1 24.5 27.1 4.85 6 6 59
Imports 15.9 10.6 7.6 7.4 10.4
Exports 1,387.5 1,015.0 1,427.8 1,132.6 1,240.8
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), o lations. 
ba of Guate n the per m 200
2006/07. Production was on average 1.9 million tons with an increasing trend and minor 
fluctua
wn calcu
Table 2-10 sh sugar ows the lance mala i iod fro 3/04 to 
tions. Average demand was 0.6 million tons. Guatemala is currently (2007) the 
world’s fifth largest exporter of sugar, the main destinations being North America and East 
Asia (USDA, 2007; GAIN Report GT7006). Guatemalan imports are negligible. MFN ad 
valorem tariffs are 20%. Imports are duty free for members of the Central American Com-
mon Market (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2007)).  
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2.1.2.7 Cuba 
Table 2-11: Sugar Balance of Cuba in Thousand Tons WSE  
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 2,318.4 1,301.8 1,200.6 1,380.0 1,550.2
Demand 625.6 630.2 639.4 642.2 634.3
Imports 170.2 193.2 248.4 161.0 193.2
Exports 1,786.6 707.9 782.0 901.6 1,044.5
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
Cuba used to be the world’s leading exporter of sugar for many decades. Exports 
mainly were shipped to the former Soviet Union in exchange for oil. The conditions of this 
trade were highly favourable for Cuba. When the Soviet Union collapsed the guaranteed 
profitab
). This was 
attributed to bad weather conditions initially, but the production did not recover in the fol-
lowing years and  1.3 to 1.5 million tons (see table 2-11 Despite high 
sug ies of sugar. While lack-
g an econom le, thi attribu longst de ag ith 
here the high  of Cu orts is s o (USD , GAIN Report 
and externa  Russi is to be paid in goods (Library of Congress, 
remains ope r the re ing will e lly lead t petitive sugar 
le market access also disappeared and Cuba found itself with a highly inefficient 
sugar industry. The production fell dramatically from about 7 to 8 million tons in the late 
1980s to about 3.5 million tons (raw value) in the 1990s (Mattson and Koo, 2003). In 2002 
the state-run sugar industry embarked on a major restructuring process. 71 out of 156 sugar 
mills were closed and production again fell sharply (Hagelberg and Alvarez, 2006
 remained at a level of
ar production costs, Cuba continues to export significant quantit
in ic rationa s can is ted to a anding tra reement w
China w est share ba’s exp hipped t A, 2007
CH7029) l debt to a which 
2006). It n whethe structur ventua o a com
sector.  
Domestic demand is subsidized by the Government under a rationing system. A 
monthly quantity of 6 pounds per capita can be purchased at US$ 0.13 per pound (~ € 0.38 
per kg, Elobeid and Beghin, 2005) To cover domestic demand and export obligations Cuba 
turned to importing substantial quantities of sugar after 2002 which in the period from 
2003/04 to 2006/07 amounted to 30% of domestic consumption (see table 2-11).  
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2.1.2.8 Colombia 
Table 2-12: Sugar Balance of Colombia in Thousand Tons WSE 
 2003/04 2005/06 2006/07 Average 2004/05 
Supply 2,496.9 2,507.3 2,226.5 2,252.6 2,370.8
De 481.1 1,448.1mand 1,406.9 1,471.6 1,432.8 1,
Imports 48.6 35.4 108.6 76.4 67.2
Exports 61.3 79.0 20.4 69.9 2.61,1 1,0 8 8 98
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), lations. 
lumbia is ma orter of Table 2-12 shows that exports have in recent 
ith a decreasing tend he decre
production and, thus, exports is largely due to the increased use of sugarcane for the produc-
tion of 
SE  
 own calcu
Co jor exp sugar. 
years been around 1 million tons WSE, although w ency. T ase in 
ethanol. The main destinations for exports are South and Central American countries. 
Columbia operates a sugar price stabilization fund. Exporting enterprises receive a payment 
out of the fund which is collected by a levy on domestic sales. MFN-imports of sugar into 
Columbia are subject to a 20% ad valorem duty. This is increased or decreased by an addi-
tional amount if the import price lies outside a price band managed by the Andean Commu-
nity member states (Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia). The floor and ceiling price for 
raw sugar are set to US$ 233 and US$304 per ton for the period from April 2007 to March 
2008 (~ € 174 and € 227). The same system of additional duties applies for all members of 
the Andean Community (USDA, 2007, GAIN Report CO7007). 
2.1.2.9 South Africa 
Table 2-13: Sugar Balance of South Africa in Thousand Tons W
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 2,120.1 2,259.2 2,088.7 2,217.6 2,171.4
Demand 1,376.1 1,440.5 1,450.7 1,455.3 1,430.7
Imports 208.8 215.3 118.6 161.2 176.0
Exports 893.7 969.6 1,047.0 907.2 954.4
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
South Africa is among the world’s major exporters of sugar. Table 2-13 shows that 
production in the years from 2003/04 to 2006/07 was on average 2.2 million tons WSE and 
consumption was 1.4 million tons. Although a major and competitive exporter, South Africa 
imports some 0.2 million tons of sugar, which enter the country under preferential agree-
ments with its neighbours. Despite its competitiveness on international markets the sugar 
industry enjoys a high degree of protection and the internal market is highly regulated. To-
 28
gether with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, South Africa is member of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (Sandrey and Vink, 2007). The SACU imposes a 
tariff on sugar imports which varies with the world market price for sugar. With high world 
market price level in spring 2006 it was completely abolished and at the moment of writing 
still is. Before, i.e. from September 2005 onwards, it had been at ZAR 233 (~ € 30) per ton 
(USDA, 2007, GAIN Report SF7015). Since there was no further protection, the question 
arises, how the high internal price level of ZAR 3,500 (~ € 441, IBID.) ex factory can be sus-
tained.  
Domestic Marketing within the SACU is regulated by quantitative restrictions for 
each member country, the amounts of which are undisclosed to public. For Swaziland, the 
on s amount is estimated to be 
0,000 tons (H uarez he SA tries a mbers of the South-
n Developm munity ). The S untries hich a
ugar produce s Zam Malaw nted a n rocal q
tricted access o ACU su rket until in 2012 all trad ar is sup
to be completely liberalized.  The quantity of this market access is not consistently stated in 
literatu
e 138,000 
tonnes. The treaty, however, does not specify which years are referred to by the mentioned 
marketing years. 
ly major sugar producer in the SACU besides South Africa, thi
26 aley and S , 2003). T CU coun re also me
ern Africa ent Com  (SADC ADC co  among w re com-
petitive s rs such a bia and i are gra on-recip uantita-
tively res n the S gar ma e in sug posed 
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re with 20,000 tons (Sandrey and Vink, 2007) to 50,000 tons per year (USDA, 2007, 
GAIN Report SF7015). In Annex VII to the SADC Trade Protocol (SADC, 2007), the market 
access is linked to annual growth of the SACU sugar market, which is deemed to be 45,000 
tones in the first marketing year, 91,000 tonnes in the second and 138,000 tones in the third 
marketing year. In the following years the market access shall be no less than thos
2.1.2.10 Russian Federation 
Table 2-14: Sugar Balance of Russia in Thousand Tons WSE  
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 1,886.6 2,274.9 2,600.1 3,212.2 2,493.5
Demand 5,975.4 5,850.7 5,846.1 5,841.5 5,878.5
Imports 3,812.0 3,500.5 3,104.2 2,981.2 3,349.5
Exports 108.0 137.5 130.5 116.3 123.1
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
                                                 
27 “If the world sugar market has ‘normalized’ sufficiently to make such liberalization acceptable“ (Sandrey and 
Vink, 2007). 
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After treating the most important exporters now the sugar sectors of the biggest im-
porters are presented, the most important of which, in terms of import quantity, is the Rus-
sian Federation. Table 2-14 shows that Russia’s imports amounted to about 3.3 million tons 
WSE between 2003/04 and 2006/07. The Russian sugar sector is steadily expanding with 
processing capacity being the key constraint. Accordingly imports are decreasing. 
Russia’s most important sources of sugar imports are Brazil and, though with a 
str system until 2004 when it 
anged to a tar gime (USDA, 2004, GAIN Report RS e quot  all 
ons tons of raw sugar were auctioned to im s. T a tarif
ith a minim  15 pe
 of € 120 per to raw and  per ton f te sugar hnikov, 2
Above-quota tariffs were not sufficient to deter imports, which is also confirmed by import 
data of
Tab
ongly decreasing trend, Cuba. Russia used to run a TRQ 
ch iff-only re 4021). Th as of all in
3.65 milli porting firm he in-quot f used to 
be 15% w um of € r ton in 2002, the above quota tariff was 40% with a 
minimum n for  € 140 or whi (Gudos 001). 
 the years before the abolishment of the TRQ system. Since 2004 Russia operates a 
tariff system which is designed similar to a variable levy. The tariff can be raised when the 
New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) fob price for raw sugar falls and falls when the price 
rises. However, despite strong price movements on the world market, it has been left un-
changed at a level of US$ 140 per tonne since September 2005. (USDA, 2007, GAIN Report 
RS7032). The consecutive increase in the duty-paid cif import price may also have contrib-
uted to the above mentioned decrease of imports. 
2.1.2.11 China 
le 2-15: Sugar Balance of China in Thousand Tons WSE  
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 10,031.4 9,074.6 8,772.7 11,199.3 9,769.5
Demand 10,490.8 10,417.3 10,674.5 11,525.4 10,777.0
Imports 1,102.0 1,214.8 1,108.4 1,526.1 1,237.8
Exports 38.1 298.2 180.0 297.6 203.5
Source: F.O. Licht ( s. 
ion as in terms of production. 
able 2-15 show s suga in the period from 2003/04 to 2006/07. Production 
years was a million tons WSE while consumption was 10.7 million tons. 
 major im h an  trend. There are no recent sources available 
tailed information about the structure of the Chinese sugar industry. However, the 
 control over the sector in terms of prices and import 
2007), own calculation
China’s sugar market is large both in terms of consumpt
T s China’ r balance 
in these round 9.8 
China is a porter wit increasing
giving de
government seems to have substantial
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quantit
prises. The state trading enterprises import roughly 450,000 tons of raw sugar from Cuba 
(see ab
03/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
ies, despite the existence of private enterprises. Nevertheless, internal prices are said 
to be largely determined by market forces. Still, the sector would face substantial changes if 
it were exposed to international competition (Mitchell, 2004).  
China has a TRQ for imports of 1.95 million tons with an in-quota tariff of 15% and 
an out of quota tariff of 50%. 30% of the total TRQ is reserved for non-state trading enter-
ove) under a longstanding agreement (Mitchell, 2004).  
2.1.2.12 India 
Table 2-16: Sugar Balance of India in Thousand Tons WSE 
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Supply 13,557.0 12,691.0 19,267.2 23,460.0 17,243.8
Demand 17,285.0 18,584.0 18,768.0 19,550.0 18,546.7
Imports 800.4 1,968.8 36.8 13.8 705.0
Exports 450.8 72.8 1,380.0 1,288.0 797.9
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
India as the second largest country of the world in terms of population is also one of 
the biggest consumers and producers of sugar. Its integration into international trade is, how-
ever, minor. Table 2-16 shows that production is with 17.2 million tons WSE on average 
roughly as big a  18.5 million tons in the years 2003/04 to 2006/07. India 
faced severe production table) when domestic con-
sumption had to be fed for a large percentage from stocks.  
e Indian sug r is tig trolled by the governm ugh licensing, 
 prices, stoc  requir nd transport subsidies. Furthermore, d
s and importers have to sell a certain share of th marketed qu ies to a pu
distribution system at lower prices which is made available to low income consumers 
(Mitch
orld markets. In the period of 
high price in 2006, for instance, the Government abolished the import duties and banned 
exports of sugar to keep the domestic price level low (USDA 2007, GAIN Report IN7035).  
s consumption with
 shortfalls in 2003/04 and 2004/05 (see 
Th ar secto htly con ent thro
minimum k holding ements a omestic 
processor eir antit blic 
ell, 2004).  
India whose sugar market is more or less balanced on average charges a 60% ad 
valorem tariff on imports plus a countervailing duty of Rs. 850 (Rs. =Indian Rupees) which 
is in lieu of fees on domestic sugar. The trade policy is, however, occasionally changed to 
deal with particularly high or low prices on the domestic or w
 31
2.1.2.13 Japan 
Table 2-17: Sugar Balance of Japan in Thousand Tons WSE 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Average 
Supply 892.8 901.5 820.6 794.9 852.4
Demand 2,213.4 2,170.0 2,139.9 2,160.2 2,170.9
Imports 1,313.9 1,224.9 1,277.2 1,380.0 1,299.0
Exports 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.8
Source: F.O. Licht (2007), own calculations. 
Table 2-17 shows that Japan acts on the world market for sugar as one of the major 
importers. The average Japanese Sugar consumption between 2003/04 and 2006/07 was 
roughly 2.2 million tons WSE, 1.3 million tons of which where imported. The remainder, 
about 900 thousand tons, is supplied from domestic production at relatively high costs. Japa-
nese Sugar is produced from beets grown on the northern island of Hokkaido and from cane 
grown on the southern islands. Japans Exports are negligible.  
 The tariff for white sugar is prohibitive. Thus imports in Japan mainly are raw sugar. 
(Fukuda et al., 2002) The major suppliers are Thailand and Australia (ISO, 2007). The tariff 
for raw sugar has been abolished in 2000. Imports of sugar are, however, tightly controlled 
by Government agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) as-
signs import volume targets to importing firms above which firms must pay an additional 
levy, letting the import volume targets effectively work like a per firm TRQ. Imports within 
the target volume must be sold to the Agriculture and Livestock Corporation (ALIC) and 
bought
cally produced sugar to be competitive with imported sugar at a price level of the 
import price plus the surcharge, around ¥ 60,000 (€ 550) per ton in 2001 (FUKUDA ET AL., 
2002) and ¥ 75,000 (€ 480) per ton in 2007 (ALIC, 2007). There is no information published, 
to which exporting countries the TRQs are assigned or whether they are country-specific at 
                                                
 back at pre-determined prices (Fukuda et al., 2002). This system works effectively as 
an in-quota tariff would do.28 The size of that surcharge varied in the last years between ¥ 
27,000 per ton of raw sugar in 2001 (Fukuda et al., 2002) and ¥ 35,000 in 2007 (ALIC, 
2007) corresponding to roughly € 250 and € 300 per ton in nominal terms. The surcharge, 
together with government funds, is spend to subsidize domestic processors and refiners who 
must purchase beet and cane from Japanese farmers at high guaranteed prices which are 
around ten times the world market price equivalents (MITCHELL, 2004). The subsidy allows 
domesti
 
28 Regarding the compliance of such policies with WTO rules, Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003) state: “It is 
amazing that Japanese policymakers have gotten away with such lack of policy discipline until now”. 
 32
all. San n t and accrue to South Afri-
can exp
 with a tariff of ¥ 21,500 plus a surcharge of 
¥ 53,88
In this section, the aspects which play a key role for modelling the world sugar mar-
kets are
f sugar. To account for this fact and to simulate changes 
in the policy instruments which are responsible for that, it is necessary that the model is able 
to depi
                                                
drey a d Vink (2007), however, state that such TRQs exis
orters. Also an official source from Fiji states that the country has a long-term deliv-
ery agreement with Japan (Tadulala, 1998). 
Surprisingly, the wholesale price for white sugar is considerably above that level. It is 
cited with ¥ 122,000 (€ 940) in 2003, ¥ 142,000 (€ 1010) in 2005 (USDA, 2006, GAIN Re-
port JA6008), ¥ 130,600 (€ 970) in 2004 and ¥ 154,500 (€ 990) in 2007 (ALIC, 2007). The 
protection which is provided for refined sugar is
0 (€ 140 + € 340, Elobeid and Beghin, 2005) per ton is not high enough to sustain 
that price level. Market Experts explain the difference with profit and wholesale margins 
between the raw sugar price and the final wholesale price for white sugar (Dyck and Fukuda, 
2007). 
2.2 Aspects of Modeling Sugar Markets 
 discussed. In doing so, it is inevitable to talk about some common aspects of model-
ling in general and modelling of agricultural markets in particular. Thus, some issues which 
would rather fit in section 3.1 will have to be anticipated here. Throughout this section and 
the whole study, the term modelling refers to economic equilibrium modelling unless explic-
itly stated otherwise. 
The internal and external policies with which a number of countries, above all the 
EU, govern their sugar markets lead to a situation where they are at the same time importers 
and exporters of sizeable quantities o
ct bilateral trade flows explicitly. Net trade models which depict countries as either 
(net-) importers or exporters of a certain commodity are unable to do so.29 
White sugar from beets and from cane is chemically identical indistinguishable. Raw 
sugar, unless consumed in the raw stage30, is an input in the production of white sugar 
(Mitchell, 2004). These facts justify the assumption, that sugar is a homogeneous good or a 
so-called fungible commodity. It is, therefore, preferable that a model to be applied for the 
analysis of changes in the sugar market be able to depict trade in homogeneous goods. How-
 
29 Banse et al. (2005) developed a possibility to depict bilateral trade flows in a net-trade model. This approach 
is, however, inflexible as either imports or exports are fixed exogenously.  
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ever, many models of international trade employ the Armington (1969) assumption of prod-
uct heterogeneity with regard to origin. This assumption leads to severe consequences when 
applied in the modelling of sugar markets as is discussed in Nolte (2006) and shall be de-
scribed in section 3.1.  
However, two issues must be discussed in the context of product homogeneity. The 
first is the substitutability of raw and white sugar. As mentioned above, raw sugar is for its 
major part an (homogeneous) input in the production of white sugar, a process which is re-
ferred to as refining. For a sugar importing country there are two possibilities to supply itself 
with white sugar. The first is to import white sugar directly from a beet sugar producing 
country or a country with a refining industry, the second is to import raw sugar and refine it 
in the country. Thus, for a country which in the past followed the first path, it will require the 
establishment of a refining industry if it were to switch to importing raw sugar in the future. 
On the other hand, for a country following the second path, its domestic refining industry 
would become idle if the country were to switch to importing white sugar. In that case it can 
be expe
The second issue necessary to be discussed in the context of the assumption of homo-
geneity
                                                
cted that the refining industry would consider its facilities as sunk cost and operate at 
variable cost until they are outdated. To substitute between raw and white sugar may hence 
require temporal adjustment. Furthermore, differences in efficiencies of refining industries 
have a significant influence on trade patterns, which is proved by the situation of countries 
like South Korea which import raw sugar and export refined sugar without producing sugar 
crops themselves. It is possible and likely that more countries specialize in refining imported 
raw sugar in the future, when the EU will reduce its exports of white sugar considerably. To 
capture the friction in the substitutability between raw and white sugar in an equilibrium 
model, the most exact way would be to model them as two products and to include a refining 
activity in the model31. If one wanted to account for the temporal adjustment it would also be 
necessary to model the refining industry as well as the sugar production dynamically rather 
than statically.  
 is the substitutability between cane and beet sugar. As mentioned in section 2.1.1, 
beet sugar is not consumed in the raw stage. For the consumption of raw sugar it is therefore 
necessary to obtain it from sugar cane. One the other hand, Mitchell (2004) states that raw 
 
 
30 According to Mitchell (2004), only about 10% of global sugar is consumed in the form of raw or partially 
refined sugar. 
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sugar which is consumed in the US and other industrialized countries is, for hygienic rea-
sons, usually white sugar to which cane molasses is added. The substitutability would be 
perfect in these cases, however, require the availability of cane molasses. The issue of substi-
tutability of beet and cane sugar is of minor relevance, though. The reason for that is that in 
the current situation of the world sugar market beet sugar producers are in most cases less 
efficient than competing cane producers and will therefore most likely not increase their pro-
duction
. 
rium Models (GE), the better option was certainly to model the transportation sector endoge-
nously.  
 and market share. A situation in which a raw sugar consumer would consider to 
switch from cane sugar to beet sugar is thus highly improbable to happen. The substitution 
will in future rather take place in the opposite direction, where substitutability is not an issue. 
As pointed out in section 2.1, sugar is a close substitute in consumption for some 
other sweeteners, the most important of which in terms of market share being HFCS. Includ-
ing that as a product in an equilibrium model would account for this relationship. The cross 
relationships of HFCS are, however, wide ranging. To model the supply of HFCS it would 
be necessary to model the supply and demand of maize which is the input for its production, 
and the demand for protein feeds, which Corn Gluten Feed (CGF), a by-product of HFCS 
production competes with. The technical as well as the empirical requirements are hence 
very high
To trade sugar as well as any other commodity is costly and those costs can make up 
for a vital share of final costs. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with the question of how to 
account for those costs in a model. The ability to do so in a net-trade modelling framework is 
limited, since the transportation costs had to be equal on all routes a country exports to or 
imports from. In a spatial modelling framework where different transport costs for different 
routes can be specified one has to decide between modelling the transportation sector 
endogenously and modelling transportation costs as parameters. Since sugar is a price taker 
in the market of bulk transportation due to its small share, the latter option would be the path 
to follow in a model of the sugar market solely. If one were to model sugar in a model which 
contains more or possibly all sectors of the economy, as it is the case with General Equilib-
                                                 
 
31 To establish such a model would besides the modeling effort require also a large amount of empirical re-
search. 
 35
As has been pointed out in section 2.1 it is necessary for an analysis of the sugar mar-
ket to account for interrelationships with the energy market. There are several possibilities 
available to do so. The best option would be to model processing demand for sugar crops 
explici
sources of agricultural enterprises, above all for land. For that reason many models which 
deal with the sugar m
odel the markets which are 
not of 
tly. This would, however, require the model to depict the production of sugar crops 
and the processing of cane or beet to sugar as two distinct activities rather than modelling the 
production of sugar directly as it is the case in most modelling approaches. Furthermore the 
modeller would have to make assumptions about the development of energy prices, espe-
cially those for crude oil, and about the substitutability or the cross-price effects of the oil 
price on processing demand for sugar crops.32 An easier way is to make estimates about the 
future level of sugar production costs and hence supply curves, which account implicitly for 
the fact that the demand for the raw product (beet or cane) faces demand competition by the 
ethanol sector.  
The Cultivation of sugar crops competes with the production of other crops for re-
arket include the production of other crops and animal products. There 
are many well established ways to include substitutes on the production side in an agricul-
tural equilibrium model. The limiting factors in doing so are thus usually not of technical 
nature. The work load that is coming along with the modelling of additional products and 
even more the empirical requirements are in most cases the reasons for which modellers de-
cide not to include all competing markets in their model or to m
central interest at a rougher scale. Possibilities for the latter are regional or sectoral 
aggregation, ignoring applied policy measures, or simply choosing the supply functions and 
their shifters such that they implicitly account for price expectations of competing products.  
As has been mentioned earlier in this section, dynamic models are better suited to 
capture adjustment periods than static models. The latter have merely the possibility of shap-
ing their (supply) functions such that they account for a degree of adjustment that is regarded 
reasonable in the envisaged time horizon of the model. In the case of the world sugar market 
it is mainly the temporal adjustment of the processing capacity, sugar factories and refiner-
ies, that makes the application of a dynamic model interesting.  
                                                 
32 It is important to point out that making assumptions about the latter is indeed the only possibility. This prob-
lem cannot be solved by empirical research at this time, since there exist virtually no observations of the substi-
tution of gasoline and ethanol purely for reasons of the price.  
In a broader context, the modeler would also have to take into account the prices and cross price elasticities of 
other substitutes for gasoline including other bio-fuels. 
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A final aspect of modelling the sugar market is the selection of an appropriate func-
tional form. The most common functional form of supply curves in agricultural equilibrium 
models are isoelastic ones in partial modelling frameworks or functions derived from a Con-
stant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) production function in GE models. Both do not 
allow for production to end while facing a positive producer price. This is, of course, unreal-
istic for all products, but usually not a severe problem as long as the run of the supply curve 
shows the desired behaviour in the price range the modeller expects to prevail. The potential 
price changes on the sugar market are, however, too large for such a proceeding. If those are 
to be modelled it is necessary to employ supply functions which allow for a positive inter-
cept on the price axis, i.e. simulate the production to end below a certain price. The simplest 
case of a function showing that property would be a linear function, which is very restrictive, 
though, and whose curvature contradicts observed behaviour of producers. Another, more 
elegant way to model sugar supply, which under certain conditions would also allow for a 
positive intercept on the price axis, are so-called second order flexible functional forms. For 
their complexity, however, they are rarely applied in agricultural equilibrium models (Grethe 
and Weber, 2005). A more simple way, which is chosen by Nolte and Grethe (2007) and 
which will also be applied in the model used for this study, is the generalization of an isoe-
lastic function by the introduction of an additive parameter which corresponds to the price at 
which the production of sugar will be abandoned.  
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3 Modeling Approaches and Results of Former Studies 
After having identified necessary and useful features of an equilibrium model of the 
world sugar market, existing models are reviewed in this chapter. In section 3.1 the most 
common modeling approaches are classified and described. In section 3.2 models which 
have been applied to analyze the world sugar market in the recent past shall be examined 
with regard to their structure and basic assumptions on the one hand and their results and 
how the former impact on the latter on the other hand.  
3.1 Modeling Approaches 
Equilibrium models are a widely applied tool in agricultural economic research.33 
They can be classified according to several characteristics. One of those is the breakdown in 
partial and general equilibrium models. The latter cover by nature the whole economy of the 
region which is the subject of research. The former group of models concentrates on selected 
sectors or sub-sectors of the economy. Examples for Partial Equilibrium (PE) models which 
have in the recent past been applied for the analysis of sugar policy scenarios are CAPRI 
(Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized Impact, (Britz, 2005)) and the FAPRI/CARD 
(Center for Agricultural and Rural Development) Model (FAPRI, 2007). The group of partial 
models can be further broken down into models using behavioural equations and those using 
programming approaches. Out of the partial equilibrium models mentioned above, the 
FAPRI/CARD Model uses behavioural equations, CAPRI employs a programming ap-
proach. General Equilibrium models applied recently for the analysis of the sugar market are 
the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) Model (Hertel, 1997) and LINKAGE (Van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2005). Building a GE model requires (for the same detail of sectors and poli-
cies to be modelled) more empirical knowledge than building a PE model. Especially when 
the agricultural sector is large in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) share and em-
ployment it is, however, useful to account for interdependencies of the agricultural sector 
with other sectors of the economy, factor markets and macroeconomic variables.  
A second characteristic according to which models can be grouped is the ability to 
explicitly account for temporal frictions in the adjustment of economic behaviour as response 
to policy changes or autonomous changes of economic variables. Models which ignore this 
friction or account for it merely implicitly (by choosing parameters and functional forms in 
                                                 
33 Other models applied in agricultural economic research are econometric models, which shall, however, not 
be discussed here. 
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line with the projection horizon of the model) are called static or more often comparative-
static. Models which are able to explicitly depict adjustment periods on the other hand are 
called dynamic or recursive dynamic. The term recursive refers to the fact, that results of 
former periods impact on results of the current period. Of the models mentioned above, the 
standard version of GTAP is comparative static, the remainder being dynamic. 
A third characteristic to classify models which is particularly relevant in the case of 
modelling the sugar market is the way in which foreign trade is modelled. A first level of 
classification is that between net-trade models and spatial models. In net-trade frameworks, a 
country is, unless it is self-sufficient, either an importer or an exporter of a certain product, 
depending on the world market price and the trade policies applied by that country. In a spa-
tial model allowing for the explicit depiction of bilateral trade flows countries can be export-
ers and importers of the same product at the same time. For a detailed analysis of the world 
sugar market this feature is crucial, since their trade policies lead a number of countries, in 
particular the European Union, to such a situation.  
The most widely applied approach to modelling bilateral trade is the so-called Arm-
ington Approach (Armington, 1969), which is applied in virtually all GE models and also in 
some partial equilibrium models, the majority of which, at least where the ones mentioned in 
this chapter are concerned, are net-trade models, though. The only partial model in the list 
which applies the Armington Approach and at the same time the only spatial partial model is 
CAPRI. The Armington Assumption underlying the approach is that products of the same 
kind coming from different regions or countries are imperfect substitutes (= heterogeneity 
with regard to origin) and the way this assumption is implemented in equilibrium models 
leads to some undesired, and in the case of sugar severe, consequences. The most well 
known of these is the so-called 4S property („small shares stay small“, also referred to as the 
„small shares problem“).34 An alternative possibility to depict bilateral trade flows in equi-
librium models is the SPE framework (Takayama and Judge, 1971). However, neither of the 
models surveyed in this section applies this approach. Nolte (2006) applied the approach in a 
small model of the world sugar market and showed that the problems of the Armington Ap-
proach can be overcome such.35 There are, of course, a number of other features by which 
                                                 
34 See Nolte (2006) who surveys and discusses the drawbacks of the Armington Assumption and its implica-
tions for depicting the sugar market extensively. 
35 The model used for that study is the base for the model applied in chapter 4. We shall see, however, that the 
approach comes along with some adverse features, which the Armington Approach does not have. 
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equilibrium models can be classified, which are, however, of minor importance in this con-
text. 
3.2 Review and Discussion of Selected Model-Based Analy-
ses 
In this section some models which have been applied in the recent past to analyze the 
world sugar market are reviewed. First they are introduced and classified according to the 
characteristics identified in section 3.1. Then their scenarios and results are reviewed and 
where possible traced back to their characteristics and assumptions.  
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Table 3-1: Classification of Models Analyzing the Sugar Market 
Study Model PE/GE Trade Formulation Dynamic/ 
Static 
Sectoral Cov-
erage 
Regional 
Coverage 
Coverage of 
the Sugar 
Sector b 
Van der 
Mensbrugghe et 
al. (2003) 
Linkage GE 1. Gross, Armington 
2. Net-Trade, Homoge-
neous Goods 
Dynamic 22 Sectors Global, 
16 Regions 
One Sector  
Elbehri et al. 
(2000) 
GTAP 
(Version 4) 
GE Gross, Armington Static 13 (tradable) sec-
tors,  
incl. 8 agricultural 
Global,  
20 Regions 
One Sector  
(Not explicitly 
specified) 
Van Berkum et al. 
(2005) 
GULA GE Gross, Armington Dynamic 7 Agricultural,  
1 non Agricultural
Global, 
12 Regions 
Crops, process-
ing 
Bureau et al. 
(2007) 
GOAL GE Net-trade Static 75 products 
(47 agricultural) 
Global, 
(Number of 
regions not 
specified) 
Crops, process-
ing sector, raw 
& white sugar 
Elobeid and 
Beghin (2005) 
CARD Inter-
national 
Sugar Model 
PE Net-trade Dynamic Cross price ef-
fects for wheat, 
rice and soybeans 
Global, 
29 Regions  
One Sector 
(raw equiva-
lents) 
Beghin et al. 
(2003) 
 
“ 
   Sweetener sectors 
only 
Global, 
(Number of 
regions not 
specified) a 
Crops, raw & 
white sugar, 
Maize & HFCS 
Adenäuer et 
al.(2004)  
CAPRI PE Gross, Armington Dynamic 30 crop,  
15 animal activi-
ties 
Global, 
13 Regions  
+ EU 15 
Sugar beet/ 
white sugar c 
Sources: as stated in the first column, own compilation. a According to FAO (2005), 29 regions (as is stated for the FAPRI model in Elobeid and Beghin (2005)). b In the Last 
column of table 3.1 the coverage of the sugar sector is specified. The standard procedure applied by most models is to combine the cropping and the processing sector in the 
model and not to distinguish between raw and white sugar. This is referred to in the table as “One sector”. c For the EU 15 sugar beet are modeled and the processing industry 
is accounted for by passing through a constant share of their revenues to the farmer. The market module depicts the supply demand and trade of processed (white) sugar.
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Table 3.1 lists the model studies which are surveyed in this section and states the ma-
jor characteristics of the models applied. The first is Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003). The 
study uses the Linkage GE model, which is maintained and applied by the World Bank, for 
its analysis of several sugar policy scenarios. Those are a baseline scenario with the con-
tinuation of policies that prevailed in the year 2000, i.e. after full implementation of the Uru-
guay Round (UR) commitments by industrialized countries and several unilateral liberaliza-
tion scenarios of the EU, the US and Japan, simulating increases in their TRQs and their 
above quota tariffs and combinations thereof. Also two multilateral liberalization scenarios 
are simulated, with one assuming full liberalization by all countries. The study involves a 
methodological advance, which is their way of implementing TRQs in GE models using 
MCP (Mixed Complementarity Problem) formulation.36 The main results and conclusions of 
the study can be summarized as follows. TRQ increases are found to have a much stronger 
effect on trade expansion of the EU, the US and Japan than moderate out of quota tariff de-
creases have. TRQ expansion leads to an increase in imports mainly from those countries 
which had a large TRQ in the baseline. Full multilateral liberalization on the other hand re-
sults mostly in increasing exports of current low cost producers. Since the standard version 
of the model applied by Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003) relies on the Armington assump-
tion, it is difficult to specify what happens to the world market price, because in such a 
model only bilateral import and export prices exist. In the full liberalization scenario those 
(precisely the country averages) increase for most countries in a range from 7% to up to 
37%, the average being about 15%. In the case of central and Eastern Europe the average 
price decreases.  
The last scenario (full liberalization) is also calculated with a homogeneous goods 
(net-trade) version of the model in which all trade distortions are accounted for by ad 
valorem equivalents. In such a model it is possible to state a world market price, which in-
creases by 21% in case of liberalization. Other results (production, consumption, trade wel-
fare) move, except for the case of SACU, in the same direction as they did in the Armington 
version. They are, however, more pronounced.  
The model in its Armington version is unable to let competitive producers capture 
market shares in countries in which they have not formerly been present as TRQ holders. 
This severe drawback is well known by modelers and also discussed by the authors. The net-
trade model they construct does away with the Armington assumption and allows for more 
                                                 
36 For a detailed explanation of MCP see section 4.1.1 
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realistic increases of exports of those countries. It is, however, unable to specify the direc-
tions in which this expansion takes place. 
Another CGE analysis had been carried out a few years earlier by Elbehri et al. 
(2000), calculating similar scenarios as Van der Mensbrugghe et al, i.e. 33% TRQ expan-
sions and out of quota tariff cuts of the same size for the EU and the USA, not for Japan, 
though. Elbehri et al. did also not simulate a full liberalization scenario and they applied a 
different approach than that of Van der Mensbrugghe et al. to implement TRQs in a CGE. 
They use the database version 4 of the GTAP model for their calculations. The authors do 
not publish results of prices and, as is very common among CGE studies, they publish there 
results in values rather than quantities, which makes it difficult to compare them to the other 
studies surveyed in this section. The most far-reaching liberalization scenario they simulate 
is a global 33% tariff cut and TRQ expansion.37 EU imports increase by US$ 444 million in 
that case, those of the USA by US$ 220 million. Sugar production decreases by 2.4% and 
2.9% respectively. Global trade increases by more than US$ 2 billion. Surprisingly, Brazilian 
exports increase only slightly, by US$ 33 million, or 1.1%, while especially African coun-
tries other than South Africa can expand their exports considerably by almost US$ 400 mil-
lion. Unfortunately, the detail in which the results and the base data of the model are pub-
lished in the study does not allow relating them to the features of the model.38 The strong 
increase of African exports is most probably a result of the market shares they already have 
in the EU and to a smaller degree also in the US. The small increase in Brazilian exports can 
in turn be explained by its small base share in these markets. However, the total increase in 
Brazilian exports is hardly more than an extrapolation of the base share of 10% which it has 
in US imports. Middle East and northern African countries which increase their imports by 
US$ 274 million would in that case have to be importing all this increase from other regions 
although the current Brazilian market share in this region is considerable and should be so in 
the base situation of the model. 
Another more recent CGE study has been carried out by Van Berkum et al. (2005) us-
ing the GULA model, a model focused on the sugar market which was developed out of the 
standard version of GTAP (Version 6). The study simulates the medium term effects of a full 
implementation of EBA market access of LDCs to the EU market, first under the assumption 
                                                 
37 The study does not state the year of projection. 
38 This is not only a problem of that particular study, but a common problem of model-based studies (and 
probably any complex quantitative analysis). This leads also to difficulties when comparing models and their 
results with each other. 
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of a continuation of 2005 EU sugar policies and afterwards assuming the implementation of 
the Fischler proposal for a sugar market reform from 2004.39 Their benchmark is the situa-
tion which prevailed in 2001. For both scenarios they simulate a much lower increase in 
LDC sugar exports to the EU than other studies. In the first scenario they increase by about 
400 thousand tons (raw equivalents). In the second scenario which assumes a reform of the 
EU sugar sector LDC sugar exports under EBA increase by merely about 200 - 250 thousand 
tons. If the figure for the first scenario is compared to estimates by other authors (~ 2-3 mil-
lion tons of total imports under EBA, see e.g. the literature cited in 2.1.2.1) they are much 
lower. The authors relate that to the fact, that other studies treated the raw sugar produced by 
LDCs and the white sugar demanded by EU consumers and industrial users of sugar are im-
perfect substitutes und try to justify the Armington assumption that way. The imperfect sub-
stitutability of raw and white sugar and its implication for modelers have been discussed in 
section 2.2. Given the fact, that Van Berkum et al. explicitly model medium run effects, 
which rules out the establishment of additional refining capacity either in the EU or in the 
LDCs, this argument can be supported.40 The validity of their argument would, however, 
find its limits if one were either to investigate the long term effects, which allow for the con-
struction of additional refineries, or increased market access for a white sugar producing 
country. It does furthermore not address the issue of substitutability between raw sugars of 
different origin. The authors conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to their Armington 
parameters which are from the standard level of 2.7 increased to 5 and 10 respectively. The 
latter case is considered to model sugar from different origins as perfect substitutes. With 
that elasticity, the authors calculate increased imports of 2.7 million tons in the case of no 
reform and 900 thousand tons in case of implementation of the Fischler reform proposal.  
The most recent CGE study surveyed here has been published by Bureau et al. 
(2007). They use the GOAL CGE, which has been used before by Gohin and Bureau (2006), 
to simulate various scenarios. Two features about this study make it different from other 
CGE based analyses of the sugar market. First, they run a mixed approach considering the 
depiction of trade for agricultural products. Some are modeled as bilaterally traded products 
which are heterogeneous with regard to origin. Some others, among them sugar, are modeled 
as homogeneous, net-traded commodities. For preferential imports of sugar in the EU this 
has the consequence that they cannot be modeled endogenously anymore, but they have to be 
                                                 
39 This proposal differed in some regards from the reform which was finally decided in 2006. The envisaged 
decrease of the reference price was somewhat lower, for instance. For further details refer to the study or to 
European Commission (2004a).  
40 However, according to Sommer (2003) some of the LDCs are producers of white sugar. 
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fixed. Secondly, they evaluate the supply response of European Farmers with econometri-
cally estimated supply functions, instead of determining supply changes endogenously. 
These functions account among others for cross subsidization of out-of-quota sugar. The 
results for supply are subsequently fed into the model to calculate overall effects of the sce-
narios.  
Two of their scenarios are discussed here, a reference scenario and a possible out-
come of WTO negotiations.41 The reference scenario simulates a price decrease in the EU to 
the final reference price level of € 404 and a reduction of sugar production in the EU 15 to 
roughly 12 million tons. The WTO scenario simulates for sugar which the authors assume to 
fall in the one of four bands which is subject to highest tariff reductions. The tariff for sugar 
is assumed to be cut by 60%. This provides sufficient border protection to sustain a price 
level of € 404. The effect that such a WTO agreement has on the EU sugar market is through 
the abolishment of export subsidies. The authors assume this to happen via quota cuts of a 
corresponding amount. This will lift world market prices to € 325 in comparison to € 308 
which prevailed in the reference scenario.  
The study stands out by the high degree of empirical and technical detail which is 
used to investigate the supply behavior of EU sugar producers. In addition, the release of the 
Armington assumption for the world sugar market allows for a realistic prediction of compe-
tition with imports from abroad. The drawbacks of the approach are first that as a net-trade 
model it is unable to simulate bilateral policies and trade flows and secondly that the supply 
behavior of third countries is only very roughly represented. 
The first partial equilibrium model surveyed in this section is one of the most well 
known models in of the international sugar market, the CARD International Sugar Model. It 
has probably the most detailed policy coverage and best empirical foundation of all global 
models of the world sugar market. It is used by FAPRI together with other components to 
establish the annual FAPRI baseline (FAPRI, 2006). The model is a dynamic, non spatial 
(net-trade), partial equilibrium model. Two studies which have used the model to analyze 
sugar policies are discussed here. The first is Elobeid and Beghin (2005). The authors simu-
                                                 
41 The original reference scenario of Bureau et al. is a continuation of current (post 2006 reform)  policies with-
out a reduction of exports to the WTO limit since, as the authors argue, sugar can be exported in the form of 
non-Annex I products, which is facilitated by the current situation on the world dairy market. For the review in 
this section, however, a scenario in which the reduction is implemented shall be considered the reference sce-
nario. 
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late three liberalization scenarios in which first the trade distortions42, then additionally the 
domestic distortions of production and finally also consumption subsidies are removed. The 
scenarios also account for effects of liberalization of policies for other crops than sugar beet 
and cane. The reform steps are introduced in the model in 2002/03 and the results are pre-
sented for the year 2011/12 and as averages for the transition period.43 The FAPRI baseline 
from 2004 is used as a base scenario. Under full liberalization, the world market price for 
sugar (Caribbean fob) increases by 47%. Global production and consumption decrease by 
2% on aggregate. The individual increases and decreases are, however, more pronounced. 
The EU-15, for instance, reduces its sugar production by around 60% and becomes a strong 
net importer. Japanese production decreases even stronger, by 64%. Competitive cane pro-
ducers as Brazil and Australia increase their production and exports by high percentages, on 
the other hand. Brazil’s production increases by about 18% and its exports increase by 43%. 
For Australia the figures are 10% and 12% respectively. Beet production generally decreases 
whereas cane production goes up, which meets common expectations. Sensitivity analyses 
carried out with respect to price elasticities of demand, supply and stock holding led in a 
small number of cases to extreme reactions. The directions of change predicted in the origi-
nal analysis were, however, maintained in virtually all cases.  
Unlike, the studies applying the Armington approach surveyed before, the analysis 
with the CARD model showed, under the assumption of full liberalization, expansions of 
trade and price effects in line with common expectations.44 Since the model cannot explicitly 
account for bilateral TRQs the effects on trade flows under these TRQs in the base had to be 
neglected in the study.  
The CARD model had been used before to simulate a sugar liberalization scenario by 
Beghin et al. (2003). They amend the standard version of the model by a multimarket sweet-
ener model of the USA, which simulates the production and consumption of cane, beet, raw 
sugar and white sugar as well as maize and HFCS. The authors simulate the elimination of 
the US sugar program, i.e. import restrictions and internal price support. They perform their 
calculations twice, applying datasets from two different years (1996 and 1998). Using 1998 
Base data, they estimate a 13.2% increase of the world market price for raw sugar. A further 
                                                 
42 The domestic market price is however maintained, by assuming unlimited availability of government funds to 
do so. This scenario does not have any meaningful interpretation as such, but is conducted to separate specific 
effects of trade policies and domestic policies. Thus, only the results of the full liberalization scenario shall be 
discussed here. 
43 Note that the model at hand is dynamic. Here, the 2011/12 figures shall be presented. 
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special feature of the model is its depiction of the processing sector in the USA. This enables 
the authors to investigate the effects of different assumption about pass-through of sugar 
prices to consumers on the distribution of welfare effects of the policy changes.45 Further-
more, the effects of substitutability between sugar and HFCS can be investigated by the 
model. They are, however, found to be negligible, since the possibilities of substitution are 
limited and industrial users of sugar and HFCS are highly specialized.  
The study of Adenäuer et al. (2004) is based on a Positive Mathematical Program-
ming (PMP) calibrated PE analysis. The authors use the CAPRI model to analyze the effects 
of the EBA initiative on the sugar sub-sector in the EU. CAPRI models the supply of the EU 
15 on a detailed level of regional disaggregation (so-called NUTS II). 
 Their reference scenario is a continuation of CAP policies including the implementa-
tion of the 2003 CAP reform, but without market access for LDCs. Subsequently, the authors 
simulate the implementation of the EBA initiative under two different sets of assumptions. 
The first EBA scenario simulates the market access for LDCs with a corresponding reduction 
in the EU sugar quota to comply with the WTO limit of export subsidies. The second EBA 
scenario envisages market access for LDCs plus a larger quota cut than the other EBA sce-
nario, sufficient to fully abolish export subsidies. The projection horizon for all scenarios is 
2009. The results of the reference scenario lie by and large within expectations. Real internal 
and external prices for sugar decrease by 4-5%, and beet area in the EU decreases slightly 
due to these lower prices and due to technical progress. EU production under A and B quotas 
as well as imports stay rather constant whereas C production increases by 14%. As a result, 
exports increase by an equivalent amount. In the first EBA scenario the imports from LDCs 
increase from 650 thousand tons (which is the size of their protocol and SPS quotas) to 3.1 
million tons. Quota production in the EU is reduced correspondingly. Due to increased pro-
duction of C sugar, however, total exports of the EU increase. The price level in the EU is 
not affected. In the second EBA scenario, imports of quota sugar and re-exports of imported 
sugar are abolished. Only C-sugar is exported, about 2 million tons. Imports from LDCs in-
crease by additional 200 thousand tons, due to a slightly higher EU price. 
                                                 
 
44 The authors state that the world market price increase the project is rather large, but they see it “within the 
ballpark of previous estimates obtained with partial equilibrium models”.  
45 The overall level of welfare changes is reported to be not affected significantly by those assumptions, as well 
as the increase in imports and world market prices. 
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The strength of the CAPRI analysis is the high degree of regional disaggregation and 
the thus achieved detailed coverage of production constraints and interdependencies. This is, 
however, not the case for the regions in the model representing the LDCs. The study covers 
bilateral international trade relationships, though on a rough level of disaggregation, which 
does not allow for investigations of the export behavior of single countries. Furthermore, the 
study relies on the Armington assumption to depict bilateral trade. The parameters of the 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand function, have, however, apparently been 
chosen rather high by the authors, without which an increase in imports from LDCs of the 
size that is observed in the study would not have been possible. 
The overview of recent economic studies of the sugar market using equilibrium mod-
els presented in this section is not comprehensive in its coverage.46 Also a systematic com-
parison of the results of the studies was unfortunately not possible, given the widely differing 
scenario assumptions and projection horizons. It was, however, possible to show how some 
features of models influence the results, one the one hand by observing the degree in which 
the models are able to reproduce common sense expectations and on the other hand by sensi-
tivity analyses and changes in model structure undertaken by the authors themselves. None 
of the surveyed studies employed the SPE approach, although it is able to combine the ad-
vantages of Armington-based and net-trade models, which are the explicit depiction of bilat-
eral trade flows and the retention of the assumption of homogeneous goods.  
Given the apparent advantages of the SPE approach and the fact that no study analyz-
ing the world sugar market with that approach has so far been published, in this study such a 
model is constructed and applied to policy scenarios. In the following chapter the model it-
self and the simulation conducted with it are described.  
                                                 
46 Overviews of some further model-based studies of the sugar market can be found in Brockmeier et al. (2005) 
who also carry out a model analysis themselves and FAO (2005). To include all the models listed there in the 
discussion of this chapter was not considered very useful. The purpose of the section was to give the reader an 
overview of existing approaches and techniques and their consequences on results which was achieved suffi-
ciently. Extending the discussion would not have lead to further insights on the one hand. On the other hand 
some of the studies are rather old and/or publish their assumptions and results only very roughly. 
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4 Analysis with own Model 
4.1 Model Classification and Description 
4.1.1 Development of Spatial Modeling 
Spatial Price Equilibrium models as opposed to non-spatial equilibrium models, 
which are generally referred to as net-trade models, explicitly take transport costs from any 
point of production to the points of consumption into account. Net trade models like the ex-
ample formulated below usually consist of a system of equations that must hold simultane-
ously. 
Net Trade Model  
 
)( iii PfD =  (1)
)( iii PgS =  (2)
)(PWhP ii =  (3)
∑∑ =
i
i
i
i DS  (4)
with   
i = 1,…,n  regions 
Di demand 
Si supply 
Pi price 
PW world market price 
The price transmission equation (3) usually reflects the trade policies of the country 
in question vis-à-vis the world market. Under very restrictive assumptions, the price trans-
mission equation could account for transportation costs, too. Precisely, this would mean that 
the destination of exports would be exogenous to the model or that the transportation costs 
are unique regardless of where exports are shipped to. The reader will note that the same 
argument applies also for trade policies in net trade model: The model assumes the same 
instruments to be applied to all imports (and exports in the case of export subsidies or taxes) 
regardless of their source – a fact which is crucial for the discussion of modelling approaches 
to be applied for the analysis of the sugar market in the previous chapter.  
If bilateral transportation costs (or trade policies) are to be introduced in the model it 
can no longer be formulated as a system of equations as the net trade model above, but must 
involve inequalities. This becomes apparent if one tries to add another dimension to the price 
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transmission equation (3) which would, in the case of constant per unit transport cost, look 
like:  
(5))( jijiji PhtcP =+  
with   
j = 1,…,n regions 
tcij per unit transportation costs from i to j 
It is obvious that equation (5) can only hold for those pairs of countries where trade 
actually occurs. In all other cases, the left hand side of the equation would be larger than the 
right hand side, which corresponds to a real world situation where it is not profitable to ex-
port from i to j.47 To determine in which direction trade takes place is, however, a task en-
dogenous to the model. A model taking into account bilateral transportation costs would thus 
look like:  
Spatial Price Equilibrium Model 
 
)( iii PfD =  (6)
)( iii PgS =  (7)
)( jijiji PhtcP ≥+  (8)
∑=
j
iji XS  (9)
∑=
j
jii XD  (10)
with   
Xij trade flow from i to j 
As indicated above, the price transmission equation (8) will hold with strict equality 
in those cases where trade occurs and with inequality in those cases where not.  
Lacking proper mathematical algorithms to solve the above problem Enke (1951) 
showed in his 1951 article how a special equilibrium model with linear export supply (import 
demand) curves which imply domestic demand and supply curves which are also linear can 
be solved with an electric circuit. In such a circuit, prices and transportation costs would be 
analogue to voltages, export supply coefficients would be analogue to electrical resistors and 
trade flows would be analogue to amperages. If connected, from such a circuit ammeters and 
                                                 
47 Note that the left hand side can never be larger than the right hand side in any equilibrium point, as, in a 
competitive market, arbitrage would occur in that case and level any differences.  
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voltmeters can be used to read the local prices and the directions and volumes of trade 
flows.48 
One year after the Enke article Samuelson (1952) showed that the spatial equilibrium 
model can equivalently be cast as a maximum problem. He demonstrates how to construct a 
“Net-Social-Payoff”-function including the integrals under the export supply and import de-
mand functions minus the transportation cost. With this function maximized, prices and 
quantities would satisfy the equilibrium conditions of the SPE described above. At the time 
the article was published, there was, however, no possibility to calculate the maximum of 
such a function other than experimentally varying the variables of the model.  
Under the very restrictive assumption of non-price responsive demand and supply 
equations such a model could be solved with linear programming techniques, which had 
been developed recently before. The simplex method developed by Dantzig (1951) allows 
finding the optimum of a linear function subject to linear constraints as is shown below.49  
LP  
∑
i
ii Xc *  Maximize 
j
i
iij bXa ≤∑ * (11) subject to 
0≥iX   
with  
Xi choice variables 
aij, bj, ci coefficients 
i = 1,…, n set of variables 
j = 1, …, m set of constraints 
The simplex method has one particular advantage over the equilibrium formulation in 
(6) – (10), which is its ability to determine endogenously which of the inequalities will hold 
with strict equality and which will not. Its disadvantage is that it can only handle linear ob-
jective functions. Price responsive supply and/or demand functions would, however, even in 
their most simple possible form, which is a linear function, lead to a quadratic (i.e. nonlinear) 
net-social-payoff-function in the Samuelson sense.  
An important step towards the solution of a nonlinear SPE model are the Kuhn-
Tucker-Conditions (KT-Conditions, (Kuhn and Tucker, 1951)). Together with the so-called 
                                                 
48 In the same paper Enke also demonstrated that for three or less countries the solution is mathematically fairly 
easy. 
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constraint qualification, they pose necessary conditions for an optimal point of a Nonlinear 
Programming (NLP) problem such as (12) below.50 
 
NLP 
)(Xf   Maximize 
0)( ≤Xg  subject to (12)
0≥iX   
with  
Xi choice variables 
f objective function 
gj constraints 
i = 1,…, n set of variables 
j = 1, …, m set of constraints 
To derive the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions, the Lagrangian of the NLP is formed in (13). 
)(*)()( XXλX, j
j
j gfL ∑+= λ  (13)
The corresponding KT-Conditions of the above problem are: 
KT-Conditions 
0≤∂
∂
iX
L 0* =∂
∂
i
i
X
X
L
0≥iX   
(14)
0* =∂
∂
j
j
L λλ0≥∂
∂
j
L
λ 0≥jλ   
with  
Xi choice variables 
λj slack variables 
gj constraints 
i = 1,…, n set of variables 
j = 1, …, m set of constraints 
The KT-Conditions show one remarkable difference compared to the first order con-
ditions that can be derived from a Lagrangian function describing an optimisation problem 
                                                 
 
49 Dantzig developed the method in 1947. Isolated from western mathematicians and economists, Leonid V. 
Kantorovich found a similar method already in 1939 (Kantorovich, 1939; Montias, 1961). 
50 Basically, this means an NLP not fulfilling the constraint qualification may have a maximum or a minimum 
not fulfilling the KT Conditions. For a detailed explanation of the Constraint Qualification refer to Chiang and 
Wainwright (Chiang and Wainwright, 2005), Ch. 13.2.  
Some publications refer to the Kuhn-Tucker-Conditions as the “Karush-Kuhn-Tucker-Conditions” (KKT-
Conditions) which reflects the fact that William Karush in his Master’s thesis (Karush, 1939) “obtained identi-
cal results twelve years earlier” than they had been published by Kuhn and Tucker in 1951(Tapia and Trosset, 
1994), which was, however, only revealed decades later. 
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with equality constraints, which are the so-called complementary slackness conditions in the 
third column. In an equality-constrained problem the first order derivatives of the Lagrangian 
must be zero. The KT-Conditions in contrast require that either the marginal equation be 
zero or the associated variable (or both). Exploiting complementary slackness makes it pos-
sible to determine endogenously which inequality is to hold with strict equality and which 
not, i.e. to find so-called corner or boundary solutions (Bishop et al., 2001). 
With constraint qualification provided for, the KT-Conditions provide necessary con-
ditions for a local optimum. For convex optimisation problems, the KT-Conditions even are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a global optimum. An optimisation problem is called 
convex, if the feasible points of a solution form a convex set and if the objective function is 
convex in case of a minimum problem and concave in case of a maximum problem (Chiang 
and Wainwright, 2005).51  
It is, however, in most cases not trivial to find the points satisfying these conditions. 
In the 1950s, when Samuelson published his article, no efficient algorithm existed to solve a 
nonlinear program of appropriate size. For instance, attempts to use the gradient method to 
find a solution of a spatial agricultural sector model of Hokkaido (with price responsive de-
mand functions) failed (Takayama, 1992). In that decade there were thus published many 
studies with non-price responsive demand relying on Linear Programming (LP). The most 
important agricultural economist in this context was Earl O. Heady. (Heady, 1952; Heady 
and Candler, 1958). 
Applying a modified Simplex-algorithm developed by Wolfe (1959) which was able 
to deal with Quadratic Programming (QP) problems52, Takayama finally succeeded to solve 
his Hokkaido model and together with G. J. Judge to apply QP to the Samuelson framework 
(Takayama and Judge, 1964a; Takayama and Judge, 1964b). Ever since, their approach has 
been applied numerous times to real world problems.  
To use the QP approach it is, however, necessary that the equations of the model sat-
isfy the so-called “integrability condition”. Otherwise, the net-social-payoff function 
Samuelson had in mind cannot be derived unambiguously. This is e.g. the case when the 
matrix of coefficients of the demand and supply functions in the multi product case is not 
                                                 
51 Arrow and Enthoven (1961) showed that, under certain conditions, the sufficiency of the KT-Conditions can 
also be extended to the case of quasiconvex programming. 
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53symmetric (Takayama and Judge, 1971).  In that case, no unique net-social-payoff function 
can be derived and hence maximized. Other cases in which the model is not integrable are 
the presence of discriminatory ad valorem tariffs or different interest rates over regions 
(Arndt et al., 2001; Langyintuo et al., 2005). In those cases, a SPE can be formulated as a 
Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP). The general form of a LCP is shown in (15) (Cottle 
et al., 1992): 
 
LCP 
0≥z    
0≥+Mzq   (15)
 0)( =+MzqzT  
with 
 nR∈qz,  
nnR ×∈M  
For a QP it can be shown, that (15) is equivalent to its corresponding KT-
Conditions.54 QPs form a subset of LCPs for which an efficient solving algorithm called the 
principal pivoting method had been developed by Cottle and Dantzig (1968) building on the 
work of Lemke and Howson (1964).  
With growing computational capacities and the development of appropriate solution 
algorithms it became possible to solve mixed complementarity problems (MCP). These are a 
generalization of LCPs in that they are able to handle non-linear functions instead of merely 
linear ones on the one hand and a mixture of equality and inequality constraints instead of 
merely inequality constraints on the other hand (Billups et al., 1997). The general form of a 
MCP is shown below in (16) (Rutherford, 1995): 
 
MCP 
)(zF , l, u Given: (16)
z, w, v  Find: 
                                                 
 
52 Quadratic programming problems are a subset of nonlinear programming problems. The former are restricted 
to a quadratic objective function and linear constrains, whereas the latter allow for nonlinearities of higher order 
than quadratic in objective functions and constraints (Bishop et al., 2001).  
53 Modellers using supply and demand functions which are merely locally symmetric (as e.g. isoelastic func-
tions) encounter a similar problem when calculating welfare effects of policy changes: The results are not un-
ambiguous as they depend on the path of integration (See e.g. Grethe (2004) Ch. 5.8).   
54 The vector z in this case would correspond to choice and slack variables in (14) and matrix M and vector q 
correspond to the coefficients of the (linear) first order derivatives of the Lagrangian. 
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0)( =+− vwzFsubject to:  
uzl ≤≤ , ,  0≥w 0≥v
0)( =− lzwT ,  0)( =− zuvT
 
with 
 NN RRF →:  
 NR∈ul,  
NR∈vwz ,,  
Besides linear and nonlinear programs and complementary problems, MCPs are a 
generalization of many problems in mathematics and optimisation, for instance systems of 
linear and nonlinear equations. For the practical purpose of SPE modelling, the MCP formu-
lation has the advantage that it allows demand and supply functions to be nonlinear. 
4.1.2 Model Description 
After having explained the mathematical fundamentals of the modeling approach to 
be applied in this study in section 4.1.1, in this section the model itself is described in its 
basic structure and with respect to base data parameter choice and calibration. 
4.1.2.1 Model Structure 
The model used for this study is a SPE model. It covers 104 regions of production 
and 90 regions of consumption. The regional coverage is shown in tables 4-1 and 4-2. The 
model is a one product model with sugar as the sole product. Sugar is modeled in white sugar 
equivalents (WSE, = refined equivalents). All demand functions and the supply functions for 
sugar cane producing countries are isoelastic. The supply functions for beet sugar production 
in the EU-27 member states, Turkey, Switzerland, Japan and the USA employ a different 
functional form.55 The supply functions do not disaggregate yield and area effects. Supply 
quantities in the model represent only processed sugar, raw and white. The production of 
sugar crops for other uses, chiefly ethanol, is ignored.56. All demand and supply curves are 
functions of the own price solely and of effective producer and consumer subsidies. Income 
elasticities are not modeled explicitly. They are, however, implicitly accounted for in the 
annual shifters of demand growth over time. Since assumptions about GDP growth do not 
differ among the various scenarios, the effect is the same. Stocks and stock changes are not 
                                                 
55 The USA is the only country in the model with two supply functions, one for beet sugar and one for cane 
sugar. 
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modeled explicitly. All prices are expressed in real 2005 Euro. Effects of different inflation 
rates and changes in exchange rates are, thus, not accounted for. 
Table 4-1: Regional Coverage of the Model – Production Regions 
Region Code Region Code Region Code Region Code 
Austria AT Benin BEN Barbados BAR Bangladesh BAN 
Belgium &  BE Burkina  BUR Belize BEL China CHN 
Luxemburg  Faso  Canada CAN India IND 
Czech Rep. CZ Congo, D.R. CDR Costa Rica COR Indonesia INS 
Denmark DK Congo, R. CON Cuba CUB Iran IRN 
Spain ES Côte  COT Dominican  DOM Japan JAP 
Finland FI d’Ivoire  Rep.  Malaysia MLY 
France FR Egypt EGY El Salvador ELS Nepal NEP 
Germany GE Ethiopia ETH Guatemala GUA Pakistan PAK 
Greece GR Gabon GAB Honduras HON Papua New PNG 
Hungary HU Guinea GUI Jamaica JAM Guinea  
Ireland IE Kenya KEN Mexico MEX Philippines PHI 
Italy IT Madagascar MAD Nicaragua NIC Thailand THA 
Lithuania LT Malawi MAL Panama PAN Rest of Near  RNE 
Latria LV Mauritius MAU St. Kitts &  STK East  
Netherlands NL Mali MLI Nevis  Rest of  RSA 
Poland PL  Morocco MOR USA-Beet UB South and  
Portugal PT  Mozambique MOZ USA-Cane UC Central Asia  
Slovenia SI  Nigeria NIG Trinidad &  TRI Rest of East REA 
Slovak Rep. SK  South Africa SAF Tobago  Asia  
Sweden SW  Senegal SEN Rest of  RCA Australia AUS 
United UK Sierra Leone SRL Caribbean  Fiji FIJ 
Kingdom  Sudan SUD Argentina ARG Rest of  RSO 
Bulgaria BUL Swaziland SWA Bolivia BOL South-East   
Romania ROM Tanzania TAN Brazil BRA Asia and   
Turkey TUR Uganda UGA Chile CHL Oceania  
Albania ALB Zambia ZAM Columbia COL   
Russia RUS Zimbabwe ZIM Ecuador ECU   
Serbia SER Rest of Sub  RAF Guyana GUY   
Switzerland SWI Sahara  Paraguay  PAR   
Rest of  REU Africa  Peru PER   
Europe    Suriname SUR   
    Uruguay URU   
    Venezuela VEN   
Source: Own compilation. 
                                                 
 
56 The effect of ethanol-based demand for sugar crops is implicitly accounted for by the calibration of technical 
progress shifters to meet FAPRI (2006) world market price projections.  
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 Table 4-2: Regional Coverage of the Model – Consumption Regions 
Region Code Region Code Region Code Region Code 
EU-25 EUR Algeria ALG Barbados BAR Bangladesh BAN 
Bulgaria BUL Benin BEN Belize BEL China CHN 
Romania ROM Burkina  BUR Canada CAN India IND 
Turkey TUR Faso  Costa Rica COR Indonesia INS 
Albania ALB Congo, D.R. CDR Cuba CUB Iran IRN 
Bosnia and BOS Congo, R. CON Dominican  DOM Japan JAP 
Herzegovina  Côte  COT Rep.  Malaysia MLY 
Norway NOR d’Ivoire  El Salvador ELS Nepal NEP 
Russia RUS Egypt EGY Guatemala GUA Pakistan PAK 
Serbia SER Ethiopia ETH Haiti HAI Papua New PNG 
Switzerland SWI Gabon GAB Honduras HON Guinea  
Rest of  REU Guinea GUI Jamaica JAM Philippines PHI 
Europe  Kenya KEN Mexico MEX South Korea SOK 
  Madagascar MAD Nicaragua NIC Thailand THA 
  Malawi MAL Panama PAN Rest of Near  RNE 
  Mauritius MAU St. Kitts &  STK East  
  Mali MLI Nevis  Rest of  RSA 
  Morocco MOR USA USA South and  
  Mozambique MOZ Trinidad &  TRI Central Asia  
  Nigeria NIG Tobago  Rest of East REA 
  South Africa SAF Rest of  RCA Asia  
  Senegal SEN Caribbean  Australia AUS 
  Sierra Leone SRL Argentina ARG Fiji FIJ 
  Sudan SUD Bolivia BOL Rest of  RSO 
  Swaziland SWA Brazil BRA South-East   
  Tanzania TAN Chile CHL Asia and   
  Togo TOG Columbia COL Oceania  
  Uganda UGA Ecuador ECU   
  Zambia ZAM Guyana GUY   
  Zimbabwe ZIM Paraguay  PAR   
  Rest of  SAC Peru PER   
  SACU  Suriname SUR   
  Rest of Sub  RAF Uruguay URU   
  Sahara  Venezuela VEN   
  Africa      
Source: Own compilation. 
In this paragraph the approach of choosing non-isoelastic supply functions for some 
beet producing countries is briefly explained. It has first been applied for a better representa-
tion of the sugar market in the ESIM model by Nolte and Grethe (2007).57 The most impor-
tant reason for the decision not to apply isoelastic supply functions in some countries is that 
those functions do not allow production to cease at a positive price. Additionally, unless one 
chooses extremely high elasticity values production cannot even be simulated to decrease 
                                                 
57 For a more detailed explanation the reader may refer to that publication. 
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considerably, say by 80%, in the case of price changes in the order of size which is envis-
aged by the 2006 CMO reform of sugar. To model the effects of large price changes on 
highly protected beet sugar markets another functional form is chosen. While an isoelastic 
function is shaped as follows, 
γβ ii PS *= (1) 
with   
i  region 
Si supply 
pi price 
β intercept parameter 
γ elasticity 
the functional form used here contains an (negative) additive intercept, α, on the 
quantity axis. This allows the function to fall to zero at a positive producer incentive price. 
To prohibit the produced quantity to become negative the supply function is put as an argu-
ment in a MAX function.58 
( ){ }γβα ii PMAXS *,0 += (2) 
The shape of two examples of both functional forms is shown in figure 4.1. The 
quantities as well as the producer incentive prices are equal for both forms in the point of 
calibration, but decreasing the price leads to different supply responses. At about 60% of the 
initial price level the production is simulated to cease with the non-isoelastic supply curve in 
this example. 
                                                 
58 Note that in equation (2) γ is not an elasticity anymore. 
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Figure 4-1: Functional form of beet supply in the model compared to an isoelastic func-
tion 
Source: Own Graph. 
The whole set of equations of the model looks as follows: 
( ) iiii bsidyconsumersuPDD εα += * (3) 
( ) kkkkk subsidyproducererPSS δγ += * (4a) 
( ){ }[ ]llllll subsidyproducererPSMAXS δγβ ++= *,0 (4b) 
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with   
i  consuming regions 
j producing regions 
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jk ⊂ producing regions with isoe-
lastic supply 
 
 
jl ⊂ producing regions with non-
isoelastic supply 
 
 
sch trade scheme 
Di demand 
PDi consumer price 
consumersubsidyi consumer subsidy 
Sj supply  
PSj  producer price 
producersubsidyj  producer subsidy  
α, β, γ, δ parameters of demand and 
supply functions a  
Xsch,j,i trade flows 
PSHj rental price for production 
quota  
PQsch,j,i rental price for TRQ 
quotaj production quota 
trqsch,j,i TRQ 
exw_fasj transportation cost from fac-
tory to port  
loadingj vessel loading cost 
freightj,i ocean freight 
tcsch transaction cost for preferen-
tial schemes  
ex_subj,i export subsidy 
tar_avsch,j,i ad valorem tariff 
tar_spsch,j,i specific tariff 
unloadingi vessel unloading cost 
inld_transporti transportation cost from port 
to place of consumption  
 
a εi and δk are demand and supply elasticities in equations 3 and 4a. 
The model is programmed in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) as a 
MCP and solved with the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995). As described in chapter 
4.1.1, the MCP formulation stems from the KT formulation of an underlying optimization 
problem. The KT conditions require complementary slackness of constraints and slack vari-
ables. In the same manner the MCP formulation of a SPE requires each inequality constraint 
to be mapped with one variable of the same dimension, which is to vanish in case the ine-
quality does not hold with strict equality. For the model applied in this study the mapping 
looks as follows: 
∑∑≤
sch j
ijschi XD ,,  ┴ PDi ≥ 0 
∑∑≥
sch i
jischj XS ,,  ┴ PSj ≥ 0 
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A lot of features which have been identified as useful for modeling the sugar market 
in section 2.2 are not implemented in the model used for this study. The most relevant of 
these are the distinction between raw and white sugar, the accommodation of substitutes in 
production and consumption of sugar crops and sugar, the separation of modeling of sugar 
crop production and the first stage of processing and the formulation as a dynamic model to 
account for time lags in production adjustment. The neglecting of these features is in general 
due to the limited scope of the study and the limited resources in terms of manpower and 
data availability. In the last chapter, however, the potential usefulness of a possible future 
implementation of each of those features will be discussed again in the light of the results 
obtained in this study. 
4.1.2.2 Base Data, Parameters and Calibration 
4.1.2.2.1 Quantities 
All quantities in the model refer to processed, raw or white, sugar. The production of 
sugar crops and the first stage of process 
Supply and demand data are for most countries extracted form F.O. Licht (2007). 
Data for countries which were not available from that source are extracted from ISO (2007). 
All Data are three years averages from 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06. Supply Data for the 
EU-27 countries are adopted from the ESIM Model which has the same Base period. Since 
the model does not account for stocks and stock changes, supply and demand needs to be 
balanced to obtain a reproducible set of base data. Supply of sugar is fluctuating much 
stronger than demand, as it is affected more by price and climate fluctuations. It makes, 
hence, more sense to alter the supply than the demand to balance the database. Thus, produc-
tion in most countries is scaled downwards (by slightly less than 4%) to meet the demand in 
the base period. 
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Some countries are treated differently during the compilation of the database, which 
is described in this paragraph. Firstly, India and Thailand, two major sugar producers, suf-
fered from years of severe drought in the base period. To put that three years average for 
their production data in the database would in future years have strongly underestimated 
their supply. Data for these two countries is therefore extracted from FAPRI (2006) for the 
first projection year (2006/07).59 The next country for which a different approach for the 
collection of base data is pursued is the United States. As described above in the policy sec-
tion, production is limited by marketing allotments and imports are limited by TRQs. Both 
are decided upon on an annual base depending on the situation on the US market, the world 
market and the export potential of the TRQ holders. Since for a non-expert in US sugar poli-
cies those decisions are hard to predict, FAPRI projections are used to determine marketing 
allotments (= supply), demand, and the overall level of TRQs (= imports).60 Finally, the data 
for Mexico is treated differently. It is, as for most other countries, taken from F.O. Licht 
(2007). It is, however, not scaled downwards in the process of balancing demand and supply 
for the base. The reason for that is that it would change the net-trade situation of Mexico. 
Mexico is currently an exporter of small quantities. Those are shipped under NAFTA market 
access to the US and are reason for hot debates there. To be able to depict those traded quan-
tities, Mexican supply is omitted from scaling.  
4.1.2.2.2 Prices 
Most prices which are in the database of the model are not extracted from statistical 
sources, but determined endogenously in a calibration run of the model. That procedure will 
be described in detail in section 4.1.2.2.5 further down. The prices which entered the model 
exogenously are the world market price for white sugar (London, fob, average of 2003/04 
and 2004/05) which is extracted from European Commission (2007), the producer incentive 
and consumer prices for the EU-27 countries which are extracted from the ESIM Model 
(BANSE ET AL., 2007), the producer incentive prices for Turkey (USDA, 2007, GAIN Report 
TU7030), prices in Japan (USDA, 2006, GAIN Report JA6008) and South Africa (USDA, 
2005, GAIN Report SF5009) and consumer and producer incentive prices in the US (Elobeid 
and Beghin, 2005; Haley and Suarez, 2004).61  
                                                 
59 Taking into account technical progress, this procedure would overestimate production. Therefore, those fig-
ures are reduced by the rate of one years technical progress. 
60 Sugar Exports under the re-export program are ignored in the model. 
61 For details please refer to the policy description section. 
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4.1.2.2.3 Transportation Costs 
One of the most important features of a SPE model is the consideration of bilateral 
transportation costs. These consist of a number of cost-sub-categories mentioned in section 
2.1.1. Regarding the poor availability of data on costs of inland transport, i.e. from the place 
of production to the place of consumption or the port and from the port to the place of con-
sumption a simple approach is chosen. Costs for inland transports are always set at € 10 per 
ton for industrialized and at € 15 per ton for developing countries. The same holds for load-
ing and unloading costs in ports. These are universally set at € 7 per ton for industrialized 
countries and at € 10.50 for developing countries. Costs for landlocked countries to transport 
sugar to ports of neighbouring countries are according to Garside et al. (2004), who review 
the case of Malawi, set at € 70 per ton. This approach, to say the least, has some scope for 
improvement by better empirical foundation. At least, the broad order of size of those cost 
components is verified empirically, though.  
The availability of data is much better for ocean freight rates, at least were routes are 
concerned that are frequently used in the international trade of raw sugar. For the routes for 
which ocean freight rates are published by the ISO the averages for 2004/05 are applied for 
the base period of the model. For projections, the function estimated in chapter 2.1.1.4 con-
taining the BDI as only explaining variable is used. For other routes the regionally estimated 
regression functions which are functions of the distance, the BDI, and the canal passages are 
applied. The arithmetic mean of costs calculated with the regional coefficients of the import-
ing and those calculated with coefficients of the exporting country is then calculated. To 
partly mitigate the problem of underestimation of the distance effect discussed in chapter 
2.1.1.4, costs for the same routes are again estimated with the coefficients estimated from the 
whole dataset and the arithmetic mean of both is taken as the final costs.62 To illustrate that 
somewhat complicated procedure, figure 4-2 describes as an example how the final ocean 
freight rate on the route between Costa Rica and Algeria is estimated. 
                                                 
62 For the sake of transparency, the such estimated ocean freight rates are rounded to integers, finally 
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Figure 4-2: Example of Estimation of Ocean Freight Rates for Sugar between Costa Rica 
and Algeria 
Source: Own compilation. 
4.1.2.2.4 Elasticities, Technical Progress and Demand Growth 
Parameters used in the model are elasticities and parameters for non-isoelastic func-
tions, rates of technical progress and demand growth (combined effect of population growth 
and income growth) and inflation rates of the Euro. Elasticities of demand and supply with 
respect to the own price are taken from Stout and Abler (2003) and from FAPRI (2007). Pa-
rameters for non-isoelastic supply functions for the EU-27 are taken from Nolte and Grethe 
(2007). Non-isoelastic supply functions for other countries are obtained by scaling the supply 
function of one EU-27 country which from its geographical and economical situation is re-
garded similar to the country in question to meet that country’s price-supply-combination. 
These are Austria for the Swiss and Japanese supply function and France for the US beet 
sugar supply function.63 Technical progress and demand growth shifters for demand and 
supply functions of EU-27 countries and the other non-isoelastic supply functions are ex-
tracted from Banse et al. (2007) and adjusted in some cases. Rates of technical progress and 
demand growth for all other functions are estimated by log-linear regression from data of the 
FARPI (2006) projection horizon. The rates of technical progress for most countries are ad-
justed later to meet the FAPRI baseline projections for the world market price movement. 
For the demand shifters of the US a different approach is applied. They are set such that in 
every year of the projection horizon the FAPRI projections are exactly met at a nominally 
                                                 
63 Note that this does not apply to the level of prices or shadow prices respectively, which are unique for each of 
these countries. 
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constant consumer price for sugar.64 The inflation rate of the Euro is extracted as a weighted 
average of European Monetary Union members from Banse et al. (2007). 
4.1.2.2.5 Calibration of the Model 
After entering all base data and policies (see chapter 4.1.2.3) in the model, a calibra-
tion run is started. Equations (3) and (4) (see chapter 4.1.2.1) are disabled and all quantities 
are fixed. The prices exogenously determined (see chapter 4.1.2.2.2) are fixed as well. Now 
the model is run. This altered model is basically of the same structure as the Hitchcock-
Koopmans transportation cost minimization problem and could be solved by a LP solver. 
The user in this case is, however, not interested in the primal solution which is the minimum 
transportation cost (in our case transportation costs and tariffs) combination of trade flows, 
but in the dual solution which is the prices of demand and supply. After the run, the prices 
for supply and demand obtained are fed into the model for calibration of supply and demand 
functions. 
Also the primal solution is of some interest. As pointed out frequently, the SPE ap-
proach in its development is an offspring of normative economic models such as LP or QP 
and it still has retained one important property of those approaches: It is not possible, to re-
produce any arbitrary set of base data, unless it is an optimal solution to the model under 
given constraints. This is so for two reasons which usually apply at the same time. The first 
is that the model simulates optimizing behavior under total information and full rationality of 
all agents which is, of course, merely an approximation of reality. The second is that the 
modeler, for many reasons, will never be able to fully capture all constraints faced by the 
agents whose behavior is simulated. Many other modeling approaches can escape this di-
lemma by calibrating behavioral functions. In an SPE framework this is not entirely possi-
ble.65 The base solution of the model generated by the calibration run will, therefore, most 
probably differ from what can be observed in reality. The extent to which it differs from 
what can be observed, can, however, be seen as an indicator of how well the model captured 
the relationships and constraints prevailing in the simulated setting. It can also give some 
hints on how to improve the model by altering the relationships and constraints or, if the 
modeler is unable to explain why one certain result is so far away from reality, can indicate 
points where empirics are especially in need to be improved. Two such examples are dis-
cussed here to demonstrate that. The first is the composition of imports to Norway. In reality 
                                                 
64 For a detailed explanation of that procedure refer to section 4.1.2.3.2 where the implementation of US poli-
cies in the model is described.  
65 We shall come back to this issue in the final chapter. 
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those consist more or less completely of shipments from the EU (ISO, 2007). The calibration 
run of the model, however, shows imports of Norway coming entirely from southern African 
LDCs which can export duty free to Norway (UNCTAD, 2007). The explanation which 
seems to be obvious is that Norway does not have a refining industry and, thus, has to import 
refined sugar. This is an example for a differing result which shows a misspecification of real 
world relationships and constraints in the model. The lesson is that the model could be im-
proved by modeling raw and white sugar production and a refining activity instead of con-
verting all sugar into WSE as is done here.66 The second example is the import composition 
of Canada. In reality Canada is supplied mainly by Central and South American countries 
(ISO, 2007), which is reproduced satisfactorily by the calibration run. What is not repro-
duced, though, is a considerable share of sugar imported from Australia. Unlike the Norwe-
gian case, this case does not give an apparent hint at what might be specified wrongly in the 
model. This could be an overestimation of transportation cost between Australia and Canada 
or a special quality of raw sugar (Largely all Canadian imports of sugar are raw) which 
fetches a better price by Canadian refiners. Only further empirical investigation can shed 
light on that question.  
Another issue about this calibration is the reproduction of the world market price. As 
indicated above, the growth parameters are adjusted so as to meet the world market price 
projections of the FAPRI baseline. The world market price used as a benchmark for the SPE 
model in this study is, however, the London fob price for white sugar extracted from Euro-
pean Commission (2007), whereas the price published by FAPRI (2007) is the Caribbean fob 
price for raw sugar. These prices are, of course, not identical, since the two markets are spa-
tially separated. However, even the Caribbean fob price in the base period of the SPE model 
used here is not identical to the one published by FAPRI for the same period, either.67 This is 
in part attributable to the application of WSE in this study. However, even if the price by 
FAPRI is multiplied by an extraction factor and refining costs are added, there is still some 
deviation from the price used in the model. The way of calculating one price with informa-
tion about the other is rather complicated, but, of course, possible, since an economic equi-
librium exists between both prices. A numerical example which fits the prices of the base 
period of the model (2004-2005) is presented below. The market in which Caribbean and 
European exporters compete with each other is the Middle East, where both regions export 
                                                 
66 The same is true, of course, for a conversion of all sugar into raw equivalents which is done in other models.  
67 The prices for the base period of the model (2004-2005) published by FAPRI (2006) are not projections but 
historical prices extracted from data of the Intercontinental Exchange (2007), formerly New York Board of 
Trade (NYBOT).  
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sizeable quantities to. Since sugar is consumed mostly as white sugar, it is the white sugar 
price in the Middle East which is the connector of both regions’ world market prices. A Car-
ibbean raw fob price of US$ 202 per ton corresponds after adding transportation and refining 
costs to a white sugar price in the Middle East of US$ 336 or € 274 per ton:  
Price/Costs Value  Source 
Caribbean raw fob price: US$ 202 FAPRI (2006) 
+ Transportation costs to Mid-
dle East 
US$ 44 ISO (various years) 
= Middle East cif price US$ 246  
+ Discharging costs ~US$ 12 Extracted from the model and 
multiplied by exchange rate 
= Middle East cif landed price US$ 258  
+ Refining losses and cost  X /0.92
+ US$ 55
Sommer (2003) 
= Middle East cif landed price 
for white sugar 
US$ 336  
Exchange Rate: 1.22642 US$/€ € 274 OANDA.com (2007) 
A similar calculation for the London white sugar fob price results in a white sugar 
price in the Middle East of € 270 per ton, which is quite close to the price calculated with the 
Caribbean price as a base: 
Price/Costs Value  Source 
London white fob price: € 191 European Commission (2007) 
+ Transportation costs to Mid-
dle East (white) 
€ 55 ISO (various years), 
OANDA.com (2007) 
= Middle East cif price € 246  
+ Discharging costs (white) ~€ 24 House of Lords (2005)68
= Middle East cif landed price € 270  
Since the model depicts all sugar in WSE, this result can not be reproduced. The cali-
bration results in a Caribbean fob (stowed) price for white sugar in the base period of € 185, 
which does, as indicated above, not correspond to the price one would end up if converting 
the raw sugar price used by FAPRI into WSE by dividing with the extraction factor and add-
ing refining costs: 
                                                 
68 The ratio between unloading costs for raw and white sugar which are stated there is applied to calculate white 
sugar unloading costs in the Middle East from raw sugar unloading costs 
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Price/Costs Value  Source 
Caribbean raw fob price: US$ 202 FAPRI (2006) 
+ Refining losses and cost  X /0.92
+ US$ 55
SOMMER (2003) 
= Caribbean white fob price US$ 275  
Exchange Rate: 1.22642 US$/€ € 224 OANDA.com (2007) 
The adjustments of the function shifters to meet the FAPRI projections is therefore 
carried out such, that the Caribbean white fob price in the model shows the same absolute 
movements as the FAPRI projections for the Caribbean raw fob price. The Caribbean white 
fob price in the model is also used as a benchmark for the world market price in the scenario 
simulations carried out in section 4.2. Why is this done? The model is programmed with a 
European view: European sugar policies are modeled more detailed than those of most other 
countries, European supply curves are implemented with a special functional form to better 
account for the producers’ behavior and most important, the European (London) fob price is 
used as a benchmark for the calibration of the model. So why not keep on using the London 
fob price as a benchmark for the world market price? The answer is simple: After the imple-
mentation of most scenarios, there will be no London fob price anymore, as the EU will not 
export sugar anymore.  
4.1.2.2.6 Validation of the Model 
As has been pointed out in section 4.1.2.2.5, the primal solution of the calibration run 
of the model, the resulting matrix of bilateral trade flows, will likely deviate from what is 
observed in reality. To assess, how well the model is able to capture the determinants of real 
world trade flows, it is, therefore, interesting to compare this primal solution to these trade 
flows.  
For this purpose, bilateral trade flows of white sugar, raw cane sugar and raw beet 
sugar69 are extracted from the SITA-Database (Statistics for International Trade Analysis) 
(ITC, 2007b) for the years 2003 - 2005. The database captures every trade flow from country 
A to country B twice: once as imports of B from A, and once as exports of A to B. Theoreti-
cally, these should resemble each other. To assess the quality of the data on the one hand, 
and to obtain a benchmark of how consistent data for bilateral trade flows from different 
                                                 
69 The reader will notice a contradiction to chapter 2 where sources are cited that say sugar beet are not proc-
essed to raw sugar, but always directly to white sugar. The average amount of raw beet sugar trade in the SITA 
statistics is, however, less than one percent of trade of all sugar of the three mentioned categories. 
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70sources  are on the other hand, as a first step, a consistency check of the data is performed. 
As a second step, the data for bilateral trade flows from the base period of the model is com-
pared by the same method to the average of the aggregate (in WSE) sugar trade flows from 
the SITA-Database.  
 It is not a trivial question which method to use for such a consistency check of trade 
data. The most apparent one would be to use a weighted average of deviations between trade 
flows extracted from different sources as is shown in equation (10):  
∑
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This would, however, lead to the undesired consequence, that if imports of j from i 
are stated 50% lower than exports from i to j, this would lead to a different result (50% de-
viation) than if exports from i to j were stated 50% lower than imports of j from i (100% de-
viation). To solve this problem, one could use logarithms instead since 
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will evaluate deviations such as the example discussed above equally. It behaves as if it were 
always using the bigger of both numbers as a denominator in (1), i.e. it results in both of the 
                                                 
70 Strictly speaking the data are all extracted, of course, from only one source (ITC, 2007b).  
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above cases in a deviation of 50%. Applying this method to import and export statistics of 
sugar in the SITA database from 2003 – 2005 this results in an average weighed deviation of 
53.8%.  
Another method for comparing two such datasets is the calculation of Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation coefficient r.71 The result for r of the analyzed SITA sugar trade 
data is 0.585 and significant at the 0.01 level. 
If the trade data from different categories of sugar are aggregated to WSE and/or av-
erages over the three years are calculated, both indicators improve their values (i.e. average 
weighed deviation decreases, r increases), as is shown in table 4.3. 
Table 4-3: Consistency of Import and Export Data from the SITA Database 
 Average weighted devia-
tion 
r 
Total Sample (3 product cate-
gories, 3 years; 3933 trade 
flows) 
53.8% 0.585 ***
3 years average, 3 product 
categories (1896 trade flows) 
48.5% 0.702***
WSE, 3 years (2611 trade 
flows) 
48.3% 0.660***
WSE, 3 years average (1190 
trade flows) 
43.9% 0.756***
Source: Own calculations; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
In the next step, the same methods are applied to the average (of imports and exports) 
aggregated trade data from the SITA database and the trade flows that emerge after calibra-
tion of the model. However, the data for production and consumption and the data for bilat-
eral trade are taken from different sources, which are usually not fully consistent. I.e. the 
balance of imports and exports from the trade data, does not match the balance of produc-
tion, consumption and stock changes, which is, of course, essential for base data of an equi-
librium model. Additionally, as has been mentioned above, the model does not account for 
stock changes. Thus, in the model, the balance of production and consumption in the region 
always equals its net-exports. In reality, however, exports and imports and thus their balance 
will due to stock changes most probably be different from the balance of internal production 
                                                 
71 Mathematically this is identical to the square root of the r2 of a linear regression of imports as a function of 
exports or vice versa. 
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and consumption. To correct for this inconsistency, imports are scaled on a country base to 
meet the total level of imports of that country and the validation is carried out a second time. 
Likewise, exports are scaled on a country base and the validation is performed again. Table 
4.4 thus has three rows, the first of which shows the results of the validation performed with 
the original data, and the second and third rows show the results for the scaled data.  
Table 4-4: Consistency of SITA Data and the Base Trade Flows of the Model 
 Average weighted deviation r 
Original data 71.1% 0.681***
Scaled to meet total imports 63.9% 0.716***
Scaled to meet total exports 58.8% 0.669***
Source: Own calculations; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
The average deviation between the SITA data and the model base trade flows is 
71.1%. This improves significantly if the data is scaled to meet country imports or exports. 
The correlation coefficient, which is 0.681 for the original data set does only improve for one 
of the scaled data sets. For the export-scaled data set, it deteriorates slightly. An attempt to 
rerun the validations with a data set that does include imports under TRQs, which are basi-
cally predetermined, does not change the results significantly. This is actually not surprising, 
since TRQs account for only 4 million tons out of roughly 34 million tons of international 
sugar trade. 
Table 4-5: Consistency of regionally aggregated trade flows 
 Average weighted deviation r 
SITA imports/ SITA exports 32.5% 0.853***
Model data/ SITA 45.6% 0.812***
Model data/ SITA  
Scaled to meet total imports 
42.4% 0.839***
Model data/ SITA  
Scaled to meet total exports 
40.2% 0.795***
Source: Own calculations; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
For a final step of validation, both, the SITA trade data and the trade data from the 
model base, are aggregated to trade flows between large geographic regions, mostly conti-
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nents.72 The results of the comparisons improve significantly, especially so for the compari-
son between the model data and the SITA data. The average deviation between SITA import 
and export data improves from 43.9% to 32.5% at the same level of data aggregation (all 
sugar in WSE, three years average). The correlation coefficient increases from 0.756 to 
0.853. The average deviation between the model data and SITA data decreases from 71.1% 
to 45.6%. The correlation coefficient increases from 0.681 to 0.812. As in table 4.4, these 
indicators improve in almost all cases if SITA trade data is scaled to meet total imports or 
total exports of a country, respectively. 
Interestingly, the correlation coefficients resulting from the comparison of SITA im-
port and export data and of average SITA data and the model base data do not differ strongly 
from each other, but the average weighted deviations which result from the comparisons 
show a substantial variation, the ones resulting from the comparison of SITA import and 
export data being significantly lower. Both indicators do not even establish the same ordinal 
appraisal of the quality of data comparison in all cases. For instance, the comparison of 
model data with SITA data that is scaled to meet total exports on a country level in the last 
row of table 4.5 is evaluated a better replication of the average SITA data by the indicator of 
weighted average deviation than the comparisons on the two rows above, the model data 
compared with unscaled SITA data and the model data compared with SITA data scaled to 
meet total imports on a country level. By the indicator of the correlation coefficient, how-
ever, it is evaluated a worse replication than the latter two. The reason for the different be-
havior of both indicators is not straightforward. Both indicators measure, of course, some-
thing different. In the ideal case, where the data sets which are validated with each other are 
identical, there would be 0% deviation and a correlation of 1, respectively. In the other ex-
treme case, where all trade flows which are stated to occur by one source are stated with zero 
by the other source and vice versa, the average deviation would be 100% and the correlation 
0. All real world cases which lie between these extremes cannot be evaluated so easily. For 
instance, validating a data set, where all trade flows were exactly half the amount of the trade 
flows stated by the other data set, would result in a correlation of 1 but in a deviation of 50%. 
Although this example is very unlikely to occur, it shows how the indicator of the correlation 
coefficient can be misinterpreted. The average weighted deviation on the other hand does not 
have this drawback. The further away any two comparable data points will lie, the more this 
indicator will increase, regardless of the behavior of other data point pairs in the samples. 
                                                 
72 The regions are: EU-27, Rest of Europe, Near East, Sub-Sahara Africa, North America, Central America and 
Caribbean, South America and Rest of Asia and Oceania. 
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This, together with the fact that is showed a stronger variability than the correlation coeffi-
cient, possibly renders it the more important indicator of both. 
A first conclusion that can be drawn from this validation exercise is that the quality of 
currently available bilateral sugar trade data is rather poor.73 Thus, even if the model were 
able to replicate observed trade data, as a prerequisite to that, the problem had to be ad-
dressed, how to make this trade data consistent with each other and with production and con-
sumption data in the model. The results of this validation suggest that the adjustment which 
will have to be made in that case will be large.74 
In comparison to the validation of SITA import and export data, the validation of the 
model base data with the average SITA data scores clearly worse where the average 
weighted deviation is concerned and slightly worse where the correlation coefficient is con-
cerned. With scaling and especially with regional aggregation of trade flows this difference 
decreases. It remains, however, still in an order of magnitude which cannot be regarded as 
satisfying, and the need for a further development of the modeling approach and, as has been 
pointed out, a more detailed depiction of real world constraints becomes apparent.  
4.1.2.3 Integration of National Policies in the Model 
In this chapter the implementation of trade policies of the major players on the world 
sugar market are described. The chapter is structured according to countries and follows the 
order of chapter 2.1.2 where the policies of the countries are described first. The categories 
of policies covered are ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, producer subsidies, consumer sub-
sidies and export subsidies. In some cases the prices which are extracted from literature con-
tradict the production costs data which is published in the same sources or with trade poli-
cies. In those cases decisions have to be made whether to change the prices or whether to 
introduce “implicit” policy instruments to make the contradicting data compatible. The gen-
eral rule which was followed is that if the information about the price is regarded very trust-
worthy, as it is the case with the data from ESIM, from the USDA and from the Japanese 
Government for instance, this is adopted in the model and policy instruments are introduced. 
Examples are implicit specific tariffs which are introduced for Romania and Bulgaria to 
bridge the Gap between the cif-based price from the model and the domestic price extracted 
                                                 
73 Other sources of bilateral data for sugar trade (ISO, 2007; United Nations, 2007) are essentially identical to 
the SITA data. 
74 It would, by the way, be interesting, to perform a validation again between the trade flows in the model base 
and this consistent set of trade data, 
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from the ESIM database. For Turkey as another example, the ESIM model takes as domestic 
price the cif-based import price plus MFN tariff. Information from the USDA (USDA, 2007; 
GAIN Report TU7030) states producer prices and production costs which are much higher 
than that. Since both sources seem rather reliable, a producer subsidy is introduced to make 
up for the difference between the producer price by USDA and the domestic price by ESIM.  
The Policies of the countries not covered in this section are extracted from ITC 
(2007a), UNCTAD (2007), WTO (2007), Sandrey and Vink (2007), USDA (GAIN Reports, 
various issues), Elobeid and Beghin (2005), Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority 
(2007), Briner (2006) and Banse et al. (2007). 
4.1.2.3.1 European Union 
For the EU-25 the policy instruments are adopted from the ESIM model (Banse et al., 
2007). These are a specific import tariff of € 536 per ton (MFN + additional duty under spe-
cial safeguard), production quotas covering the actual amount of production (incl. C-sugar) 
of the base period, and variable export subsidies which sustain a price level of € 712 per ton. 
From 2006/07 onwards decoupled direct payments for sugar are accounted for. These are 
considered to be 10% coupled.75  
The CMO reform is implemented by gradual reduction of the intervention/ reference 
price as the price which is sustained by granting export subsidies if the EU market is in a 
surplus situation. This is necessarily somewhat imprecise and arbitrary. In the base of the 
model it is not the intervention price which is supported by policy, but a price which is con-
siderably higher. It cannot be said a priori what the price will be that will be sustained by the 
Commission as long as the price does not lead to exports exceeding the WTO limit in quan-
tity or volume terms.76 Furthermore, the model is unable to depict, that accumulated stocks 
of the EU will have to be exported which means that either exports will have to be higher or 
production will have to be lower than actually shown by the model in the implementation 
period of the CMO reform in order to achieve a balanced EU market after that period. Any 
results for that phase have, therefore, to be interpreted with care.  
                                                 
75 This treatment of C-Sugar production in the model is stronlgy simplifying. It is an approach which is, how-
ever, also applied by other models, for instance ESIM (Banse et al., 2007). It tends to overestimate the quantity 
the producers are willing to produce under a certain price since the production of C-sugar is also dependent on a 
variety of other reasons (see Adenäuer and Heckelei, 2005). The accommodation of these issues in equilibrium 
models is an own field of research, though. 
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4.1.2.3.2 USA 
The US sugar policy is difficult to predict for an outsider. Therefore, FAPRI (2006) 
projections for quantities at nominally constant prices are depicted in the model. This is done 
by calibrating the demand growth rates and by setting the marketing allotments for cane and 
beet producers such that the predictions are exactly met if the nominal price stays constant.77 
The internal price is set at € 518 per ton (22.9 US cents per pound, Elobeid and Beghin, 
2005) The MFN tariff is set at € 292 per ton (16.21 US cent per pound, IBID.), which is pro-
hibitive. Marketing allotments are treated as quotas and adjusted to meet the FAPRI projec-
tions of production. NAFTA and CAFTA market access are phased in as scheduled and raw 
and refined sugar TRQs are adjusted in order to meet the balance gap between US demand 
and supply.  
4.1.2.3.3 Brazil 
The only policy modeled for Brazil is the MFN import tariff and the preferential im-
port tariffs for some Latin American countries. This is, however, without any consequences 
as Brazil does under no scenario import sugar. The ethanol policy of Brazil is not accounted 
for explicitly. However, supply functions are scaled downwards in 2006/07 compared to the 
base period to meet the FAPRI projections. The increase in opportunity costs for sugar pro-
duction which is simulated by that can in part be seen to implicitly account for the ethanol 
use of sugar cane (and other crops).  
4.1.2.3.4 Australia 
No policies are modeled for Australia.  
4.1.2.3.5 Thailand 
The policies modeled for Thailand are a 65% ad valorem tariff (Imports do not take 
place either in reality or in the model and are unlikely to occur under any scenario. The TRQ 
and above quota tariff are, therefore, not modeled). The development of the domestic sales 
quota (Quota A) is hard to predict. It is accounted for by a tax equivalent which lifts internal 
prices in the model to the levels observed in reality. This policy leads over the whole projec-
tion period to a price level somewhat above world market prices which is probably realistic.  
                                                 
 
76 These limits are 1.273 million tons WSE and € 499 million respectively. Utilizing fully both limits means a 
price of € 392 above the world market price can be sustained (volume divided by quantity). With world market 
price levels of around € 200 this corresponds to an internal price level of slightly less than € 600. It is, however 
clear, that the price in the EU will be lower after full implementation. The volume limit of subsidized exports 
will, thus become irrelevant in the medium run. 
77 FAPRI does not assume a change of the loan rate which effectively establishes the internal price. Technical 
progress shifters of supply have been set such that the marketing allotments are always filled. 
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4.1.2.3.6 Guatemala 
For imports in Guatemala a 20% MFN tariff and duty-free market access for member 
countries of the Central American Common Market (CACM) is modeled. Imports do, how-
ever, not occur.  
4.1.2.3.7 Cuba 
Market policies for a planned economy such as Cuba are difficult to model, if at all. 
The approach which is followed here is that the production costs for Cuba are extracted from 
Illovo (2006) and a producer subsidy is modeled to bridge the gap between the (export 
based) market price and the costs from literature. An abolishment of that subsidy in the 
model would correspond to a privatization of sugar producing enterprises.  
4.1.2.3.8 Colombia 
The only policy modeled for Columbia is the import tariff of 20% and the tariff ex-
emptions for Andean Community member states. The adjustments of duty for prices outside 
the price band are ignored, since this policy addresses price fluctuations which do not occur 
in a non-stochastic model such as the one used here. Furthermore, Columbia as a single 
country and the Andean Community as a whole are net exporters.  
4.1.2.3.9 South Africa 
The South African trade policies, a specific tariff of ZAR 233 (South African Rand, ~ 
€ 30) per ton, cannot explain the high internal price level (€ 441 per ton) which is reported in 
numerous trustworthy sources. To account for the high price level, an ad valorem tariff 
equivalent to all suppliers (including South Africans themselves, which produce and export 
under world market conditions) is introduced in the model in addition to the € 30 per ton 
which was applied officially in the base period of the model. This tariff equivalent is sup-
posed to depict the distortions introduced by the internal marketing system, which is appar-
ently also effective in keeping foreign suppliers out of the market. TRQ limited market ac-
cess for SADC countries is implemented as described in section 2.1.2.9., treating 2004/05 as 
marketing year one. However, all countries but Zimbabwe and Zambia have either no sur-
plus to export or have more advantageous export opportunities, such as EU sugar protocol 
quotas. The overall quota for SADC countries to the SACU market is therefore divided be-
tween those two countries. 
4.1.2.3.10 Russian Federation 
For the base period a weighted average of the import tariff applied by Russia con-
verted in current € is calculated with € 146. Since September 2005 the tariff is not adjusted 
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anymore and stays at US$ 140 per ton (~ € 114). For the projections of the model it is as-
sumed that the nominal level of the tariff in € stays constant. 
4.1.2.3.11 China 
As for Cuba, it is difficult to model market policy effects on a sector which is to a 
large extent government controlled. For China only the trade policies mentioned in chapter 
2.1.2.11 are modeled and the internal price is determined in the calibration run.  
4.1.2.3.12 India 
India’s sugar policy parameters are adapted frequently and rather unpredictably. Only 
the trade policies are modeled which are a 60% ad valorem tariff plus a countervailing duty 
of 850 Rs. (~ € 15) which also has to be paid for domestically marketed sugar. An export 
(‘transport’) subsidy for exported sugar of 140 Rs. Per ton (~ € 3) is also accounted for in the 
model.  
4.1.2.3.13 Japan 
The Japanese import policy is difficult to depict since it is unclear how the licensing 
system works. Another difficulty is the high gap between domestic and international prices 
mentioned in 2.1.2.13. As a starting point for depicting Japanese policies the domestic prices 
quoted by ALIC (2007) for the base period was chosen and converted in real 2005 €. This 
price was around ¥ 133 per kg (~ € 984 per ton). The difference between the cif based import 
price and the average resale price was modeled as a specific tariff equivalent. The gap be-
tween that cif duty-paid price and the domestic wholesale price, accounting for the abnor-
mally high profit and wholesale margins set as a specific tariff. A preferential TRQ is mod-
eled only for Fiji to account for the observed imports which cannot be explained otherwise. 
TRQs for the remaining imports are not modeled as the model framework does not allow for 
non-country specific TRQs. They are regarded as entering under a first come-first serve 
TRQ. For projections, it must be assumed, that the TRQs are adjusted over time to fill the 
gap between domestic supply and demand at desired prices, which is implicitly accounted for 
by the tariff equivalent. 
4.2 Model Analysis 
4.2.1 Description of Scenarios 
In this study, four scenarios are calculated with the model described above. The sce-
narios and the assumptions made are described in this section, whereas in the next section, 
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4.2, the results will be presented and discussed. The projection horizon for all scenarios shall 
be 2015/16. 
4.2.1.1 Scenario 1: Baseline Scenario 
The first scenario to be calculated with the SPE model established for this study is a 
baseline scenario which will serve as a benchmark for the other three simulations. Trade and 
domestic sugar policies are assumed to be continued, unless changes are already decided. 
These changes are on the part of the EU the implementation of the 2006 reform of the EU’s 
CMO for sugar, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania including the implementation of im-
port quotas for their suppliers previous to accession, phasing in of unlimited market access 
for LDCs and according reduction and finally abolition of the SPS quotas, and reallocation 
of Protocol quotas of countries which are unable to fill them to other participant countries of 
the sugar protocol. On the part of the USA, NAFTA market access for Mexico and CAFTA-
DR market access for sugar from Central American countries and the Dominican Republic is 
phased in as planned. Remaining sugar TRQs are adjusted in order to meet projected imports 
by FAPRI.  
The BDI, and thus ocean freight rates for sugar, moved upwards in 2007 (see figure 
2-3). This move is captured for the baseline scenario and all others, by estimating ocean 
freight rates for 2006/07 as described in 4.1.2.2.3 with the average BDI of 2006/07 as ex-
plaining variable. In the remaining years of the projection horizon the BDI is assumed to 
return linearly to its average level of the base period. 
Against the results of this baseline scenario the results of the following three counter-
factual scenarios are compared to investigate the projected effect of the policy changes on 
production, consumption, prices and trade flows. 
4.2.1.2 Scenario 2: WTO Agreement  
The first counterfactual Scenario, referred to as DOHA, simulates the implementation 
of a possible WTO agreement. As a reference for how such an agreement could be shaped, 
the proposal of Chairman Falconer in July 2007 is taken. The suggestions of the Falconer 
proposal in terms of market access are summarized in table 4-3 below.  
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Table 4-6: Proposed Formula for Agricultural Tariff Cuts 
Industrialized countries Developing Countries 
Current tariff in ad 
valorem equivalents 
Tariff reduction Current tariff in ad 
valorem equivalents 
Tariff reduction 
0-20% 48-50% 0-30% 32-33%
20-50% 55-60% 30-80% 37-40%
50-75% 62-65% 80-130% 41-43%
> 75% 66-73% > 130% 44-49%
Source: Agra-Europe Weekly (2007). 
Tariff reductions would happen in four categories, so-called bands. The band with the 
highest tariffs in ad valorem equivalents would face the strongest tariff cuts. The widths of 
the bands are different between developed and developing countries as are the proposed tar-
iff cuts. The tariffs of industrialized countries falling into the highest band are those above an 
ad valorem equivalent of 75%. These would have to be cut by between 66% and 73%. The 
highest band for developing countries on the other hand would comprise only those tariffs 
exceeding an ad valorem equivalent of 130% and proposed reductions thereof would be be-
tween 44% and 49%. The sugar tariffs of as well the EU as the USA would fall in the highest 
band and are thus subject of reductions of 70%.78 The same is true for the sugar tariffs of 
most industrialized countries. Among the group of developing countries, only Turkey and 
Panama fall in the highest band.79 A number of other developing countries, among them the 
big importers China and India have bound their tariffs in the UR and with accession respec-
tively so high above the applied levels that no reductions need to be done.80  
Falconer suggests different options for the future of the special safeguard clause. For 
this study it is assumed that it is not used for sugar markets of developed countries anymore, 
in particular the EU. It is furthermore assumed, that no country declares sugar as a sensitive 
product, which would allow for smaller tariff cuts on the one hand, but require the applying 
country to open additional TRQs, or as a special product. Reduction commitments for do-
mestic support suggested by the Falconer Proposal are not accounted for in the scenario. The 
                                                 
78 For the implementation of tariff reductions in the model the arithmetic mean of the proposed range is used. 
79 Some other countries fell into the highest band with their bindings, their applied tariffs were, however, not 
affected by reduction commitments for the bound tariffs. A special case is Morocco, which applies currently an 
ad valorem tariff plus a variable duty. Since the model is not stochastic, the variable duty is modeled as a spe-
cific tariff. Both measures together bring Morocco in the highest band for developing countries and its tariff are 
in the DOHA scenario modeled as the bound ad valorem equivalent minus the reduction commitments. 
80 In cases where countries operated preferential tariffs for other countries or groups of countries, these are in 
the model reduced by the same percentages as the MFN tariffs. 
 79
only country for which domestic support is modelled explicitly is the EU, where the scale is 
minor. What remains is, of course, the elimination of all export subsidies.  
Some countries, especially Japan and South Africa, operate sugar policies which are 
highly intransparent and actually not in line with Uruguay Round commitments (see, e.g. 
Van der Mensbrugghe et al., 2003). The effects these policies have are accounted for in the 
Base period by ad valorem tariff equivalents. For the simulation of the DOHA scenario, the 
policies applied by these two countries are reduced to their UR bound tariffs minus the nec-
essary reduction. While in the case of South Africa this affects merely the internal price level 
and the quota rents of some preferential importers from SADC, in the case of Japan the pro-
ducer incentive price is also affected massively.81  
4.2.1.3 Scenario 3: EU Liberalization 
The second counterfactual scenario simulates a complete liberalization of all EU 
sugar policies. All policy measures such as production quotas, tariffs, TRQs and export sub-
sidies are abolished. The only policy measure which is retained is the decoupled direct pay-
ments.82  
4.2.1.4 Scenario 4: Full Liberalization 
The last scenario is a full liberalization of all sugar market and domestic polices by 
all countries in the model.  
4.2.1.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
The results of all equilibrium model studies depend crucially on assumptions and pa-
rameters for which the empirical foundation is often rather weak. The study at hand is no 
exemption from this rule. To investigate the extend to which results of policy changes might 
be over- or underestimated as a consequence of misspecification of parameters and assump-
tions, a series of sensitivity analysis is performed.  
The parameters which are regarded crucial are the supply elasticities of sugar and the 
BDI. Thus, the baseline scenario and the full liberalization scenario are calculated again un-
der the assumption of  
                                                 
81 The complete list of policy changes introduced can be seen in the Annex tables. 
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1. A permanent increase of the BDI to its 2007 peak83 
2. A doubling of all supply elasticities 
3. A halving of all supply elasticities84 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion85 
4.2.2.1 Scenario 1: Baseline Scenario 
Table 4-4 shows the results of the baseline scenario for supply, demand and domestic 
wholesale prices for the most important players of the world sugar market and for the world 
as a whole. Global production grows by 14% to 151 million tons. The only country in the 
table that reduces its production is the EU, which is due to the implementation of 2006 re-
form. The world market price increases by roughly 12% and the domestic prices of countries 
linked to the world market increase by about the same percentage. The prices of the EU and 
the USA decline. For the EU this is largely due to policy changes, for the USA it is the result 
of merely deflation of nominal (institutional) prices.  
Table 4-7: Results of the Baseline Scenario in Million Metric Tons (MT) WSE and €/ton a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
World 151.0 (14%) 151.0 (14%) 207 (12%)
EU-27 16.3 (-15%) 19.5 (8%) 426 (-40%)
USA 7.1 (3%) 8.8 (3%) 414 (-20%)
BRA 31.4 (23%) 11.3 (16%) 196 (13%)
AUS 5.9 (20%) 1.2 (12%) 212 (12%)
THA 6.5 (33%) 2.5 (20%) 246 (11%)
GUA 1.9 (10%) 0.7 (26%) 196 (13%)
CUB 1.7 (12%) 0.7 (7%) 198 (13%)
COL 2.9 (27%) 1.8 (23%) 194 (12%)
SAF 2.5 (21%) 1.6 (10%) 517 (13%)
RUS 2.4 (12%) 6.1 (3%) 359 (0%)
CHN 10.0 (12%) 11.9 (13%) 320 (9%)
IND 22.0 (25%) 22.0 (21%) 427 (8%)
JAP 1.0 (20%) 2.2 (1%) 1,023 (4%)
Other 39.4 (16%) 60.8 (17%) - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the base period. 
Table 4-5 shows the results for the EU domestic Market. The 2006 reform is imple-
mented in the model by fixing quotas to the most recent published level (European Union, 
                                                 
 
82 The assumed allocation effectiveness of these direct payments, which is adopted from the ESIM model 
(Banse et al., 2007), is 20%, which makes their effect on production rather unimportant. 
83 In early October 2007 the BDI had passed beyond 10,000 whereas its average in former years (and the base 
period of the model) was around 4,000.  
84 Note that only the isoelastic supply functions are affected by 2 & 3.  
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2006, Council Regulation (EC) 2011/2006, Official Journal (OJ) L 384, pp. 1-7), the (exo-
genously determined) abolishment of sugar production in Ireland, Latvia and Slovenia (Bu-
reau et al., 2007), the reduction of the reference price as the price which is supported by pay-
ing export subsidies for the gap to the world market price and finally the effective 
prohibition of C-sugar production. The model simulates that these measures are more than 
sufficient to achieve a balanced EU market in the medium run. At a domestic wholesale price 
of € 426 per ton of white sugar the EU production will together with preferential imports 
achieve market equilibrium without any subsidized exports.86 Of those member states which 
continue to produce, all southern member states do not manage to fill their quota while all 
northern member states as well as those which acceded in 2004 fill their quota. The only ex-
emption is Finland. 
Table 4-8: EU Results of the Baseline Scenario in Million MT WSE a 
Production in Member States in 2015/16    
AT 0.3873 (-9%) LT 0.1030 (-16%)
BE 0.8198 (-10%) LV 0 (-100%)
CZ 0.4549 (-13%) NL 0.8646 (-0%)
DK 0.4207 (-14%) PL 1.6719 (-12%)
ES 0.7533 (-25%) PT 0.0402 (-44%)
FI 0.1082 (-26%) SI 0 (-100%)
FR 4.0325 (-4%) SK 0.1849 (-18%)
GE 3.6555 (-7%) SW 0.3257 (-18%)
GR 0.1464 (-53%) UK 1.1386 (-12%)
HU 0.4017 (-14%) BUL 0.0029 (21%)
IE 0 (-100%) ROM 0.0435 (7%)
IT 0.7251 (-52%) Total 16.2807 (-15%)
Imports   3.2427 (25%)
Subsidized Exports  0.0 (-100%)
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the base period. 
Table 4-6 shows the results of the baseline scenario for preferential sugar imports by 
the EU-27 under different preferential import schemes. Total imports increase to roughly 3.2 
million tons. In the base period they had been 2.6 million tons, 700 thousand tons of which 
were, however, imports of Romania and Bulgaria previous to their accession that did not take 
place under any of the preferential schemes mentioned in the table.  
                                                 
 
85 All results of supply, demand, consumer and producer prices as well as bilateral trade flows are displayed in 
the annex tables. 
86 This price is much above the envisaged reference price level, which is deflated to roughly € 323 in 2015/16. 
Subsidized exports, though legally still possible up to the quantitative limit that was bound in the UR, do not 
take place, since export subsidies will only bridge the gap between the fob price and the reference price.  
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Due to the reduced internal market price in the EU, for some countries it is not advan-
tageous anymore to export to the EU. ACP quotas of countries that are unable to fill them are 
redistributed to other ACP countries who participate in the sugar protocol, thus overall im-
ports from these countries stay more or less constant. Imports under the Balkans Initiative 
decrease by 97% since for the largest supplier, Serbia, it is not profitable anymore to supply 
sugar to the EU and the country instead replaces former imports to its domestic market.87 
Imports from LDCs under EBA increase after phasing in of unrestricted market access by 
large percentages to an overall amount of 1.3 million tons. This is well below the figures 
given by the studies cited in section 2.1.2.1, but still higher than the figures projected by Van 
Berkum et al. (2005). Some LDCs which did deliver under preferential quotas during the 
phasing in of EBA do not export anymore after the reduction of EU prices. Ethiopia with 
roughly 350 thousand tons is the largest exporter under EBA. Imports under CXL stay con-
stant except for Brazil who is attributed new quotas due to the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007 which it fills completely. Imports under SPS completely disappear as the 
imports under EBA increase. 
 
87 The scheme also provides a TRQ to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, however, due to the sources used for the 
Database, does not produce sugar. 
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Table 4-9: Results of the Baseline Scenario for Preferential Imports in the EU-27 in thousand MT WSE a 
2015/16 ACP BALKANS EBA CXL SPS Total
 Base Baseline Base Baseline Base Baseline Base Baseline Base Baseline Base Baseline 
ALB    1.3 1.3 -   1.3 1.3 - 
AUS    9.1 9.1 - 9.1 9.1 - 
BAN    0.3 133.0 (44,233%)   0.3 133 (44,233%) 
BAR 32.3 29.7 (-8%)     32.3 29.7 (-8%) 
BEL 39.9 44.3 (11%)     2.0 0 (-100%) 41.9 44.3 (6%) 
BEN    3.8 3.4 (-11%)   3.8 3.4 (-11%) 
BRA    22.0 508.1 (2,210%) 22 508.1 (2,210%) 
BUR        8.0  0 (-100%)        8 0 (-100%) 
CDR    11.7 66.4 (468%)   11.7 66.4 (468%) 
CON 10.2 11.3 (11%)     1.7 0 (-100%) 11.9 11.3 (-5%) 
COT 10.2 11.3 (11%)     10.0 0 (-100%) 20.2 11.3 (-44%) 
CUB    54.3 54.3 - 54.3 54.3 - 
ETH    13.8 354.0 (2, 465%)   13.8 354 (2,465%) 
FIJ 167.7 186.0 (11%)     7.0 0 (-100%) 174.7 186 (6%) 
GAB    22.4 (New flow)   0 22.4 (New flow) 
GUA    3.7 3.7 - 3.7 3.7 (0%) 
GUI    27.5 (New flow)   0 27.5 (New flow) 
GUY 155.0 171.9 (11%)     8.0 0 (-100%) 163 171.9 (5%) 
IND 9.9 (-100%)     9.9 0 (-100%) 
JAM 118.6 135.3 (14%)     6.4 0 (-100%) 125 135.3 (8%) 
KEN 10  0 (-100%)     10.5 0 (-100%) 20.5 0 (-100%) 
MAD 10.8 12.0 (11%)   13.8 (New flow)   1.7 0 (-100%) 12.5 25.8 (106%) 
MAL 20.8 23.1 (11%)   2.6 84.1 (3,135%)   10.0 0 (-100%) 33.4 107.2 (221%) 
MAU 491.0 468.0 (-5%)     13.8 0 (-100%) 504.8 468 (-7%) 
MOZ 12.0 13.3 (11%)   27.6 261.0 (846%)   39.6 274.3 (593%) 
NEP    9.0 0 (-100%)   9 0 (-100%) 
REU  5.3 5.3 -   5.3 5.3 - 
SEN  96.7 (New flow)   0 96.7 (New flow) 
SER  225.0 0 (-100%)   225 0 (-100%) 
SRL   6.1 (New flow)   0 6.1 (New flow) 
STK 15.6 17.2 (10%)    15.6 17.2 (10%) 
SUD   16.4 181.3 (1,005%)   16.4 181.3 (1005%) 
SWA 118.2 131.1 (11%)    30.0 0 (-100%) 148.2 131.1 (-12%) 
TAN 10.1  0 (-100%)  1.7 0 (-100%)   1.7 0 (-100%) 13.5 0 (-100%) 
TRI 29.7 27.3 (-8%)    29.7 27.3 (-8%) 
ZAM 14.4 16.0 (11%)  9.2 87.4 (850%)   11.9 0 (-100%) 35.5 103.4 (191%) 
ZIM 23.4 26.0 (11%)    25.0 0 (-100%) 48.4 26 (-46%) 
Total 1,299.8 1,323.8 (2%) 231.6 6.6 (-97%) 104.1 1,337.1 (1,184%) 89.1 575.2 (546%)  0 (-100%) 1864.3 3242.7 (74%) 
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the base period. 
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Table 4-7 shows the imports of the USA under different preferential TRQ schemes. 
CAFTA and NAFTA are assumed to be fully implemented. Whereas all CAFTA-DR quotas 
are filled some countries do not fill their quotas under the traditional TRQ system of the 
USA. This is first of all Mexico, not exporting at all anymore, which is especially interesting 
having in mind the fears that fully phased in Market Access under NAFTA would put US 
markets under pressure. Given its high tariffs and the deflation of the US price level, it be-
comes more advantageous for Mexican producers to market their sugar domestically. Other 
countries, most of which are African LDCs, ship their available production to the EU rather 
than to the US after being granted extended access to that market. TRQs of other quota hold-
ers are increased by about 20% to keep the overall level of imports constant.  
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Table 4-10: Results of the Baseline Scenario for US Preferential Imports in thousand MT 
WSE a 
2015/16  TRQs (incl. NAFTA) CAFTA-DR 
ARG 84.1 (20%)     
AUS 162.5 (21%)     
BEL 21.6 (21%)     
BOL 15.8 (22%)     
BRA 283.6 (21%)     
CAN 38.3 (20%)     
COL 47.0 (21%)     
CON 6.7       
COR 29.4 (21%) 11.9 (New flow) 
COT 6.7       
DOM 275.3 (21%) 10.9 (New flow) 
ECU 21.6 (21%)     
ELS 50.9 (21%) 29.7 (New flow) 
FIJ 14.1 (21%)     
GUA 93.7 (20%) 40.2 (New flow) 
GUY 23.4 (21%)     
HON 19.5 (20%) 8.7 (New flow) 
IND   (-100%)     
JAM 0.6 (-93%)     
MAD   (-100%)     
MAL   (-100%)     
MEX   (-100%)     
MOZ   (-100%)     
NIC 41.1 (21%) 23.9 (New flow) 
PAN 22.2 (-46%)     
PAR   (-100%)     
PER 80.2 (21%)     
PHI 105.4 (-48%)     
PNG 6.7       
REA 15.1 (20%)     
SAF 44.8 (20%)     
STK   (-100%)     
SWA 31.3 (21%)     
THA 27.3 (20%)     
URU 6.7       
ZIM 23.4 (21%)     
Total 1,599.0 (-3%) 125.3 (New scheme)  
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the base period. 
4.2.2.2 Scenario 2: WTO Agreement 
In table 4-8 the results of the WTO scenario for production, consumption and prices 
of the most important countries are presented. The extended market access to formerly 
highly protected industrialized countries’ markets lifts the world market price by 14% to 
€ 236 in comparison to the baseline scenario. The overall volume of the world market is al-
most unaffected, but among countries a sizeable reallocation of production takes place. The 
high protected countries EU, USA and Japan see significant reductions of production.  
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The EU loses the least in terms of market share, which is due to the 2006 reform 
which anticipated many of the liberalizations which would otherwise have become due after 
the ratification of the WTO agreement. However, after the reduction of its tariffs including 
the abolishment of the SSG, MFN imports take place on a large scale (see below) for proba-
bly the first time in the history of the CMO for sugar.  
In the USA, production falls by 27%. This is mainly made up for by a reduction of 
beet production, which falls by 42% while cane production merely goes down by 8%. The 
USA also becomes a major sugar importer on a MFN base. 
The most tremendous changes are faced by Japan, though, where sugar production 
comes completely to an end. This outcome is, however, contingent upon whether the WTO 
agreement will, as is assumed here, bring about a tariffication of Japan’s import policies and 
a reduction of the tariff from the levels that were bound in the UR. 
The highest increase in production in absolute as well as in relative terms takes place 
in Brazil, which increases its production by 9%. Other competitive exporters increase their 
production by between 3% and 7%. One other notable result is the strong price decrease in 
South Africa, which refers to the consumer price only, however (see sections 2.1.2.9 and 
4.1.2.3.9). That decreases by 56% after implementing the agreed tariff cuts.88 The producer 
price (not displayed in the table) was the fob-based world market price already before. It 
increases thus by just 11% relative to the baseline scenario. For India, production, consump-
tion and prices are not at all effected. This is, since its tariffs are bound at a much higher 
level than the applied ones and the applied tariffs are prohibitive with a significant amount of 
“water” in them.  
                                                 
88 This result is again contingent on assumptions. These are, that the internal marketing system is liberalized as 
well, which lets consumers in South Africa (and SACU) buy sugar at world market prices since the region is a 
surplus producer. This assumption is, of course, arbitrary, as any other assumption on how the internal market-
ing system is adapted to cope with the downward pressure on prices resulting from the tariff cut would  be. 
Assuming in contrast that the marketing system would not be liberalized, but the prices would be supported at 
the highest level possible, i.e. the cif-duty paid import price, would lift prices in South Africa to € 356 and 
lower consumption by 4% in all of SACU. The effect on the world market price is with less than € 0.30 minor, 
though. 
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Table 4-11: Results of the WTO Scenario in Million MT WSE and €/ton a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
World 151.1 (0%) 151.1 (0%) 236 (14%)
EU-27 15.4 (-6%) 19.7 (1%) 380 (-11%)
USA 5.2 (-27%) 8.9 (1%) 350 (-15%)
BRA 34.2 (9%) 11.2 (-1%) 218 (12%)
AUS 6.3 (7%) 1.2 (-1%) 235 (11%)
THA 6.8 (3%) 2.4 (-1%) 272 (11%)
GUA 2.0 (4%) 0.7 (-1%) 221 (13%)
CUB 1.8 (2%) 0.7 (-1%) 223 (13%)
COL 3.1 (5%) 1.7 (-1%) 219 (13%)
SAF 2.6 (4%) 1.7 (9%) 227 (-56%)
RUS 2.5 (4%) 6.1 (0%) 381 (6%)
CHN 10.2 (3%) 11.8 (-1%) 347 (9%)
IND 22.0 (0%) 22.0 (0%) 427 (0%)
JAP 0.0 (-100%) 2.4 (7%) 426 (-58%)
Other 39.1 (-1%) 60.6 (0%) - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
The reduction of the bound tariff for white sugar by almost 70% in the EU reduces 
the effective protection significantly to a non prohibitive level and thus ends the isolation of 
EU producers from world market price movements. The wholesale price declines to € 380 
per ton which is still above the reference price level of € 323. While some of the countries 
which filled their quotas in the baseline scenario continue to do so at the reduced price others 
do not, as can be seen in table 4-9. Those countries which did not fill their quotas already in 
the baseline reduce their production further. No country ceases production, but some reduce 
it so strongly that the small remaining quantities may not be sustainable for a processing 
firm. Overall production is projected to fall by 6% to 15.4 million tons. Imports increase by 
35% to 4.4 million tons, 1.9 million of which are MFN imports coming entirely from Brazil. 
As in the baseline scenario, subsidized exports do not take place anymore. 
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Table 4-12: EU Results of the WTO Scenario in Million MT WSE a 
Production in Member States in 2015/16    
AT 0.3873  LT 0.0804 (-22%)
BE 0.8198  LV 0  
CZ 0.4549  NL 0.8646  
DK 0.3559 (-15%) PL 1.6719  
ES 0.4844 (-36%) PT 0.0205 (-49%)
FI 0.0792 (-27%) SI 0  
FR 4.0325  SK 0.1356 (-27%)
GE 3.6555  SW 0.3257  
GR 0.0551 (-62%) UK 1.1386  
HU 0.4017  BUL 0.0024 (-17%)
IE   ROM 0.0352 (-19%)
IT 0.3518 (-51%) Total 15.353 (-6%)
Imports   4.3653 (35%)
Subsidized Exports  0.0 
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
Table 4-10 shows the results for preferential trade flows to the EU. In total they de-
crease by 24% from 3.2 million tons in the baseline scenario to 2.5 million tons after imple-
mentation of the WTO Agreement. A number of ACP countries do not fill their quotas any-
more, which are subsequently reallocated to other protocol members. Since imports under 
the protocol are subject to a refinery aid, they are more profitable than under EBA. Hence, 
some LDCs, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, decrease their deliveries under EBA, which 
does not mean, however, that their market access has declined. Other LDCs decrease or 
cease their exports due to the lower prices. The trade flows under the Balkans Initiative and 
under CXL stay constant.  
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Table 4-13: Results of the WTO Scenario for Preferential Imports in the EU-27 in thou-
sand MT WSE a 
2015/16 ACP BALKANS EBA CXL 
ALB    1.3           
AUS          9.1   
BAN       0  (-100%)     
BAR 10.3 (-65%)           
BEL 68.7 (55%)           
BEN       0  (-100%)     
BRA          508.1   
BUR              
CDR       0  (-100%)     
CON   (-100%)           
COT   (-100%)           
CUB          54.3   
ETH       337.3 (-5%)     
FIJ 218.7 (18%)           
GAB       0  (-100%)     
GUA          3.7   
GUI       0  (-100%)     
GUY 266.7 (55%)           
IND              
JAM 4.0 (-97%)           
KEN              
MAD  0 (-100%)    0  (-100%)     
MAL 35.8 (55%)    52.4 (-38%)     
MAU 402.1 (-14%)           
MOZ 20.6 (55%)    85.6 (-67%)     
NEP              
REU    5.3         
SEN       0  (-100%)     
SER              
SRL       0  (-100%)     
STK 12.9 (-25%)           
SUD       0  (-100%)     
SWA 203.4 (55%)           
TAN              
TRI  0 (-100%)           
ZAM 24.8 (55%)    98.1 (12%)     
ZIM 40.3 (55%)             
Total 1,308.3 (-1%) 6.6   573.4 (-57%) 575.2   
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
In Table 4-11 the preferential imports of the USA are presented. As in the EU, the US 
domestic price level for sugar is affected by the WTO agreement which makes their MFN 
tariffs non prohibitive. The domestic price declines from € 414 in the baseline scenario to 
€ 350 per ton under the tariff cuts (see table 4-8). MFN imports of a total of 2 million tons 
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enter from Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras and the Rest of the Caribbean in declin-
ing order.89  
Of the traditional preferential importers some decrease or end their exports to the 
USA. Two forces are responsible for that. These are the declining preferential margin, of 
course, but also an increased TRQ for the EU market in some cases which is more profitable 
to fill. The TRQs of other quota holders are increased.90 In the case of the Dominican Re-
public that leads the country to not filling its CAFTA-DR quota anymore in contrast to all 
other countries participating in this agreement.  
                                                 
89 This result is depending on the assumption that the USA will retain its trade embargo against Cuba. Other-
wise, about 600 thousand tons would be imported from Cuba. 
90 It is, of course, questionable whether the USA will increase those quotas which actually meant to provide for 
the minimum and current access commitments from the UR, when MFN imports enter its market on a large 
scale. However, for this study it is assumed.  
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Table 4-14: Results of the WTO Scenario for US Preferential Imports in thousand MT 
WSE a 
2015/16  TRQs (incl. NAFTA) CAFTA-DR 
ARG 117.3 (39%)     
AUS 226.6 (39%)     
BEL 18.5 (-14%)     
BOL 13.5 (-15%)     
BRA 395.4 (39%)     
CAN 32.8 (-14%)     
COL 65.6 (40%)     
CON 0  (-100%)     
COR 41.0 (39%) 11.9   
COT 0  (-100%)     
DOM 141.5 (-49%) 9.9 (-9%) 
ECU 30.1 (39%)     
ELS 70.9 (39%) 29.7   
FIJ 0  (-100%)     
GUA 130.6 (39%) 40.2   
GUY 0  (-100%)     
HON 27.2 (39%) 8.7   
IND         
JAM 0  (-100%)     
MAD         
MAL         
MEX         
MOZ         
NIC 57.2 (39%) 23.9   
PAN 9.5 (-57%)     
PAR         
PER 68.5 (-15%)     
PHI   (-100%)     
PNG 6.7       
REA   (-100%)     
SAF 62.5 (40%)     
STK         
SWA 43.6 (39%)     
THA 38.1 (40%)     
URU 0  (-100%)     
ZIM 0  (-100%)     
Total 1,597.1 (-0%) 124.3 (-1%)  
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
4.2.2.3 Scenario 3: EU Liberalization 
Table 4-12 shows the model results of a unilateral liberalization on the part of the EU 
on global production, consumption and prices. Relative to the baseline scenario, world pro-
duction decreases by 1%. The world market price increases by 23% to € 255 per ton. It is 
interesting to note that the full liberalization of the EU alone has a stronger effect on world 
market prices than partial liberalization by all countries under a possible Doha Round 
Agreement, which led to a world market price increase of merely 14% to  
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€ 236 per ton. The production of competitive exporters increases by different percentages. 
The strongest increase can be observed for Brazil with 19% to 37.3 million tons. India and 
the US do not react at all to the policy changes in the EU.91 This is because their markets are 
isolated from what happens on the world market by prohibitive tariffs.  
Table 4-15: Results of the EU Liberalization Scenario in Million MT WSE and €/ton a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
World 150.2 (-1%) 150.2 (-1%) 255 (23%)
EU-27 5.0 (-69%) 20.1 (3%) 306 (-28%)
USA 7.1 (0%) 8.8 (0%) 414 (0%)
BRA 37.3 (19%) 11.1 (-2%) 244 (25%)
AUS 6.6 (13%) 1.2 (-2%) 255 (20%)
THA 6.9 (6%) 2.4 (-2%) 292 (19%)
GUA 2.1 (8%) 0.7 (-2%) 242 (23%)
CUB 1.8 (4%) 0.7 (-2%) 244 (23%)
COL 3.2 (8%) 1.7 (-2%) 241 (25%)
SAF 2.7 (8%) 1.5 (-2%) 642 (24%)
RUS 2.6 (9%) 6.0 (-1%) 407 (14%)
CHN 10.4 (5%) 11.8 (-1%) 368 (15%)
IND 22.0 (0%) 22.0 (0%) 427 (0%)
JAP 1.3 (31%) 2.2 (-1%) 1158 (13%)
Other 41.1 (4%) 60.0 (-1%) - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
In table 4-13 it can be seen that the production in all EU-27 member states is affected 
by the unilateral liberalization of its sugar market policies which lowers the internal price to 
€ 306 per ton.92 No member state is able to fill its quota anymore. All southern member 
states abandon sugar production. All others reduce their production significantly. The total 
supply in the EU goes down by 69% to 5 million tons and imports rise almost fourfold to 
15.3 million tons. 13.6 million tons of these imports come from Brazil, about 700 thousand 
tons from Eastern Europe and the remainder form several Caribbean countries. Preferential 
imports take, of course, not place anymore. Former preferential suppliers ship their products 
to other destinations with preferential access, which are, however, limited and supply the 
regional market, i.e. mainly Sub-Saharan Africa. Some countries also reduce their produc-
                                                 
91 The production increase in Japan is actually the highest in relative terms. This result has, however, to be 
treated with caution. The difference between the import price and the internal price which cannot be explained 
by any policies is modeled by an ad valorem tariff equivalent (see sections 2.1.2.13 and 4.1.2.3.13). This means 
that higher world market prices translate into an even higher gap to domestic prices. Whether this will happen 
in reality is highly questionable, though. Together with the functional form of the Japanese supply curve in the 
model, which has a higher elasticity than an isoelastic curve this leads to rather strong production increases. 
Fortunately, this increase moves in a range in which it does not affect the further results of the model signifi-
cantly. Alternatively, the gap could be accounted for by a specific tariff equivalent. This would, however, result 
in a deflation of this gap over time, which is rather unrealistic. 
92 This is only 5% below the reference price of € 323. 
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tion, on average by 2%.93 The most affected countries are Barbados and St. Kitts and Nevis 
where production decreases by 13% and 11% respectively. Some countries, however, even 
increase their production as their prospects on the world market have increased.  
As part of the liberalization, the EU abolishes also all export subsidies, which have, 
however, no effect in the baseline scenario already. Subsidized exports of EU sugar take thus 
not place anymore under any scenario. One of the interesting results of this scenario is, how-
ever, that the EU turned to a MFN exporter of sugar. It exports some 250 thousand tons to 
Switzerland for which it has a comparative advantage due to transportation costs.  
Table 4-16: EU Results of the EU Liberalization Scenario in Million MT WSE a 
Production in Member States in 2015/16    
AT 0.1272 (-67%) LT 0.0227 (-78%)
BE 0.1964 (-76%) LV 0  
CZ 0.2485 (-45%) NL 0.2791 (-68%)
DK 0.0081 (-98%) PL 0.5647 (-66%)
ES 0 (-100%) PT 0 (-100%)
FI 0.0238 (-78%) SI 0  
FR 1.3093 (-68%) SK 0.0413 (-78%)
GE 1.0839 (-70%) SW 0.2619 (-20%)
GR 0 (-100%) UK 0.6808 (-40%)
HU 0.1772 (-56%) BUL 0.0015 (-48%)
IE 0  ROM 0.0205 (-53%)
IT 0 (-100%) Total 5.0469 (-69%)
Imports   15.3031 (372%)
Subsidized Exports  0.0 
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
In table 4-12 it became clear that supply, demand and prices on the US market are not 
affected by a unilateral liberalization of the EU. There are, however, some effects on the US 
market since the markets of its preferential import quota holders are affected. These impacts 
are threefold. First, some countries lose their preferential margin on the EU market and thus 
tend to fill their TRQs on the US market which were formerly under utilized. The only coun-
try going that way is Jamaica, which as can be seen in table 4-14 increases its imports to the 
upper limit of the quota which has due to several years of under delivery been cut to a mini-
mum boatload. Secondly, some countries benefit from a higher world market price and ship 
their production to other countries or use it to substitute former imports on their domestic 
market. These are Congo (Republic (R.)) and Côte d’Ivoire. Third, the remaining quota 
                                                 
93 Arithmetic mean of ACP protocol members and LDCs which exported to the EU in the baseline scenario.  
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holders are affected by a reallocation of quotas to keep the overall level of imports constant. 
Imports under CAFTA-DR are not affected by the liberalization of the EU. All quotas are, as 
in the baseline scenario, completely filled. 
Table 4-17: Results of the EU Liberalization Scenario for US Preferential Imports in 
thousand MT WSE a 
2015/16  TRQs (incl. NAFTA) CAFTA-DR 
ARG 83.4 (-1%)     
AUS 161.1 (-1%)     
BEL 21.4 (-1%)     
BOL 15.7 (-1%)     
BRA 280.9 (-1%)     
CAN 37.9 (-1%)     
COL 46.5 (-1%)     
CON   (-100%)     
COR 29.1 (-1%) 11.9   
COT   (-100%)     
DOM 273.0 (-1%) 10.9   
ECU 21.4 (-1%)     
ELS 50.4 (-1%) 29.7   
FIJ 14.0 (-1%)     
GUA 93.0 (-1%) 40.2   
GUY 23.2 (-1%)     
HON 19.4 (-1%) 8.7   
IND         
JAM 6.7 (1017%)     
MAD         
MAL 6.7 (n.a.)      
MEX         
MOZ 6.7 (n.a.)      
NIC 40.7 (-1%) 23.9   
PAN 22.2       
PAR         
PER 79.4 (-1%)     
PHI 105.4       
PNG 6.7       
REA 15.0 (-1%)     
SAF 44.5 (-1%)     
STK 6.7       
SWA 31.0 (-1%)     
THA 27.0 (-1%)     
URU 6.7       
ZIM 23.2 (-1%)     
Total 1,599.0   124.3   
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
4.2.2.4 Scenario 4: Full Liberalization 
Table 4-15 shows results of the model for global production, consumption and prices 
of sugar after full liberalization of all policies. The total quantity of global sugar production 
is not affected deeply. Shifts of production among countries are, however, immense. Highly 
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protected industrialized countries reduce their production, whereas currently competitive 
exporters, above all Brazil, increase their production by high percentages. The world market 
price increases by 42% to € 295 per ton. This is, as expected, the highest value of all scenar-
ios.  
The production decrease in the EU is with 41% lower than in the EU liberalization 
scenario discussed in the previous section, but higher than in the Doha scenario, since the 
world market price increases stronger if other countries liberalize, too.  
For the USA the decrease in supply is with 34% also stronger than in the DOHA sce-
nario and again beet farmers are more affected than cane farmers. The former reduce their 
production by 54%, the latter by merely 11%. The USA imports under the liberalization sce-
nario some 4.2 million tons of sugar, all of which enters, of course, duty free, which means 
there is no privileged market access for former quota holders anymore. The bulk of these 
imports enter from Brazil and Colombia with 1.3 and 1.2 million tons respectively. The re-
mainder is delivered by El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Domini-
can Republic, Belize, Panama and St. Kitts and Nevis in decreasing order. For all these coun-
tries but Guatemala, the USA becomes the only export market for sugar.  
Most of the full liberalization scenario results are comparable to the WTO scenario 
with changes being more pronounced. There are a number of variables, though, which 
change in an opposite direction under full liberalization than they do under the WTO sce-
nario. This is first of all the production in Cuba, where the state control of the sector is given 
up which was simulated by a subsidy equivalent between the production cost estimates from 
literature and the fob-based world market price. Only production is in this case affected dif-
ferently than under the Doha scenario. Second, there are countries whose trade polices were 
not affected by the WTO agreement. Russia is not a WTO member. Therefore, its tariffs 
were not cut under the Doha scenario. The risen world market price translated into a higher 
domestic price and led to increased production and decreased consumption. The signs of the 
full liberalization scenario point in the opposite direction. The Russian wholesale price de-
creases after abolishing the tariff and hence supply decreases and demand increases. Indian 
trade policies were not affected by the Doha scenario since its bindings contained enough 
space to conserve its applied tariffs after reduction of the bindings. Also the increased world 
market price did not affect India since its tariff had been prohibitive in the baseline scenario. 
Under full liberalization, this changes. The domestic price is now the cif-based world market 
price. Consumption increases, production goes down.  
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Table 4-18: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario in Million MT WSE and €/ton a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
World 151.3 (0%) 151.3 (0%) 295 (42%)
EU-27 9.6 (-41%) 19.9 (2%) 339 (-20%)
USA 4.6 (-34%) 8.9 (1%) 337 (-19%)
BRA 41.1 (31%) 11.0 (-3%) 277 (42%)
AUS 7.2 (22%) 1.2 (-4%) 289 (36%)
THA 7.2 (11%) 2.4 (-2%) 292 (19%)
GUA 2.2 (13%) 0.7 (-3%) 279 (42%)
CUB 1.6 (-9%) 0.7 (-3%) 282 (42%)
COL 3.3 (14%) 1.7 (-4%) 278 (44%)
SAF 2.8 (13%) 1.7 (6%) 286 (-45%)
RUS 2.4 (-2%) 6.1 (0%) 349 (-3%)
CHN 10.2 (3%) 11.8 (-1%) 347 (9%)
IND 20.7 (-6%) 22.4 (2%) 354 (-17%)
JAP 0.0 (-100%) 2.4 (9%) 342 (-67%)
Other 38.2 (-3%) 60.5 (0%) - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
In table 4-16 the results of the full liberalization scenario for the sugar sector of the 
EU-27 are displayed. Overall production decreases by 41% to 9.6 million tons at an internal 
market price of € 339 per ton. As in the Doha scenario this is still above the reference price. 
Although all member states’ production is affected by the liberalization, only three in coun-
tries, Portugal, Greece and Italy sugar production is brought to an end. Spain, which was 
predicted to cease production as well under the unilateral liberalization scenario discussed in 
the pervious section, reduces is supply by almost two thirds, but stays in the market. Other 
countries reduce their production in a range between 24% and 55%. Interestingly, there is 
even one country in the EU, Sweden, which is predicted to expand its sugar production 
slightly after abolishment of the quota.94  
Under a MFN tariff of zero no preferential margins exist anymore. All imports of the 
EU-27, which are predicted to be 10.8 million tons, are simulated to come from Brazil and, 
though the share is tiny, from Eastern Europe. Again, producers in some former preferential 
exporters are worse off due to liberalization of the EU and other previously preferential mar-
kets. Given the higher world market price, however, this is less pronounced. The production 
decreases on average by 1%. Most affected countries are again Barbados and St. Kitts and 
                                                 
94 This seems implausible at first glance, and essentially it is a result of the course of the supply curve, which is 
calibrated to the same low shadow price as those of, for instance, France or Germany. But there might also be 
an agronomic explanation: The conditions for summer crops such as sugar beet are especially advantageous in 
southern Sweden where these crops benefit from long periods of sunshine in the northern summer and do not 
suffer from the adverse conditions in winter as do cereals or rapeseed which in most cases are sown in fall. 
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Nevis, which reduce their production by 10% and 8% respectively (13% and 11% in the uni-
lateral EU liberalization scenario). 
As in the unilateral EU-27 liberalization scenario, the EU exports to Switzerland on 
an MFN base. Under full liberalization, however, the Swiss sugar production is projected to 
come to an end and hence the entire market is supplied from the neighbouring EU countries. 
Table 4-19: EU Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario in Million MT WSE a 
Production in Member States in 2015/16   2015/16 
AT 0.2477 (-36%) LT 0.0483 (-53%)
BE 0.4801 (-41%) LV 0  
CZ 0.3445 (-24%) NL 0.5130 (-41%)
DK 0.1502 (-64%) PL 1.1316 (-32%)
ES 0.1952 (-74%) PT 0 (-100%)
FI 0.0448 (-59%) SI 0  
FR 2.5315 (-37%) SK 0.0824 (-55%)
GE 2.2852 (-37%) SW 0.3357 (3%)
GR 0 (-100%) UK 0.9475 (-17%)
HU 0.2752 (-31%) BUL 0.0019 (-34%)
IE 0  ROM 0.0262 (-40%)
IT 0 (-100%) Total 9.6410 (-41%)
Imports   10.7795 (232%)
Subsidized Exports  0.0 
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the baseline scenario. 
4.2.2.5 Comparison of Scenario Results for Selected LDCs 
A particular strength of a model capturing bilateral trade flows explicitly is the ability 
to analyze the results of policy changes within the complex system of trade preferences and 
duty-free or duty reduced TRQs. Four countries which are especially deeply involved in this 
system are Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. All four countries are LDCs and 
have thus market access to the EU which will be duty and quota free as of 2009/10. They 
also benefit from the GSP of Norway95, which allows duty free imports from LDCs as well. 
In addition, some of the countries have market access to the EU under the EU-ACP sugar 
protocol, to the US under the system of raw sugar TRQs, to Kenya under its TRQ for Com-
mon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) member states and to South Af-
rica/ SACU under the quota for SADC member states. Furthermore, some of the countries 
are competitive on the world market for sugar and, of course, all countries have a domestic 
                                                 
95 Note, that the exports of LDCs to Norway in the base are an artifact of the model, as has been explained in 
section 4.1.2.2.5 
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sugar market which they can choose to supply fully or in part themselves or by imports. To 
illustrate this, the results for exports, imports and domestic markets of these four countries 
under all four scenarios are examined in detail in this section. 
Table 4-17 shows the result of the different scenarios including the base period for 
Ethiopia. In the base period the country exports to the EU-27 to fill its EBA quota and to 
Norway where no quantitative restriction exists. About half of the domestic market is sup-
plied by Ethiopian sugar the other half coming from Brazil. In the baseline scenario, after 
unrestricted market access to the EU-27 under EBA is phased in, Ethiopia exports its entire 
production to the EU and supplies its domestic market by imports from Brazil. The exports 
to Norway are abolished, which is done by all other countries reviewed in this section, too. 
Norway fills its market by MFN imports from Colombia and the Caribbean instead. Tariff 
cuts under a possible Doha agreement decrease the price Ethiopian sugar can fetch in the 
EU-27, which remains, however, still the country’s sole outlet. Thus, production and exports 
go down. A unilateral liberalization of its sugar policy by the EU-27 erodes the preferential 
margin Ethiopia enjoyed under EBA. The preferential market access to Norway becomes 
interesting again for the country under such circumstances. Also the domestic market is pro-
jected to be supplied entirely by home grown sugar. Despite the loss of preferential market 
access to the EU-27, the producers are better of under this scenario as compared to the Doha 
scenario, as the incentive price and hence production increase due to a stronger increase of 
the world market price. Under full liberalization the world market price increases even 
stronger, but no preferential access to any market exists anymore. Ethiopia supplies its do-
mestic market where consumption slightly decreases and its neighbour Uganda. 
Table 4-20: Comparison of Different Scenario Results for Ethiopia in thousand tons WSE 
 Base Baseline Doha EU Liberalization Full Liberalization
Exports to:    
EU-27 (EBA) 14 354 337   
NOR (GSP) 138   37  
UGA (MFN)     49
Domestic 132   302 300
Imports from:      
BRA 131 305 303   
Total Supply 284 354 337 339 349
Total Demand 264 305 303 302 300
Producer  
Incentive Price € 243 € 340 € 295 € 299 €325
Source: Own simulations. 
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In table 4-18 the model results of the different scenarios for Malawi are shown. In the 
base period the country fills preferential quotas to the EU under the sugar protocol and EBA, 
to Kenya under COMESA96, and to the USA under the raw sugar TRQ. It also exports on a 
preferential (COMESA) basis to Eastern African countries and to Norway (GSP). Despite 
preferential treatment for all its exports, the producer incentive price for Malawi is with 
€ 169 amazingly low, which results from its landlockeness. In the baseline scenario almost 
all of Malawi’s exports go to the EU. Only the exports to Kenya are maintained which due to 
its proximity and its high MFN protection is an even more profitable export market for Ma-
lawi. Under the Doha scenario the producer incentive price decreases considerably, which 
has an affect on the level of production. The directions of trade remain, however, unchanged 
compared to the baseline scenario. Under the EU liberalization scenario Malawi turns back 
to its former preferential markets which are Norway and the US where Malawi’s TRQ due to 
several years of underfillment is cut to a minimum boatload. As it has been the case for 
Ethiopia, Malawian producers benefit from the EU liberalization more than from a multilat-
eral liberalization under the WTO, due to a higher world market price. Under full liberaliza-
tion, Malawi turns to supplying the East African market by exporting its surplus to Tanzania. 
The producer incentive price is somewhat lower than under the baseline, where Malawi had 
unlimited preferential access to the EU-27, but the difference is not large. The effect on pro-
duction at least is minor.  
                                                 
96 Kenya has been granted a waiver for liberalization of its market access for sugar under COMESA. Instead a 
duty free TRQ for COMESA members had to be opened. Country specific TRQs are not published and accord-
ing to USDA (2006, GAIN Report KE6004) trade that actually occurs is hard to capture. Therefore, the TRQ is 
for the model distributed to all COMESA members which are net exporters of sugar. 
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Table 4-21: Comparison of Different Scenario Results for Malawi in thousand tons WSE 
 Base Baseline Doha EU Liberalization Full Liberalization
Exports to:    
EU-27 (ACP) 21 23 36   
EU-27 (EBA) 13 84 52   
NOR (GSP) 3 45 
KEN (COMESA) 6 6 6 6  
SUD (COMESA) 5  
TAN (MFN)   108
UGA (COMESA) 5 38 
USA (TRQ) 16 7 
Domestic 138 155 157 157 155
Imports from: - - - - -
Total Supply 207 268 251 253 264
Total Demand 138 155 157 157 155
Producer  
Incentive Price € 169 € 266 € 220 € 224 € 253
Source: Own simulations. 
Table 4-19 compares the scenario results for Mozambique. In the base period, Mo-
zambique exports under various preferential schemes to the EU-27, the US and Norway and 
supplies its domestic market. In the baseline scenario, where preferential access under EBA 
becomes unrestricted, the entire production is shipped to the EU-27, and the domestic market 
is supplied by imports from Swaziland. Under the WTO scenario, the world market price 
increases, and the tariff, which is not reduced a lot due to water in the binding, provides a 
high degree of protection for the domestic market. In contrast, the protection of the EU mar-
ket is reduced compared to the base. Therefore, sugar producers in Mozambique supply their 
own market and the EU market under their ACP-protocol quota and under EBA. With a pro-
hibitive tariff in place, the domestic price is determined by the fob-based preferential export 
price the producers can fetch. Under the assumption of unilateral liberalization of EU poli-
cies, other options for preferential market access, Norway and the USA are used again. Like 
in Ethiopia and Malawi, producers in Mozambique are better off with EU liberalization than 
with multilateral liberalization under the WTO. Under full liberalization, Mozambique sup-
plies its domestic market and exports the remainder to Iran. Unlike the former two countries, 
for producers in Mozambique full liberalization is the worst of all options, with a price al-
most 20% lower than in the baseline.  
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Table 4-22: Comparison of Different Scenario Results for Mozambique in thousand tons 
WSE 
 Base Baseline Doha EU Liberalization Full Liberalization
Exports to:    
EU-27 (ACP) 12 13 21   
EU-27 (EBA) 28 261 86   
NOR (GSP) 24   101  
USA (TRQ) 21   7  
IRN (MFN)   101
Domestic 135  155 155 156
Imports from:   
SWA  154  
Total Supply 220 274 261 263 257
Total Demand 135 154 155 155 156
Producer  
Incentive Price € 239 € 336 € 290 € 294 € 274
Source: Own simulations. 
The scenario results for Zambia are shown in table 4-20. In the base period Zambia 
uses a wide range of preferential market access options. These are ACP and EBA quotas on 
the EU-27 market, preferential access to Norway under its GSP, Congo (Democratic Repub-
lic (D.R.)) to Kenya, Sudan and Uganda under COMESA, and to the SACU under SADC. 
As in Malawi the producer price in the base is due to the landlocked position of the country 
very low. The assumption that both countries export via Mozambique and the fact that they 
export to the same markets lead to equal producer prices in both countries in all scenarios. In 
the baseline scenario, Zambia fills its TRQs in SACU and Kenya which is due to lower 
transportation costs and a higher price level more profitable than exporting to the EU and 
ships the rest of its surplus production to the EU under its ACP quota and EBA. Under the 
WTO scenario, the price in SACU sinks to world market level (see 4.2.2.2) and the TRQ 
becomes worthless for Zambia. Exports to other preferential markets are expanded as a con-
sequence. Under liberalization of the EU, Zambian surplus production is simulated to exceed 
the possibilities for preferential market access and the country starts to export on a MFN 
base to Tanzania. Under full liberalization, Zambia exports its surplus to Tanzania and 
Congo (D. R.).  
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Table 4-23: Comparison of Different Scenario Results for Zambia in thousand tons WSE 
 Base Baseline Doha EU Liberalization Full Liberalization
Exports to:    
EU-27 (ACP) 14 16 25  
EU-27 (EBA) 21 87 98  
NOR (GSP) 1 5 
CDR (COMESA) 40 30 30 17
KEN (COMESA) 7 7 7 7 
SAF (SADC) 23 70 70 
SUD (COMESA) 9  
TAN (MFN)  50 159
UGA (COMESA) 10  
Domestic 104 116 118 118 117
Imports from:        
Total Supply 229 297 279 281 292
Total Demand 104 116 118 118 117
Producer  
Incentive Price € 169 € 266 € 220 € 224 € 253
Source: Own simulations. 
For producers in all countries surveyed in this section, the Baseline scenario brings 
the most beneficial results. Further liberalization has universally negative but different im-
pacts on their sugar sectors. Producers in Mozambique are worse off under the assumption of 
full liberalization than under partial liberalization of a possible WTO agreement, while in the 
other three countries they are better off under full liberalization. For the sector in Mozam-
bique, the loss of preferential market access weighs heavier than the gain through an in-
creased world market price. Only two of the four countries made use of the so-called swap 
opportunity, i.e. exporting their production to the EU-27 under EBA and filling their domes-
tic markets fully or partly by imports from third countries.  
4.2.2.6 Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section sensitivity analyses with respect to two parameters are carried out. The 
first of these is the BDI which is increased to 10,000 from the level of about 4000 which is 
assumed in the standard version of the model. The second are the supply elasticities of the 
isoelastic supply functions in the model which are first doubled and then halved. For all three 
variations of the model the baseline scenario and the full liberalization scenario are calcu-
lated again and the results of the simulations are compared to those obtained with the stan-
dard version of the model. Table 4-21 shows the results of a BDI of 10,000 in the baseline 
scenario. The high BDI increases ocean freight rates considerably. On the route from Brazil 
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to the EU (Santos to Marseille), for instance, the rates increase from € 34 per ton WSE to 
about € 66. The influence on global production and consumption as well as world market 
prices is minor. In single countries, the results, however, changed compared to the standard 
version. In general, exporting countries face lower prices and importing countries face higher 
prices. Demand and supply react accordingly. There are, however, some interesting exemp-
tions. In some exporting countries the fob price rises despite increased transportation costs to 
their export partners. The reason for this is that the price increase in those importing coun-
tries is so high that it outweighs the rise in transportation costs for the exporter. This happens 
in regions with a large deficit, which has to be imported over relatively large distances, such 
as Asia which imports from South America. Hence the fob price in Thailand increases. The 
opposite effect is an importing country facing lower prices resulting from increased global 
transportation costs. The fob price of its trade partner decreases stronger more than the bilat-
eral transportation costs rise. The only country showing that effect in the sensitivity analysis 
carried out here is Paraguay. 
First of all in Thailand and South Africa prices rise, although they are exporters. This 
is primarily due to the fact that the prices shown in the table are consumer prices and both 
countries despite being efficient producers protect their domestic markets, which makes them 
behave like those of importers. If one looks however at their producer prices (not in the ta-
ble), one sees that they have risen as well. The explanation for this is, that two effects are 
counteracting here in their effects on the fob price of exporting countries. The first is the 
higher transportation cost to the destination which affects the fob price ceteris paribus nega-
tively. The second is an increased cif price due to the higher transportation costs which has 
ceteris paribus an increasing effect also on the fob price. For countries like Brazil, the first 
effect dominates the second, because it is located in a surplus region and therefore has to 
ship its exports over longer distances, which increases the share of transportation costs in the 
revenue. For countries where the distances to the export markets are shorter, the second 
force, the increased cif price, dominates.  
In the EU production and consumption are not affected a lot, but the price increases 
significantly. This comes via a reduction of preferential imports from LDCs under EBA 
which decrease by roughly 400 thousand tonnes. To fill the Gap, EU producers have to in-
crease their production which is in many cases, however, limited by the quota. It takes there-
fore a relatively large price increase to provide sufficient incentive to producers in countries 
which underfill their quota to increase production. The price of Japan increases by the same 
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amount as that of the EU, 6%. The effect on production, however, is huge. It increases by 
20%. This is by reason of a supply function which is relatively elastic and the absence of 
quantitative limits of production.  
The effect on total trade is interestingly minor. The total quantity which is exported 
and imported decreases by merely 3% compared to the standard version. The number of ob-
served trade flows decreases by 2%.  
Table 4-24: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Results of the Baseline Scenario a 
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
 
Standard 
Version BDI 10,000 
Standard 
Version BDI 10,000 
Standard 
Version BDI 10,000 
World 151.0 150.6 (-0%) 151.0 150.6 (-0%) 207 208 (0%)
EU-27 16.3 16.5 (1%) 19.5 19.4 (-1%) 426 450 (6%)
USA 7.1 7.1 (0%) 8.8 8.8 (0%) 414 414 (0%)
BRA 31.4 29.8 (-5%) 11.3 11.4 (1%) 196 183 (-6%)
AUS 5.9 5.7 (-3%) 1.2 1.2 (0%) 212 205 (-3%)
THA 6.5 6.6 (2%) 2.5 2.5 (0%) 246 251 (2%)
GUA 1.9 1.9 (0%) 0.7 0.7 (0%) 196 188 (-4%)
CUB 1.7 1.7 (0%) 0.7 0.7 (0%) 198 189 (-4%)
COL 2.9 2.9 (0%) 1.8 1.8 (0%) 194 189 (-2%)
SAF 2.5 2.5 (0%) 1.6 1.6 (0%) 517 527 (2%)
RUS 2.4 2.6 (8%) 6.1 6.0 (-2%) 359 391 (9%)
CHN 10.0 10.2 (2%) 11.9 11.9 (0%) 320 341 (7%)
IND 22.0 22.0 (0%) 22.0 22.0 (0%) 427 427 (0%)
JAP 1.0 1.2 (20%) 2.2 2.2 (0%) 1,023 1,086 (6%)
Other 39.4 39.9 (1%) 60.8 60.5 (0%) - - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the standard version. 
In table 4-22 the results of an increased BDI are shown for the full liberalization sce-
nario. The change in the world market price due to higher transportation costs is more pro-
nounced here, which leads in all countries in the table to the domination of the transportation 
cost effect.97 Production and prices increase and demand decreases in importing countries. 
For exporters the opposite can be observed. The effect is particularly visible for the EU, 
where production as a response on a 4% price increase expands by 19%. Unlike in the base-
line scenario, all member states can contribute to the increase, since there is no quota in place 
anymore.  
                                                 
97 Not for all countries in the model, though. 
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Table 4-25: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
 
Standard 
Version BDI 10,000 
Standard 
Version BDI 10,000 
Standard 
Version BDI 10,000 
World 151.3 151.0 (-0%) 151.3 151.0 (-0%) 295 283 (-4%)
EU-27 9.6 11.5 (19%) 19.9 19.9 (-0%) 339 351 (4%)
USA 4.6 4.7 (2%) 8.9 8.9 (-0%) 337 339 (1%)
BRA 41.1 38.8 (-6%) 11.0 11.0 (1%) 277 258 (-7%)
AUS 7.2 6.9 (-3%) 1.2 1.2 (1%) 289 274 (-5%)
THA 7.2 7.2 (-0%) 2.4 2.4 (0%) 292 290 (-1%)
GUA 2.2 2.2 (-2%) 0.7 0.7 (1%) 279 263 (-6%)
CUB 1.6 1.5 (-2%) 0.7 0.7 (1%) 282 265 (-6%)
COL 3.3 3.3 (-2%) 1.7 1.7 (1%) 278 264 (-5%)
SAF 2.8 2.8 (-0%) 1.7 1.7 (0%) 286 284 (-1%)
RUS 2.4 2.5 (5%) 6.1 6.1 (-1%) 349 374 (7%)
CHN 10.2 10.3 (1%) 11.8 11.8 (-0%) 347 358 (3%)
IND 20.7 20.9 (1%) 22.4 22.3 (-0%) 354 365 (3%)
JAP 0.0 0.0 (0%) 2.4 2.4 (-0%) 342 353 (3%)
Other 38.2 38.3 (0%) 60.5 60.3 (0%) - - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the standard version. 
Table 4-23 shows the results of the baseline scenario with a model version where all 
supply elasticities of isoelastic functions are doubled. The world market price is influenced 
negatively, i.e. the growth which could be observed in the baseline scenario relative to the 
base period is much less pronounced. This lower price is translated to all countries except for 
those with prohibitive tariffs in place. This is firstly the EU, where the price decrease is 
caused by increased imports under EBA, and second the USA. Demand does not respond 
much to the price decreases. Supply, due to increased elasticities, does not show great 
movements, either. The exemptions are Russia and Japan, where supply elasticities are 
high.98 
                                                 
98 Production decrease in Cuba is considerably high as well. This is due to the simulation of the state control as 
a producer subsidy which decreases over time as a result of inflation. Thus Cuban production would have even 
decreased under this sensitivity analysis if the price would have stayed constant. Together with the effect of the 
price decrease, the production decrease is more pronounced than in most other countries. 
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Table 4-26: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Results of the Baseline Scenario a 
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
 
Standard  
Version ε * 2 
Standard  
Version ε * 2 
Standard  
Version ε * 2 
World 151.0 151.5 (0%) 151.0 151.5 (0%) 207 197 (-5%)
EU-27 16.3 16.1 (-1%) 19.5 19.6 (0%) 426 415 (-3%)
USA 7.1 7.1 (-0%) 8.8 8.8 (-0%) 414 415 (0%)
BRA 31.4 31.8 (1%) 11.3 11.4 (0%) 196 186 (-5%)
AUS 5.9 5.9 (1%) 1.2 1.2 (1%) 212 202 (-5%)
THA 6.5 6.6 (0%) 2.5 2.5 (0%) 246 234 (-5%)
GUA 1.9 2.0 (1%) 0.7 0.7 (0%) 196 187 (-5%)
CUB 1.7 1.7 (-4%) 0.7 0.7 (0%) 198 189 (-5%)
COL 2.9 3.0 (0%) 1.8 1.8 (1%) 194 184 (-5%)
SAF 2.5 2.5 (1%) 1.6 1.6 (1%) 517 491 (-5%)
RUS 2.4 2.3 (-3%) 6.1 6.1 (0%) 359 349 (-3%)
CHN 10.0 10.0 (1%) 11.9 12.0 (0%) 320 308 (-4%)
IND 22.0 22.1 (0%) 22.0 22.1 (0%) 427 413 (-3%)
JAP 1.0 0.9 (-8%) 2.2 2.2 (0%) 1,023 991 (-3%)
Other 39.4 39.6 (0%) 60.8 61.0 (0%) - - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the standard version. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis for the full liberalization scenario are displayed 
in table 4-24. The world market price after liberalization is about 10% lower than projected 
with the standard version of the model. Since all countries face the world market price, this 
decrease translates to all domestic markets, with some local differences. Global production 
increases by about 1% with considerable reallocation of production taking place. Due to the 
lower price, EU-27 production is about half of what it would have been with the standard 
version. US production decreases less with just 42%. Beet production in the US, however, 
decreases by even 64% as a response to the lower price. Cane production on the other hand 
decreases by only 29% as a result of lower prices and a higher elasticity. Also other countries 
with large protection in the baseline face substantial decreases of production. The most im-
portant in absolute terms is India, where production decreases by 1.8 million tons.  
The largest production increase in absolute as well as relative terms takes place in 
Brazil, where supply increases by 20% to almost 50 million tons. This alone more than out-
weighs the declining supply in the EU and the USA. Other exporting countries in the table 
increase their production by percentages between 6% and 14%, which is little in absolute 
terms, though.  
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Table 4-27: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
 
Standard  
Version ε * 2 
Standard  
Version ε * 2 
Standard  
Version ε * 2 
World 151.3 152.6 (1%) 151.3 152.6 (1%) 295 264 (-10%)
EU-27 9.6 4.8 (-50%) 19.9 20.1 (1%) 339 308 (-9%)
USA 4.6 2.7 (-42%) 8.9 8.9 (0%) 337 306 (-9%)
BRA 41.1 49.4 (20%) 11.0 11.1 (1%) 277 247 (-11%)
AUS 7.2 8.1 (14%) 1.2 1.2 (1%) 289 258 (-11%)
THA 7.2 7.7 (6%) 2.4 2.4 (1%) 292 262 (-11%)
GUA 2.2 2.4 (9%) 0.7 0.7 (1%) 279 249 (-11%)
CUB 1.6 1.3 (-18%) 0.7 0.7 (1%) 282 252 (-11%)
COL 3.3 3.6 (9%) 1.7 1.7 (1%) 278 248 (-11%)
SAF 2.8 3.0 (8%) 1.7 1.7 (1%) 286 256 (-11%)
RUS 2.4 2.1 (-13%) 6.1 6.1 (1%) 349 319 (-9%)
CHN 10.2 10.2 (-0%) 11.8 11.9 (1%) 347 317 (-9%)
IND 20.7 18.9 (-9%) 22.4 22.6 (1%) 354 324 (-9%)
JAP 0.0 0.0 (0%) 2.4 2.4 (1%) 342 311 (-9%)
Other 38.2 38.3 (0%) 60.5 61.0 (1%) - - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the standard version. 
Table 4-25 shows the results of the third sensitivity analysis, where all supply elastic-
ities of isoelastic functions are halved, for the baseline scenario. As expected, the world mar-
ket price increases as compared to the baseline simulated with the standard elasticity set, and 
so do all domestic prices. The EU having prohibitive tariffs in place is, as in the second sen-
sitivity analysis, affected only by way its preferential imports. The imports entering the EU 
market under EBA are the only ones which are not quota limited, and thus basically the only 
ones whose overall quantity can vary. With production in LDCs decreasing relative to the 
standard version their exports to the EU decrease as well. The total quantity of preferential 
imports is declining by about 250 thousand tons, which leads to a 4% increase of the domes-
tic price and a 1% increase of domestic production, which is for most member states limited 
by the quota. In the US, production, consumption and imports do not change at all due to a 
prohibitive tariff in place. The only country where production is affected significantly is Ja-
pan.  
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Table 4-28: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Results of the Baseline Scenario a 
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
 
Standard 
Version ε * ½ 
Standard 
Version ε * ½ 
Standard 
Version ε * ½ 
World 151.0 150.3 (-0%) 151.0 150.3 (-0%) 207 222 (7%)
EU-27 16.3 16.5 (1%) 19.5 19.5 (-0%) 426 441 (4%)
USA 7.1 7.1 (0%) 8.8 8.8 (0%) 414 414 (0%)
BRA 31.4 30.8 (-2%) 11.3 11.2 (-1%) 196 210 (8%)
AUS 5.9 5.8 (-1%) 1.2 1.2 (-1%) 212 227 (7%)
THA 6.5 6.5 (-1%) 2.5 2.4 (-1%) 246 263 (7%)
GUA 1.9 1.9 (-1%) 0.7 0.7 (-1%) 196 210 (7%)
CUB 1.7 1.8 (2%) 0.7 0.7 (-1%) 198 212 (7%)
COL 2.9 2.9 (-1%) 1.8 1.8 (-1%) 194 208 (8%)
SAF 2.5 2.5 (-1%) 1.6 1.6 (-1%) 517 556 (8%)
RUS 2.4 2.5 (1%) 6.1 6.1 (-0%) 359 374 (4%)
CHN 10.0 9.9 (-1%) 11.9 11.9 (-1%) 320 337 (6%)
IND 22.0 21.9 (-0%) 22.0 21.9 (-0%) 427 449 (5%)
JAP 1.0 1.1 (12%) 2.2 2.2 (-0%) 1,023 1,073 (5%)
Other 39.4 39.3 (0%) 60.5 61.0 (-1%) - - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the standard version. 
Under full liberalization, the reduced elasticities show a greater impact, as can be 
seen in table 4-26. World market and thus domestic prices increase by around 10% compared 
to the standard version. The impact on consumption is still minor with a decrease of 1% or 
less in the countries shown in table 4-26. Effects on supply are in contrast very large in many 
countries. In the EU and the USA, the higher world market price leads to a much smaller 
decrease in production after liberalization. The EU produces still some 14 million tons, 
which is only 2 million tons less than in the baseline scenario. The results for the USA are 
similar. Production decreases under liberalization to 6 million tons which is one million less 
than under prohibitive tariffs. As a consequence, production increases in exporting countries 
like Brazil, Australia and Thailand are less pronounced.99 
                                                 
99 The exemption is again Cuba, for the same reasons as in the second sensitivity analysis. 
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Table 4-29: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario a  
2015/16 Supply Demand Price 
 
Standard 
Version ε * ½ 
Standard 
Version ε * ½ 
Standard 
Version ε * ½ 
World 151.3 150.0 (-1%) 151.3 150.1 (-1%) 295 324 (10%)
EU-27 9.6 14.1 (46%) 19.9 19.8 (-1%) 339 368 (9%)
USA 4.6 6.0 (30%) 8.9 8.8 (-0%) 337 366 (9%)
BRA 41.1 35.6 (-13%) 11.0 10.9 (-1%) 277 306 (10%)
AUS 7.2 6.5 (-10%) 1.2 1.2 (-1%) 289 322 (11%)
THA 7.2 6.9 (-5%) 2.4 2.4 (-1%) 292 325 (11%)
GUA 2.2 2.1 (-6%) 0.7 0.7 (-1%) 279 308 (10%)
CUB 1.6 1.7 (8%) 0.7 0.6 (-1%) 282 310 (10%)
COL 3.3 3.1 (-6%) 1.7 1.7 (-1%) 278 307 (10%)
SAF 2.8 2.6 (-6%) 1.7 1.6 (-1%) 286 315 (10%)
RUS 2.4 2.5 (4%) 6.1 6.1 (-1%) 349 378 (8%)
CHN 10.2 10.1 (-1%) 11.8 11.7 (-1%) 347 380 (9%)
IND 20.7 21.4 (3%) 22.4 22.2 (-1%) 354 383 (8%)
JAP 0.0 0.0 (0%) 2.4 2.4 (-1%) 342 375 (10%)
Other 38.2 37.6 (-2%) 60.5 60.0 (-1%) - - -
Source: Own simulations; a Numbers in brackets are changes compared to the standard version. 
Figure 4-3 summarizes the results of all sensitivity analyses carried out in this chapter 
by comparing the relative effect of Liberalization on production under the standard version 
and the three sensitivity analyses on the production of the world as a whole and in 13 single 
countries. Production on a global level is not affected a lot by the sensitivity analyses, as it 
has not been affected by the different scenarios either. The picture looks different for results 
in single countries although in virtually all cases the effects of liberalization go in the same 
direction as they do under the standard version of the model.  
The effects of the first sensitivity analysis, the increase in ocean freight rates under 
the assumption of a BDI of 10,000 has only minor effects on the results of liberalization. In 
most cases, the results are dampened slightly as compared to the standard version. In two 
cases, however, Cuba and Russia, both of which reduce their production under liberalization, 
the sensitivity analysis increases this reduction as compared to the standard version.  
The effects of the second and the third sensitivity analysis, the variation of the own 
price elasticities of supply, are much stronger. If elasticities are doubled, the effect of liber-
alization is strongly enhanced in all cases. In three countries the effect more than doubles. 
The effect is dampened if the elasticities are halved, as happened in the third sensitivity 
analysis. In Russia the sign of the effect even turns: Whereas under the standard version of 
the model, liberalization lead to a decrease of the internal price and thus to a reduction of 
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supply, in the version with halved elasticities the price and thus supply in Russia even in-
crease slightly.  
The sensitivity analyses carried out in this chapter revealed that especially the influ-
ence of the supply elasticities on the results of the model is immense. Although the impact 
on global production, consumption and prices is modest, the results for single countries dif-
fer enormously in some cases between model versions with different supply elasticities. 
However, the direction of changes under liberalization does not change in most cases.  
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Figure 4-3: Sensitivity Analysis of the Effect of Full Liberalization on Sugar Production 
Source: Own simulations. 
 111
5 Conclusions and Outlook 
The simulations carried out in this study provide many interesting results. This ap-
plies to general variables such as production, consumption and prices, as well as to particular 
results such as bilateral trade flows.  
Already the baseline scenario yields various interesting insights and answers to some 
of the research questions formulated in chapter one. One of this is the outcome of the reform 
process of the EU’s CMO for sugar. Despite present doubts about the potential of the reform 
measures decided upon in 2006 to achieve the necessary quantity reductions, according to 
the model it is sufficient to reduce the price support for sugar to a level which is still consid-
erably above the final envisaged reference price level. The reduction in price support is 
achieved by a reduction of the per unit export subsidy to merely bridge the gap between the 
fob world market price and the reference price. This reduction is simulated to be sufficient to 
completely discourage subsidized exports and to reduce the community production such that 
together with preferential imports, the EU market is balanced. The price prevailing on the 
EU market would still be considerably above the envisaged reference price level. This result 
clearly contrasts with the findings of Bureau et al. (2007). They simulate that even if the 
price would fall to the reference price level, the community market would still be oversup-
plied in 2015 and export subsidies would be necessary. Both results, the one obtained in this 
analysis and the one by Bureau et al. (2007), depend, of course, crucially upon the assump-
tions about supply behavior of EU sugar suppliers. The results also seem to contradict the 
fact that quota sales by sugar factories to the restructuring fund have lagged behind expecta-
tions so far. With the projected moderate level of imports under EBA and an increase in con-
sumption, however, the necessary quota reduction still to achieve until the end of the imple-
mentation period of the CMO reform is less than one million tons, which is considerably 
below the 3.8 million tons currently envisaged. 
The preference erosion brought about by the price decreases on the EU-27 market is 
rather low. Some countries end their preferential exports to the EU. In all these countries, 
however, the sugar sectors expand their production and the real prices producers can fetch 
increase. Other countries increase their preferential exports, which in total increase by 25% 
to 3.2 million tons, 1.3 of which are exported under EBA. Other studies which simulate a full 
implementation of EBA are not fully comparable due to different assumptions. Adenäuer et 
al. (2004) project import under EBA of a total of roughly 3 million tons. They assume, how-
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ever, a development of the EU sugar market without the 2006 reform, and thus an internal 
EU price which is about 25% higher. Van Berkum et al. (2005) simulate imports under EBA 
of merely 250 thousand tons under the assumption implementation of the Fischler proposal 
for reforming the CMO. Under the assumption of an unreformed EU sugar market, the au-
thors project imports of roughly 400 thousand tons, which is not much more. Their results, 
which are considerably lower than those obtained here and even more so than in other stud-
ies, clearly depend on the Armington Approach of heterogeneity with regard to origin.  
Another interesting result is the termination of Mexican Exports to the USA despite 
of duty free access under NAFTA. None of the model-based studies reviewed in chapter 3 
analyses the US sugar market and thus the question of Mexican exports. However, other, not 
model-based, sources expect these exports to rise considerably after 2008.100 
The most interesting insight yielded by the WTO scenario is, that it is the level of the 
tariff which determines the future EU price level and thus production, rather than internal 
policies, i.e. the reference price. The EU starts to import 1.9 million tons under MFN condi-
tions and production goes down accordingly. This is mitigated somewhat by the reduction of 
preferential imports by roughly a quarter to 2.5 million tons. The WTO scenario simulated 
by Bureau et al. (2007) deviates in its assumptions and its reference scenario too far from the 
analysis carried out in this study to be comparable. Merely the effect on the world market 
price could perhaps be compared, which increases with 6% by a much lower percentage than 
the 14% projected here. It is also an interesting fact to notice that the effects on the world 
market price by a possible WTO agreement are found to be lower than those of a unilateral 
complete liberalization of the EU, which increases the world market price by even 23%. 
None of the studies reviewed here does, however, simulate such a scenario. It would cer-
tainly be interesting to compare whether the other studies confirm or contradict the relative 
strengths of both world market price effects.  
The full liberalization scenario projects a world market price increase of 42%. This 
seems rather high at first glance. The simulation of the same scenario by Elobeid and Beghin 
(2005), however, leads to an even higher increase with 47% and the authors state that their 
result moves “within the ballpark of previous estimates obtained with partial equilibrium 
models”. Mitchell (2004) surveys various model-based studies which have been published a 
few years earlier than the ones reviewed here, and their projections of world market price 
                                                 
100 See section 4.1.2.3.2 and the cited literature. 
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effects of liberalization move around 40% as well. The homogeneous goods version of the 
model analysis by Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003) in contrast projects a world market 
increase of merely 21% in case of full liberalization, which is only half. This is even lower 
than the world market price increase of 34% which is projected here by the second sensitiv-
ity analysis using doubled own price elasticities of supply. All the world market price effects 
projected by other studies suffer, however, in comparability due to the fact that the reference 
scenario does not account for the implementation of the 2006 CMO reform by the EU.101 
Under Full Liberalization the production decrease in the EU is projected to be 41% 
compared to the baseline scenario. The results of other studies are quite diverse. Elobeid and 
Beghin (2005) simulate a decrease of 60% which is quite in line with the results obtained 
here, since the authors reference situation is an unreformed EU market. The results of the 
two model versions of Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003), however, move far out if this 
range. The Armington version projects a decrease of 9%, the homogeneous goods version, 
however, projects a virtual stop of sugar production in the EU. Interestingly, the results of 
the two model versions depart, to a rather extreme degree, from the results obtained here in 
two different directions. One is much lower, the other one much higher. For the production 
of the remaining countries, most of the results of the full liberalization scenario of Elobeid 
and Beghin (2005) move in the same order of size as the ones obtained here. The exemptions 
are the USA where production decreases by only 5% (in contrast to 34% projected here), 
which is probably due to a lower assumed shadow price for producers, and Thailand where 
production decreases by 1% (while here it is projected to rise by 11%).102 The results for 
production of Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003) deviate tremendously among the two 
model versions applied in the study and in most cases from the results obtained here. Most of 
the results of the Armington version suffer from the heterogeneity assumption. Decreases of 
production in formerly highly subsidizing countries are pronounced much less than one actu-
ally would expect, while competitive exporters increase their production only to a small de-
gree. The homogeneous goods version of the model in contrast leads to rather extreme reac-
tions. Production in the EU, the USA and Japan virtually disappears, while it triples in 
Australia and doubles in Thailand. Interestingly, production is terminated in SACU and tri-
                                                 
101 This applies, of course, to the comparability of all results of these studies with the one at hand. 
102 This could be due to the formulation of the Thai policies.  
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ples in the former Soviet Union. A figure for Brazil is not stated, the authors just mention the 
increase is “less”.103  
The special ability of the model is the precise and realistic depiction of the develop-
ment of bilateral trade flows in a changing political environment. It could be shown how 
erosion of preferences leads their beneficiaries to exporting to other destinations, some of 
which offer preferential market access as well, some of which do not. The detailed analysis 
of the complex network of preferential trading arrangements and the interdependencies of 
preferential trade flows with the development of the world market has shown that the effect 
of preference erosion on the affected sectors is moderate in most cases. In some cases the 
liberalization of sugar policies in preference granting countries has even a positive effect on 
the sugar sectors of the former beneficiaries of these preferences through an increase in the 
world market price.  
It could also be shown that under open markets new, huge trade flows are generated, 
which due to prohibitive trade barriers did not exist before. The most prominent examples 
are the 9.9 and 13.6 million tons the EU is projected to import from Brazil under full multi-
lateral and unilateral liberalization respectively. On the other hand, trade flows which pre-
vailed are simulated to contract or to disappear. Brazil, for instance, is despite a large in-
crease in total exports simulated to reduce its exports to the South and Central Asian market 
considerably under full multilateral liberalization and to practically withdraw from that re-
gion under unilateral liberalization by the EU. These results are not comparable to any of the 
model results reviewed in this study. The net-trade models do by nature not depict bilateral 
trade flows. The remainder of the models applies the Armington Approach, thus their projec-
tions cannot show such regime changes. Furthermore, their regional aggregation is in most 
cases rather rough, and even for the depicted regions results for bilateral trade flows are usu-
ally not published in detail.  
The SPE model developed and applied in this study combines the strengths of two 
prevalent modeling approaches for the sugar market which are the assumption of homogene-
ity of goods and the ability to depict bilateral trade flows explicitly. The analyses carried out 
and the results obtained demonstrate the ability of the SPE approach to realistically simulate 
the effects of policy scenarios and to analyze them in high detail. It can, therefore, be consid-
                                                 
103 The results suggest, that the supply is extremely elastic in this model version, which would in turn explain 
the comparably low world market price increase, and that the policies are misspecified, possibly by a protection 
coefficient applying to domestic production and exports, in some cases. 
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ered as a progress in comparison to the prevailing modeling methods for the sugar market. 
Yet, it suffers from one severe problem that the other two approaches are immune to. This is 
its inability to reproduce any arbitrary base data. This applies firstly to domestic prices where 
in many cases the gap to the world market price cannot be explained by the policies applied 
alone. This is a problem which net trade models face as well and it can be solved by intro-
ducing tariff equivalents, as is done in this study, or by introducing price transmission equa-
tions, as is done for instance by FAPRI. Second and more important, since it is a unique fea-
ture of SPE models, observed bilateral trade flows cannot be reproduced as is discussed in 
sections 4.1.2.2.5 and 4.1.2.2.6. For the reasons mentioned there, the unrealistic assumption 
of optimizing behavior and the incomplete coverage of all real world constraints in a model 
framework, this is inevitable if one applies a quasi-normative approach as a SPE. Especially 
in the light of the results of the validation of the model base data, it is hard to avoid the ques-
tion: Do the results produced in this study have any relevance at all, if a given situation can-
not be replicated satisfactorily? The author’s answer would be in the affirmative: The model 
can replicate anything that a net-trade model can replicate, supply, demand, prices and net-
trade with perfect accuracy. And the relevance of results of net-trade models is usually be-
yond doubts.104 But in addition, it has more to offer. It can take into account, that the prices 
producers and consumers of sugar in a particular country face and that they compare with 
domestic prices in their decision making are in many cases not dependent on the world mar-
ket price in New York City or London (and MFN-trade policies of their country), but on 
prices in countries with special bilateral trade relationships to their countries (and on these 
bilateral policies). 
Some adjustments of the model with respect to the coverage of real world relation-
ships could, however, contribute to enhancing the accuracy of reproduction of the base data. 
The most important step would be the distinction between raw and white sugar and the ac-
commodation of a refining activity in the model.105 This would allow accounting for the dif-
ference in transportation costs between both types of sugar and avoid the mistakes in the rep-
resentation of situations as they have been described for the imports of Norway. Other steps 
could be a better empirical foundation of trade policies of the countries in the model and 
transportation cost parameters. 
                                                 
104 Of course, not beyond the doubts that apply to the concept of equilibrium modeling in general. 
105 This, however, requires the model to become dynamic, i.e. to allow the building up of refining capacities 
over time, to be meaningful for projections. Otherwise the interlinkages between the markets for both types of 
sugar would be heavily underestimated.  
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With all these facts correctly accounted for, the model would still not be able to re-
produce observed base data. This phenomenon also occurs of course with all normative pro-
gramming-based models and economists applying them have searched for solutions to that 
problem. For agricultural supply models it has been addressed by the development of posi-
tive mathematical programming (PMP) by Howitt (1995) and others. A detailed explanation 
of PMP would be beyond the scope of the study. In summary, it allows to convert a norma-
tive programming model into a positive one, i.e. give it the ability to reproduce base data. 
This is done by assigning a cost term to every observed activity and calibrating it such that 
the optimal outcome of the model accounting for this additional cost term is identical to the 
observed situation. Similarly, one could imagine attaching such a cost term to every ob-
served trade flow in the base data of a SPE model and calibrating these costs such that the 
base data is reproduced. The question remains, however, how to treat the trade flows which 
are not observed, but which are regarded possible, i.e. which costs to attach to them? Any 
arbitrary (positive) amount (or function) of costs would be possible, since it does not influ-
ence the base situation. The same applies by the way also to supply models applying PMP. 
The modeler must take a decision about how to treat activities which are not pursued in the 
base, but may become profitable under policy scenarios. 
The possible steps to enhance the model discussed above could help improving not 
only the accuracy of reproduction of base data, but also the quality of the projections. Addi-
tionally, there are some other possible adjustments, which although they will not have an 
impact on the accuracy of base data reproduction, will also contribute to improving simula-
tion results. These include the separate modeling of agricultural production and processing, 
which would also facilitate the accommodation of further crop production activities in the 
model and the modeling of non-food (i.e. ethanol) use of sugar crops. Also assumptions 
about different inflation rates and changing exchange rates, which can heavily impact agri-
cultural trade106, could in future be made to enhance projections.  
As discussed in section 3.1 already, all these model adjustments, which would cer-
tainly improve the quality of the projection results would, however, require a large amount of 
empirical work to be a realistic representation of real world constraints. Even without ac-
commodating further features into the model applied here, better empirical foundation of 
assumptions, parameters and constraints could go a long way towards improving the simula-
tion results, which is of course the case for any equilibrium model based study and usually 
                                                 
106 See Grethe and Nolte (2005) 
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pointed out by the authors. For various reasons, the amount of empirical work which is actu-
ally carried out in order to enhance the quality of equilibrium models remains, however, low 
as compared to efforts of developing them methodologically.  
Good empirical foundation is as the study has shown of particular importance for the 
approach used here, as it cannot be calibrated to reproduce any set of base data. The fact that 
the other model types which have been discussed in chapter 3, net-trade models and Arming-
ton-based gross trade models, do not exhibit this problem poses at first glance a significant 
advantage for these approaches. Perhaps it is this advantage which is the primary reason for 
their prevalence in agricultural economic equilibrium model analyses.  
 x
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A-1 
Annex I: Base Data of the Model 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price Own Price Elasticity MFN Tariffs
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   Supply Demand specific ad valorem 
AT 0.426     390 *   
BE 0.912     390     *       
CZ 0.524     465     *       
DK 0.488     440     *       
ES 1.002     540     *       
FI 0.147     540     *       
FR 4.187     390     *       
GE 3.921     390     *       
GR 0.309     540     *       
HU 0.467     465     *       
IE 0.209     540     *       
IT 1.506     540     *       
LT 0.123     515     *       
LV 0.067     515     *       
NL 0.865     390     *       
PL 1.891     415     *       
PT 0.072     540     *       
SI 0.043     515     *       
SK 0.224     515     *       
SW 0.399     390     *       
UK 1.287     390     *       
ALB 0.003   0.081  249.2   264.2  0.652 -0.075  10%   
BOS     0.121      341.2    -0.075  10%   
BUL 0.002   0.25  444   459  * -0.075 106.5 50%   
EUR     17.258      712    -0.088 537    
NOR     0.165      329.05    -0.157 172    
ROM 0.041   0.517  452   467  * -0.075 92.7 60%   
RUS 2.161   5.891  342.5   357.5  0.652 -0.075 114    
SER 0.345   0.306  354.9   369.9  0.652 -0.075  20%   
SWI 0.202   0.382  540   723  0.028 -0.157 431    
TUR 1.865   1.84  521.8   536.8  0.050 -0.100  135%   
ALG     1.082      250.2    -0.100  5%   
BEN 0.004   0.033  629.5   279.9  0.333 -0.100  20%   
BUR 0.035   0.063  339.7   354.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
CDR 0.054   0.083  258.593   273.593  0.333 -0.100  20%   
CON 0.048   0.056  286.1   301.1  0.333 -0.100  30%   
COT 0.117   0.204  263.7   278.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
EGY 1.421   2.295  249.2   264.2  0.333 -0.100  10%   
ETH 0.284   0.264  242.55   257.55  0.333 -0.100  5%   
GAB 0.019   0.019  286.1   301.1  0.333 -0.100  30%   
GUI 0.023   0.104  263.7   278.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
KEN 0.486   0.67  444.5   459.5  0.333 -0.100  100%   
MAD 0.021   0.125  269.7   284.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
MAL 0.206   0.138  168.55   183.55  0.333 -0.100  8%   
MAU 0.505   0.039  625.5   306.3  0.333 -0.100  30%   
MLI 0.03   0.089  339.7   354.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
MOR 0.434   1.067  481.75   496.75  0.333 -0.100 181 35%   
MOZ 0.22   0.135  238.55   253.55  0.333 -0.100  68%   
NIG 0.01   1.067  328.5   343.5  0.333 -0.100  50%   
SAC     0.195      456    -0.075 30 164%   
SAF 2.067   1.423  167.5   456  0.333 -0.100 30 163%   
SEN 0.079   0.166  263.7   278.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
SRL 0.005   0.022  263.7   278.7  0.333 -0.100  20%   
SUD 0.701   0.711  304.55   319.55  0.333 -0.100  40%   
SWA 0.578   0.019  97.5   456  0.333 -0.100 30 352%   
TAN 0.219   0.406  442.5   457.5  0.333 -0.100  100%   
TOG     0.048       279.9     -0.100   20%   
Sources: F.O. Licht, 2007; ISO, 2007; FAPRI, 2006; European Commission, 2007; Banse et al., 2007; 
Elobeid and Beghin, 2005; USDA (various years); Haley and Suarez, 2004; Stout and Abler, 2003; 
UNCTAD, 2007; WTO, 2007; Briner, 2006; Sandrey and Vink, 2007; Fiji Islands Revenue and Cus-
toms Authority (2007) ; own adjustments and simulations. 
* Region does not have an isoelastic curve 
A-2 
Annex I continued: Base Data of the Model 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price Own Price Elasticity MFN Tariffs
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   Supply Demand specific ad valorem 
UGA 0.166   0.193  443.76 458.76 0.333 -0.100  100%
ZAM 0.229   0.104  168.55   183.55  0.333 -0.100  25%   
ZIM 0.399   0.279  168.55   183.55  0.333 -0.100  25%   
BAR 0.032   0.016  659.5   317.7  0.326 -0.100  40%   
BEL 0.099   0.011  243.7   258.7  0.326 -0.100  40%   
CAN 0.093   1.281  235   245  0.633 -0.046 16    
COR 0.349   0.223  161.5   176.5  0.326 -0.100  45%   
CUB 1.541   0.632  160.5   175.5  0.326 -0.100  10%   
DOM 0.439   0.303  249.7   264.7  0.326 -0.100  15%   
ELS 0.507   0.211  162.5   177.5  0.326 -0.100  40%   
GUA 1.766   0.584  158.5   173.5  0.326 -0.100  20%   
HAI     0.17      315.3    -0.100  40%   
HON 0.324   0.239  160.5   175.5  0.326 -0.100  40%   
JAM 0.133   0.111  442.5   315.3  0.326 -0.100  40%   
MEX 5.137   5.034  442.5   457.5  0.326 -0.100 294    
NIC 0.409   0.183  161.5   176.5  0.326 -0.100  20%   
PAN 0.148   0.107  441.5   456.5  0.326 -0.100  147%   
STK 0.018   0.005  441.5   316.7  0.326 -0.100  40%   
TRI 0.03   0.064  659.5   317.7  0.326 -0.100  40%   
UB 3.736     472     *       
UC 3.138     430     0.720       
USA     8.516      518    -0.046 302    
ARG 1.829   1.493  159.5   174.5  0.326 -0.100  20%   
BOL 0.291   0.238  167.256   182.256  0.326 -0.100  10%   
BRA 25.435   9.75  158.5   173.5  0.722 -0.091  16%   
CHL 0.352   0.636  228.86   345.86  0.652 -0.100 102 6%   
COL 2.311   1.437  157.5   172.5  0.326 -0.100  20%   
ECU 0.426   0.416  212.5   227.5  0.326 -0.100  20%   
GUY 0.252   0.021  246.7   234.5  0.326 -0.100  40%   
PAR 0.103   0.126  296.324   311.324  0.326 -0.100  30%   
PER 0.674   0.852  214.5   229.5  0.326 -0.100  25%   
SUR 0.004   0.02  301.7   316.7  0.326 -0.100  40%   
URU 0.007   0.104  224.7   239.7  0.326 -0.100  5%   
VEN 0.579   0.797  246.25   261.25  0.326 -0.100  15%   
BAN 0.114   0.948  290.5   305.5  0.313 -0.100  25%   
CHN 8.923   10.528  276.9   291.9  0.313 -0.100  20%   
IND 17.574   18.212  377.7   395.7  0.313 -0.100 15 60%   
INS 2.074   3.74  275.7   290.7  0.313 -0.100  20%   
IRN 1.228   1.9  279.44   294.44  0.313 -0.100  19%   
JAP 0.836   2.175  974   984  0.028 -0.078 744    
MLY 0.063   1.037  266   281  0.313 -0.100 33.5    
NEP 0.116   0.12  331.7   346.7  0.313 -0.100  10%   
PAK 3.052   3.862  299.1   314.1  0.313 -0.100  30%   
PNG 0.041   0.032  172.5   187.5  0.313 -0.100  70%   
PHI 2.001   1.863  323.76   338.76  0.313 -0.100  65%   
SOK     1.143      255.19    -0.157  3%   
THA 4.935   2.055  179.5   221.425  0.313 -0.105  65%   
AUS 4.875   1.098  180   190  0.620 -0.130     
FIJ 0.283   0.055  280   295  0.313 -0.100  27%   
REU 2.166   2.018  167.5   182.5  0.652 -0.157     
RNE 0.12   4.14  227.5   242.5  0.333 -0.075     
RAF 0.465   0.808  266.1   281.1  0.333 -0.075  20%   
RCA 0.065   0.031  159.5   174.5  0.326 -0.100     
RSA 0.152   2.244  232.5   247.5  0.313 -0.105     
REA 0.08   0.877  232.5   247.5  0.313 -0.105     
RSO 0.992   1.988   231.5   246.5   0.313 -0.105       
Sources: F.O. Licht, 2007; ISO, 2007; FAPRI, 2006; European Commission, 2007; Banse et al., 2007; 
Elobeid and Beghin, 2005; USDA (various years); Haley and Suarez, 2004; Stout and Abler, 2003; 
UNCTAD, 2007; WTO, 2007; Briner, 2006; Sandrey and Vink, 2007; Fiji Islands Revenue and Cus-
toms Authority (2007) ; own adjustments and simulations. 
* Region does not have an isoelastic curve 
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Annex II: Trade flows in the Base Period after Calibration 
Scheme Origin Destination
    ALB BOS EUR BUL ROM NOR 
Domestic ALB 0.0015       
Domestic EUR   15.3936     
Domestic BUL    0.0024    
Domestic ROM     0.0407   
MFN BRA 0.0790 0.1212  0.2479 0.4767   
CXL CUB   0.0543     
CXL GUA   0.0037     
CXL BRA   0.0220     
CXL AUS   0.0091     
Balkans ALB   0.0013     
Balkans REU   0.0053     
ACP SER   0.2250     
ACP CON   0.0102     
ACP COT   0.0102     
GSP ETH      0.1376 
ACP KEN   0.0100     
ACP MAD   0.0108     
ACP/GSP MAL   0.0208   0.0031 
ACP MAU   0.4910     
ACP/GSP MOZ   0.0120   0.0239 
ACP SWA   0.1182     
ACP TAN   0.0101     
ACP/GSP ZAM   0.0144   0.0006 
ACP ZIM   0.0234     
ACP BAR   0.0323     
ACP BEL   0.0399     
ACP JAM   0.1186     
ACP STK   0.0156     
ACP TRI   0.0297     
ACP GUY   0.1550     
ACP IND   0.0099     
ACP FIJ   0.1677     
EBA BEN   0.0038     
EBA BUR   0.0080     
EBA CDR   0.0117     
EBA ETH   0.0138     
EBA MOZ   0.0276     
EBA SUD   0.0164     
EBA BAN   0.0003     
EBA NEP   0.0090     
SPS CON   0.0017     
SPS COT   0.0100     
SPS KEN   0.0105     
SPS MAD   0.0017     
SPS MAU   0.0138     
SPS SWA   0.0300     
SPS ZIM   0.0250     
SPS BEL   0.0020     
SPS JAM   0.0064     
SPS GUY   0.0080     
SPS FIJ   0.0070     
SPS/EBA MAL   0.0126     
SPS/EBA TAN   0.0034     
SPS/EBA ZAM     0.0211       
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex II Continued: Trade flows in the Base Period after Calibration 
Scheme Origin Destination
    RUS SER SWI TUR ALG BEN 
Domestic RUS 2.1608       
Domestic SER  0.1199      
Domestic SWI   0.2023     
Domestic TUR    1.8397    
MFN BRA 3.7300 0.1863 0.1801  0.9318 0.0331 
EXS EUR     0.1500   
           
    BUR CDR CON COT EGY ETH 
Domestic BUR 0.0273       
Domestic CDR  0.0427      
Domestic CON   0.0293     
UEMOA/Domestic COT 0.0356   0.0380    
Domestic EGY     1.4206   
Domestic ETH      0.1323 
COMESA ZAM  0.0401      
MFN BRA   0.0262 0.1661 0.8744 0.1314 
           
    GAB GUI KEN MAD MAL MAU 
Domestic GAB 0.0190       
Domestic GUI  0.0226      
Domestic KEN   0.4657     
Domestic MAD    0.0023    
Domestic MAL     0.1380   
MFN BRA 0.0003 0.0817 0.1857 0.1225  0.0389 
COMESA MAL   0.0060     
COMESA ZAM   0.0070     
COMESA ZIM   0.0060     
           
    MLI MOR MOZ NIG SAC SAF 
UEMOA COT 0.0168       
Domestic MLI 0.0303       
Domestic MOR  0.4339      
Domestic MOZ   0.1351     
Domestic NIG    0.0097    
Domestic SAF      1.3776 
MFN SEN 0.0418       
SACU SWA     0.1950   
MFN HON  0.0542      
MFN BRA  0.5448  1.0574    
MFN RCA  0.0340      
SADC ZAM      0.0229 
SADC ZIM      0.0220 
           
    SEN SRL SUD SWA TAN TOG 
MFN MAL   0.0045     
Domestic SEN 0.0376       
Domestic SRL  0.0050      
Domestic SUD   0.6848     
Domestic SWA    0.0194    
Domestic TAN     0.2052   
MFN ZAM   0.0086     
MFN ZIM   0.0132     
MFN BRA 0.1280 0.0174     0.2007 0.0483 
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex II Continued: Trade flows in the Base Period after Calibration 
Scheme Origin Destination
    UGA ZAM ZIM BAR BEL CAN 
           
COMESA MAL 0.0054       
Domestic UGA 0.1661       
COMESA/Domestic ZAM 0.0103 0.1038      
COMESA/Domestic ZIM 0.0114  0.2785     
Domestic BEL     0.0109   
Domestic CAN      0.0610 
MFN CUB      0.1434 
MFN GUA      1.0762 
CARICOM GUY    0.0156    
           
    COR CUB DOM ELS GUA HAI 
           
Domestic/MFN COR 0.2233  0.0845     
Domestic/MFN CUB  0.6317 0.0031   0.1670 
Domestic DOM   0.2108     
Domestic ELS    0.2109    
Domestic GUA     0.5840   
MFN/Domestic HON   0.0049   0.0032 
           
    HON JAM MEX NIC PAN STK 
           
CARICOM BEL      0.0033 
MFN COR  0.0151      
MFN CUB  0.0911      
Domestic/MFN HON 0.2391 0.0050    0.0013 
Domestic MEX   5.0339     
Domestic NIC    0.1830    
Domestic PAN         0.1074   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
A-6 
Annex II Continued: Trade flows in the Base Period after Calibration 
Scheme Origin Destination
    TRI USA ARG BOL BRA CHL 
           
Domestic UB  3.7355      
Domestic UC  3.1376      
CARICOM BEL 0.0254       
Domestic ARG   1.4926     
Domestic BOL    0.2385    
Domestic BRA     9.7503   
Domestic CHL      0.3520 
MFN COL      0.1786 
CARICOM GUY 0.0385       
TRQ CON  0.0067      
TRQ COT  0.0067      
TRQ MAD  0.0067      
TRQ MAL  0.0162      
TRQ MOZ  0.0211      
TRQ SAF  0.0373      
TRQ SWA  0.0259      
TRQ ZIM  0.0194      
TRQ BEL  0.0179      
TRQ CAN  0.0319      
TRQ COR  0.0243    0.0015 
TRQ DOM  0.2284      
TRQ ELS  0.0422    0.0015 
TRQ GUA  0.0778    0.0215 
TRQ HON  0.0162      
TRQ JAM  0.0083      
TRQ/NAFTA MEX  0.1032      
TRQ NIC  0.0341      
TRQ PAN  0.0408      
TRQ STK  0.0026      
TRQ ARG  0.0698    0.0346 
TRQ BOL  0.0130    0.0120 
TRQ BRA  0.2351    0.0177 
TRQ COL  0.0390    0.0162 
TRQ ECU  0.0179      
TRQ GUY  0.0194      
TRQ PAR  0.0067      
TRQ PER  0.0665      
TRQ URU  0.0067      
TRQ IND  0.0104      
TRQ PNG  0.0067      
TRQ PHI  0.2023      
TRQ THA  0.0227      
TRQ AUS  0.1347      
TRQ FIJ  0.0117      
TRQ REA  0.0126      
           
    COL ECU GUY PAR PER SUR 
           
Preferential BOL    0.0273    
Preferential BRA   0.0213 0.0023    
Domestic/ANDEAN COL 1.4371 0.0075   0.2448   
Domestic ECU  0.4083      
CARICOM GUY      0.0156 
Domestic PAR    0.0967    
Domestic PER     0.6076   
Domestic SUR           0.0044 
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
A-7 
Annex II Continued: Trade flows in the Base Period after Calibration 
Scheme Origin Destination
    URU VEN BAN CHN IND INS 
           
MFN SAF   0.0439  0.1807   
MFN SWA   0.0976     
MFN GUA  0.0025      
MFN BRA 0.1041  0.6928  0.4779 0.9963 
MFN COL  0.2154      
Domestic URU 0.0002       
Domestic VEN  0.5789      
Domestic BAN   0.1139     
Domestic CHN    8.9233    
Domestic IND     17.5537   
Domestic INS      2.0735 
MFN THA    1.1525    
MFN AUS    0.0017  0.6705 
TRQ CUB    0.4500    
           
    IRN JAP MLY NEP PAK PNG 
           
MFN SAF 0.2455    0.1106   
MFN SWA 0.0515    0.0409   
MFN ELS  0.2293      
MFN NIC  0.1687      
MFN ARG 0.2323       
MFN BRA    0.0125 0.6588   
Domestic IRN 1.2281       
Domestic JAP  0.8356      
Domestic MLY   0.0634     
Domestic NEP    0.1071    
Domestic PAK     3.0522   
MFN/Domestic PNG   0.0023   0.0321 
MFN AUS  0.8987 0.9712     
MFN REU 0.1427       
TRQ FIJ  0.0422      
           
    PHI SOK THA AUS FIJ REU 
           
MFN ELS  0.0229      
MFN NIC  0.0229      
MFN COL  0.1721      
Domestic PHI 1.7985       
ASEAN/MFN/Dom. THA 0.0641 0.8319 2.0549     
MFN/Domestic AUS  0.0937  1.0983    
Domestic FIJ     0.0545   
Domestic REU      2.0184 
           
    RNE RAF RCA RSA REA RSO 
           
MFN SAF    0.0714    
MFN BRA 0.4702 0.3428  2.0206    
MFN THA     0.8089   
MFN AUS     0.0014 0.9956 
Domestic RNE 0.1204       
Domestic RAF  0.4653      
Domestic RCA   0.0309     
Domestic RSA    0.1524    
Domestic REA     0.0671   
Domestic RSO      0.9921 
Export Subsidies EUR 3.5239       
Export Subsidies TUR 0.0258           
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex III: Results of the Baseline Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.3873     365      
BE 0.8198     362      
CZ 0.4549     365      
DK 0.4207     386      
ES 0.7533     416      
FI 0.1082     416      
FR 4.0325     365      
GE 3.6555     360      
GR 0.1464     416      
HU 0.4017     370      
IE              
IT 0.7251     416      
LT 0.103     404      
LV              
NL 0.8646     369      
PL 1.6719     359      
PT 0.0402     416      
SI              
SK 0.1849     416      
SW 0.3257     321      
UK 1.1386     345      
ALB 0.0033   0.0934  276   291   
BOS     0.1409      368   
BUL 0.0029   0.2803  419   434   
EUR 16.2343   18.633      426   
NOR     0.1876      396   
ROM 0.0435   0.6103  419   434   
RUS 2.42   6.0857  344   359   
SER 0.3604   0.3604  321   336   
SWI 0.2023   0.4532  525   662   
TUR 2.0592   2.1726  582   597   
ALG     1.2432      277   
BEN 0.0035   0.0383  342   309   
BUR 0.0404   0.0729  369   384   
CDR 0.0664   0.0956  340   310   
CON 0.0553   0.0642  317   332   
COT 0.1353   0.2362  293   308   
EGY 1.663   2.8181  276   291   
ETH 0.3541   0.3052  341   284   
GAB 0.0224   0.0223  341   334   
GUI 0.0275   0.1207  343   308   
KEN 0.5608   0.7757  493   508   
MAD 0.0258   0.1444  337   314   
MAL 0.2678   0.1546  266   281   
MAU 0.468   0.045  360   339   
MLI 0.0347   0.1031  369   384   
MOR 0.4906   1.3347  478   493   
MOZ 0.2744   0.1535  336   337   
NIG 0.0112   1.2347  365   380   
SAC     0.2258      517   
SAF 2.4968   1.5619  191   517   
SEN 0.0967   0.1916  344   308   
SRL 0.0061   0.0259  343   308   
SUD 0.812   0.822  342   357   
SWA 0.692   0.0222  121   560   
TAN 0.2526   0.4695  493   508   
TOG     0.0559       309   
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex III continued: Results of the Baseline Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1914   0.2236 490 505
ZAM 0.2969   0.1163  266   281   
ZIM 0.4747   0.3196  205   220   
BAR 0.0297   0.018  366   353   
BEL 0.1155   0.0126  277   292   
CAN 0.1037   1.421  257   267   
COR 0.4057   0.2578  184   199   
CUB 1.7309   0.6769  183   198   
DOM 0.507   0.3509  278   293   
ELS 0.5888   0.2436  185   200   
GUA 1.943   0.7337  181   196   
HAI     0.1968      350   
HON 0.3777   0.2759  184   199   
JAM 0.1359   0.1287  337   350   
MEX 5.6973   5.6973  470   485   
NIC 0.4749   0.2114  184   199   
PAN 0.1511   0.1289  336   351   
STK 0.0186   0.0053  336   351   
TRI 0.0273   0.0739  365   353   
UB 3.8379     391      
UC 3.2236     382      
USA     8.7858      414   
ARG 2.2705   1.768  181   196   
BOL 0.3335   0.2765  183   198   
BRA 31.3698   11.3088  181   196   
CHL 0.4192   0.742  253   350   
COL 2.9407   1.7647  179   194   
ECU 0.4906   0.4815  235   250   
GUY 0.2927   0.0247  280   259   
PAR 0.1176   0.1467  315   330   
PER 0.8491   1.01  238   253   
SUR 0.0051   0.0231  337   352   
URU 0.0079   0.1208  248   263   
VEN 0.6382   0.9556  274   289   
BAN 0.133   1.097  335   338   
CHN 9.9578   11.9288  305   320   
IND 21.9972   21.9972  410   427   
INS 2.3645   4.1764  305   320   
IRN 1.3542   2.2456  309   324   
JAP 1.0018   2.1962  1013   1023   
MLY 0.0724   1.2662  283   298   
NEP 0.1327   0.1387  359   374   
PAK 3.8275   4.8065  332   347   
PNG 0.0476   0.0371  195   210   
PHI 2.3749   2.2695  317   332   
SOK     1.2399      279   
THA 6.5428   2.4607  201   246   
AUS 5.862   1.2254  202   212   
FIJ 0.3066   0.0643  255   270   
REU 2.6264   2.3152  191   206   
RNE 0.1388   4.8045  252   267   
RAF 0.5374   0.9372  296   311   
RCA 0.0755   0.0357  182   197   
RSA 0.1754   2.5966  258   273   
REA 0.0915   1.0159  256   271   
RSO 1.1405   2.3004   256   271   
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex III continued: Trade flows in the Baseline Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    ALB BOS EUR BUL ROM NOR 
           
Domestic ALB 0.0020       
Domestic EUR   16.2343     
Domestic BUL    0.0029    
Domestic ROM     0.0435   
EBA BEN   0.0034     
EBA CDR   0.0664     
EBA ETH   0.3270 0.0136 0.0134   
EBA GAB   0.0224     
EBA GUI   0.0275     
EBA MAD    0.0070 0.0068   
EBA MAL   0.0460 0.0191 0.0190   
EBA MOZ   0.2288 0.0162 0.0160   
EBA SEN   0.0967     
EBA SRL   0.0061     
EBA SUD    0.0057 0.1756   
EBA ZAM   0.0493 0.0191 0.0190   
EBA BAN   0.1055 0.0138 0.0137   
MFN BRA 0.0914 0.1409      
MFN COL      0.1478 
MFN RCA      0.0398 
CXL CUB   0.0543     
CXL GUA   0.0037     
CXL BRA   0.0220 0.1828 0.3033   
CXL AUS   0.0091     
Balkans ALB   0.0013     
Balkans REU   0.0053     
ACP CON   0.0113     
ACP COT   0.0113     
ACP MAD   0.0120     
ACP MAL   0.0231     
ACP MAU   0.4680     
ACP MOZ   0.0133     
ACP SWA   0.1311     
ACP ZAM   0.0160     
ACP ZIM   0.0260     
ACP BAR   0.0297     
ACP BEL   0.0443     
ACP JAM   0.1353     
ACP STK   0.0172     
ACP TRI   0.0273     
ACP GUY   0.1719     
ACP FIJ   0.1860     
                
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex III continued: Trade flows in the Baseline Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    RUS SER SWI TUR ALG BEN 
           
Domestic RUS 2.4200       
Domestic SER  0.3604      
Domestic SWI   0.2023     
Domestic TUR    2.0592    
MFN BRA 3.6657  0.2509 0.1134 1.2432 0.0383 
           
    BUR CDR CON COT EGY ETH 
           
Domestic BUR 0.0404       
Domestic CON   0.0372     
UEMOA/Domestic COT 0.0325   0.0164    
Domestic EGY     1.4718   
MFN BRA  0.0956 0.0270 0.2198 1.3463 0.3052 
           
    GAB GUI KEN MAD MAL MAU 
           
Domestic KEN   0.5608     
Domestic MAL     0.1546   
MFN BRA 0.0223 0.1207 0.1960 0.1444  0.0450 
COMESA MAL   0.0060     
COMESA ZAM   0.0070     
COMESA ZIM   0.0060     
           
    MLI MOR MOZ NIG SAC SAF 
           
UEMOA COT 0.0684       
Domestic MLI 0.0347       
Domestic MOR  0.4906      
Domestic NIG    0.0112    
Domestic SAF      1.4242 
SACU SWA   0.1535  0.2258   
MFN BRA  0.8441  1.2235    
SADC ZAM      0.0702 
SADC ZIM      0.0675 
           
    SEN SRL SUD SWA TAN TOG 
           
COMESA EGY   0.1912     
Domestic SUD   0.6307     
Domestic SWA    0.0222    
Domestic TAN     0.2526   
MFN BRA 0.1916 0.0259   0.2169 0.0559 
                
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex III continued: Trade flows in the Baseline Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    UGA ZAM ZIM BAR BEL CAN 
           
Domestic UGA 0.1914       
Domestic ZAM  0.1163      
COMESA/Domestic ZIM 0.0323  0.3196     
Domestic BEL     0.0126   
Domestic CAN      0.0654 
MFN CUB    0.0006  0.3054 
MFN GUA      1.0502 
CARICOM GUY    0.0175    
           
    COR CUB DOM ELS GUA HAI 
           
Domestic/MFN COR 0.2578  0.0601     
Domestic/MFN CUB  0.6769 0.0263   0.1968 
Domestic DOM   0.2208     
Domestic ELS    0.2436    
Domestic GUA     0.7337   
MFN/Domestic HON   0.0437     
           
    HON JAM MEX NIC PAN STK 
           
CARICOM BEL  0.0371      
MFN COR  0.0450      
MFN CUB  0.0167    0.0040 
Domestic/MFN HON 0.2759 0.0300      
Domestic MEX   5.6973     
Domestic NIC    0.2114    
Domestic PAN     0.1289   
Domestic STK      0.0013 
                
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex III continued: Trade flows in the Baseline Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    TRI USA ARG BOL BRA CHL 
           
Domestic UB  3.8379      
Domestic UC  3.2236      
Domestic ARG   1.7680     
Domestic BOL    0.2765    
Domestic BRA     11.3088   
Domestic CHL      0.4192 
MFN COL      0.2178 
CARICOM GUY 0.0739       
TRQ CON  0.0067      
TRQ COT  0.0067      
TRQ SAF  0.0448      
TRQ SWA  0.0313      
TRQ ZIM  0.0234      
TRQ BEL  0.0216      
TRQ CAN  0.0383      
TRQ COR  0.0294    0.0015 
TRQ DOM  0.2753      
TRQ ELS  0.0509    0.0015 
TRQ GUA  0.0937    0.0215 
TRQ HON  0.0195      
TRQ JAM  0.0006      
TRQ NIC  0.0411      
TRQ PAN  0.0222      
TRQ ARG  0.0841    0.0346 
TRQ BOL  0.0158    0.0120 
TRQ BRA  0.2836    0.0177 
TRQ COL  0.0470    0.0162 
TRQ ECU  0.0216      
TRQ GUY  0.0234      
TRQ PER  0.0802      
TRQ URU  0.0067      
TRQ PNG  0.0067      
TRQ PHI  0.1054      
TRQ THA  0.0273      
TRQ AUS  0.1625      
TRQ FIJ  0.0141      
TRQ REA  0.0151      
CAFTA COR  0.0119      
CAFTA DOM  0.0109      
CAFTA ELS  0.0297      
CAFTA GUA  0.0402      
CAFTA HON  0.0087      
CAFTA NIC  0.0239      
           
    COL ECU GUY PAR PER SUR 
           
Preferential BOL    0.0292    
Preferential BRA   0.0247   0.0120 
Domestic/ANDEAN COL 1.7647 0.0125   0.2411   
Domestic ECU  0.4690      
CARICOM GUY      0.0060 
Domestic PAR    0.1176    
Domestic PER     0.7689   
Domestic SUR      0.0051 
                
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex III continued: Trade flows in the Baseline Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    URU VEN BAN CHN IND INS 
           
MFN SAF   0.7652     
MFN SWA   0.0695     
MFN ARG 0.1195       
MFN BRA   0.1192     
MFN COL  0.3174      
Domestic URU 0.0012       
Domestic VEN  0.6382      
Domestic CHN    9.9578    
Domestic IND     21.9972   
Domestic INS      2.3645 
MFN THA    1.5209    
MFN AUS   0.1431   1.8120 
TRQ CUB    0.4500    
           
    IRN JAP MLY NEP PAK PNG 
           
MFN SAF 0.2626       
MFN SWA 0.0586       
MFN ELS  0.2631      
MFN NIC  0.1986      
MFN ARG 0.2643       
MFN BRA    0.0060 0.9789   
Domestic IRN 1.3542       
Domestic JAP  1.0018      
Domestic MLY   0.0724     
Domestic NEP    0.1327    
Domestic PAK     3.8275   
MFN/Domestic PNG  0.0038    0.0371 
MFN THA  0.5306      
MFN AUS  0.1563 1.1938     
MFN REU 0.3059       
TRQ FIJ  0.0422      
           
    PHI SOK THA AUS FIJ REU 
           
MFN COL  0.1761      
Domestic PHI 2.2695       
MFN/Domestic THA  1.0638 2.4607     
Domestic AUS    1.2254    
Domestic FIJ     0.0643   
Domestic REU      2.3152 
           
    RNE RAF RCA RSA REA RSO 
           
MFN BRA 4.6658 0.3998  2.4212    
MFN THA     0.9395   
MFN AUS      1.1599 
Domestic RNE 0.1388       
Domestic RAF  0.5374      
Domestic RCA   0.0357     
Domestic RSA    0.1754    
Domestic REA     0.0764   
Domestic RSO      1.1405 
                
Source: Own simulations. 
A-15 
Annex IV: Results of the Doha Scenario 
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.3873     365      
BE 0.8198     362      
CZ 0.4549     365      
DK 0.3559     370      
ES 0.4844     370      
FI 0.0792     370      
FR 4.0325     365      
GE 3.6555     360      
GR 0.0551     370      
HU 0.4017     370      
IE       701      
IT 0.3518     370      
LT 0.0804     370      
LV       701      
NL 0.8646     369      
PL 1.6719     359      
PT 0.0205     370      
SI       701      
SK 0.1356     370      
SW 0.3257     321      
UK 1.1386     345      
ALB 0.0035   0.093  292   307   
BOS     0.1402      393   
BUL 0.0024   0.2826  373   388   
EUR 15.3154   18.8204      380   
NOR     0.1936      323   
ROM 0.0352   0.6154  373   388   
RUS 2.5233   6.0577  366   381   
SER 0.3604   0.3604  321   336   
SWI 0.096   0.4734  439   501   
TUR 1.6369   2.2185  469   484   
ALG     1.2329      300   
BEN 0.0034   0.038  321   336   
BUR 0.0414   0.0724  396   411   
CDR 0.0646   0.095  313   328   
CON 0.0554   0.0642  321   336   
COT 0.1394   0.2342  320   335   
EGY 1.7118   2.7949  301   316   
ETH 0.3374   0.3027  295   308   
GAB 0.0222   0.0222  332   347   
GUI 0.0269   0.1197  320   335   
KEN 0.5345   0.7866  427   442   
MAD 0.0255   0.1433  325   340   
MAL 0.2514   0.1574  220   235   
MAU 0.4473   0.0451  314   329   
MLI 0.0355   0.1024  396   411   
MOR 0.5008   1.3236  509   524   
MOZ 0.2613   0.155  290   305   
NIG 0.0115   1.2241  399   414   
SAC     0.232      359   
SAF 2.5883   1.6955  212   227   
SEN 0.0944   0.19  320   335   
SRL 0.0059   0.0257  320   335   
SUD 0.8021   0.8249  329   344   
SWA 0.7313   0.0252  142   157   
TAN 0.2464   0.4729  457   472   
TOG     0.0554       336   
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex IV continued: Results of the Doha Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1838   0.2263 434 449
ZAM 0.2787   0.1184  220   235   
ZIM 0.4638   0.3217  191   206   
BAR 0.0284   0.0181  320   335   
BEL 0.1148   0.0126  272   287   
CAN 0.1078   1.4172  273   283   
COR 0.4229   0.2548  209   224   
CUB 1.7694   0.6689  208   223   
DOM 0.5031   0.3517  272   287   
ELS 0.6118   0.241  208   223   
GUA 2.0267   0.7249  206   221   
HAI     0.1971      346   
HON 0.3944   0.2725  210   225   
JAM 0.1334   0.1294  318   333   
MEX 5.3864   5.7929  396   411   
NIC 0.4936   0.2091  207   222   
PAN 0.141   0.1315  272   287   
STK 0.0183   0.0053  320   335   
TRI 0.0265   0.074  332   347   
UB 2.2093     340      
UC 2.9669     340      
USA     8.8541      350   
ARG 2.3563   1.7494  202   217   
BOL 0.3375   0.2756  189   204   
BRA 34.1766   11.1961  203   218   
CHL 0.4906   0.7446  323   338   
COL 3.0728   1.7428  204   219   
ECU 0.507   0.4769  260   275   
GUY 0.2907   0.0244  274   281   
PAR 0.1162   0.1473  304   319   
PER 0.8781   1.0003  263   278   
SUR 0.005   0.0232  329   344   
URU 0.0081   0.12  267   282   
VEN 0.6506   0.9503  291   306   
BAN 0.135   1.0885  350   365   
CHN 10.2325   11.8302  332   347   
IND 21.9972   21.9972  410   427   
INS 2.4297   4.1419  332   347   
IRN 1.3887   2.2285  335   350   
JAP     2.3515  674   426   
MLY 0.0742   1.2569  306   321   
NEP 0.1355   0.1378  384   399   
PAK 3.9313   4.7673  361   376   
PNG 0.0493   0.0367  218   233   
PHI 2.2587   2.2587  270   348   
SOK     1.2241      303   
THA 6.7694   2.4343  224   272   
AUS 6.268   1.209  225   235   
FIJ 0.3241   0.0632  305   320   
REU 2.8182   2.2789  212   227   
RNE 0.1428   4.7751  274   289   
RAF 0.522   0.9431  271   286   
RCA 0.0792   0.0352  210   225   
RSA 0.1801   2.5748  280   295   
REA 0.094   1.0072  279   294   
RSO 1.1717   2.2807   279   294   
Source: Own simulations. 
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Annex IV continued: Tariff Cuts of the Doha Scenario 
 UR bound tariffs   Doha bound tariffs 
Post Doha applied 
tariffs 
 
Ad 
Valorem 
Tariffs 
Specific 
Duties 
cif 
price in 
base 
Ad valorem 
equivalent 
of specific 
duties 
Total Ad 
valorem 
equivalent 
Developing or 
industrialized 
county ad 
valorem 
specific 
duty   
ad 
valorem 
specific 
duty 
ad 
valorem 
specific 
duty 
ALB 10%  217  10% D 10% 6.6%  6.6%
BOS 10%  287  10% D        10.0%  
EUR   537 218 246% 246% I   419     125.7 0.0% 125.7 
NOR   172 218 79% 79% I   172     51.6 0.0% 51.6 
RUS   114 218 52% 52% D        0.0% 114 
SER 20%  287  20% D        20.0%  
SWI   431 275 157% 157% I   429 +73   128.7 0.0% 201.7 
TUR 135%  218  135% D 135%    72.5%  72.5%  
ALG 5%  214  5% D        5.0%  
BEN 20%  212  20% D 60%    37.0%  20.0%  
BUR 20%  281  20% D 100%    57.7%  20.0%  
CDR 20%  212  20% D 100%    57.7%  20.0%  
CON 30%  212  30% D 30%    19.8%  19.8%  
COT 20%  211  20% D 15%    9.9%  9.9%  
EGY 10%  217  10% D 20%    13.2%  10.0%  
ETH 5%  221  5% D        5.0%  
GAB 30%  212  30% D 60%    37.0%  30.0%  
GUI 20%  211  20% D 40%    24.7%  20.0%  
KEN 100%  217  100% D 100%    57.7%  57.7%  
MAD 20%  216  20% D 30%    19.8%  19.8%  
MAL 8%  224.8  8% D 125%    72.1%  7.5%  
MAU 30%  216  30% D 122%    70.4%  30.0%  
MLI 20%  281  20% D 60%    37.0%  20.0%  
MOR 35% 181 215 84% 119% D 168%    90.2%  90.2%  
MOZ 68%  163  68% D 100%    57.7%  57.7%  
NIG 50%  212  50% D 150%    80.6%  50.0%  
SAC 164% 30 163 18% 183% D 105%    60.6%  60.6%  
SAF 163% 30 163 18% 182% D 105%    60.6%  60.6%  
SEN 20%  211  20% D 30%    19.8%  19.8%  
SRL 20%  211  20% D 40%    24.7%  20.0%  
SUD 40%  222  40% D        40.0%  
SWA 352% 30 233 13% 365% D 105%    60.6%  60.6%  
TAN 100%  216  100% D 120%    69.2%  69.2%  
TOG 20%  212  20% D 80%    49.4%  20.0%  
UGA 100%  287  100% D 80%    49.4%  49.4%  
ZAM 25%  224.8  25% D 125%    72.1%  25.0%  
ZIM 25%  224.8  25% D 150%    80.6%  25.0%  
BAR 40%  209  40% D 122%    70.4%  40.0%  
BEL 40%  205  40% D 100%    57.7%  40.0%  
CAN   16 212 8% 8% I   16     4.8 0.0% 4.8 
COR 45%  207  45% D 45%    27.8%  27.8%  
CUB 10%  207  10% D 40%    24.7%  10.0%  
DOM 15%  208  15% D 85%    49.0%  15.0%  
ELS 40%  203  40% D 70%    43.2%  40.0%  
GUA 20%  204  20% D 160%    85.9%  20.0%  
HAI 40%  207  40% D 40%    24.7%  24.7%  
HON 40%  207  40% D 40%    24.7%  24.7%  
JAM 40%  207  40% D 100%    57.7%  40.0%  
MEX   294 208 141% 141% D   294      0.0% 157.9 
NIC 20%  203  20% D 100%    57.7%  20.0%  
PAN 147%  204  147% D 144%    77.3%  77.3%  
STK 40%  208  40% D 130%    75.0%  40.0%  
TRI 40%  209  40% D 100%    57.7%  40.0%  
USA   302 208 145% 145% I   301     90.3 0.0% 90.3 
ARG 20%  204  20% D 35%    21.6%  20.0%  
BOL 10%  225  10% D 40%    24.7%  10.0%  
BRA 16%  205  16% D 35%    21.6%  16.0%  
CHL 6% 102 206 50% 56% D 98%    56.5%  3.5% 58.9 
COL 20%  205  20% D 117%    67.5%  20.0%  
ECU 20%  202  20% D 38%    23.1%  20.0%  
GUY 40%  209  40% D 100%    57.7%  40.0%  
PAR 30%  224  30% D 30%    19.8%  19.8%  
PER 25%  204  25% D 49%    30.2%  25.0%  
SUR 40%  209  40% D 20%    13.2%  13.2%  
URU 5%  204  5% D 35%    21.6%  5.0%  
VEN 15%  205  15% D 105%    60.6%  15.0%  
BAN 25%  224  25% D 200%    107.4%  25.0%  
CHN 20%  222  20% D 50%    30.9%  20.0%  
IND 60% 15 222 7% 67% D 150%    80.6%  60.0% 15 
INS 20%  221  20% D 95%    54.8%  20.0%  
IRN 19%  226  19% D        19.0%  
JAP 234% 223 223 334% 334% I   575     172.5 0.0% 172.5 
MLY   33.5 222 15% 15% D 15%      33.5 0.0% 33.5 
NEP 10%  292  10% D 60%    37.0%  10.0%  
PAK 30%  222  30% D 150%    80.6%  30.0%  
PNG 70%  217  70% D 75%    46.3%  46.3%  
PHI 65%  221  65% D 65%    40.1%  40.1%  
SOK 3%  223  3% I 18%    9.2%  3.0%  
THA 65%  221  65% D 94%    54.2%  54.2%  
FIJ 27%   215   27% D 40%     24.7%   24.7%   
Sources: FAPRI, 2006; Banse et al., 2007; USDA (various years); UNCTAD, 2007; ITC (2007); WTO, 
2007; Elobeid and Beghin, 2005; Briner, 2006; Sandrey and Vink, 2007; Fiji Islands Revenue and 
Customs Authority (2007); own adjustments and simulations. 
Remarks: Romania and Bulgaria are not included since they join the EU in 2007. Swiss tariff is 
amended by several duties which are also payable by domestic producers. The overall amount of 
these duties is not reduced under Doha. 
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Annex IV continued: Trade flows in the WTO Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    ALB BOS EUR BUL ROM NOR 
           
Domestic ALB 0.0022       
Domestic EUR   15.3154     
Domestic BUL    0.0024    
Domestic ROM     0.0352   
EBA ETH   0.0403 0.0500 0.2470   
EBA MAL   0.0462 0.0021 0.0041   
EBA MOZ   0.0482 0.0221 0.0153   
EBA ZAM   0.0644 0.0232 0.0105   
MFN BRA 0.0909 0.1402 1.9018   0.1936 
CXL CUB   0.0543     
CXL GUA   0.0037     
CXL BRA   0.0220 0.1828 0.3033   
CXL AUS   0.0091     
Balkans ALB   0.0013     
Balkans REU   0.0053     
ACP MAL   0.0358     
ACP MAU   0.4021     
ACP MOZ   0.0206     
ACP SWA   0.2034     
ACP ZAM   0.0248     
ACP ZIM   0.0403     
ACP BAR   0.0103     
ACP BEL   0.0687     
ACP JAM   0.0040     
ACP STK   0.0129     
ACP GUY   0.2667     
ACP FIJ   0.2187     
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex IV continued: Trade flows in the WTO Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    RUS SER SWI TUR ALG BEN 
           
Domestic RUS 2.5233       
Domestic SER  0.3604      
Domestic SWI   0.0960     
Domestic TUR    1.6369    
Domestic BEN      0.0034 
MFN BRA 3.5344  0.3774 0.5465 1.2329 0.0346 
MFN REU    0.0351    
           
    BUR CDR CON COT EGY ETH 
           
Domestic BUR 0.0414       
Domestic CDR  0.0646      
Domestic CON   0.0554     
UEMOA/Domestic COT 0.0310   0.0831    
Domestic EGY     1.7118   
COMESA ZAM  0.0304      
MFN BRA   0.0087 0.1511 1.0831 0.3027 
           
    GAB GUI KEN MAD MAL MAU 
           
Domestic GAB 0.0222       
Domestic GUI  0.0269      
Domestic KEN   0.5345     
Domestic MAD    0.0255    
Domestic MAL     0.1574   
Domestic MAU      0.0451 
COMESA ZIM    0.0307    
MFN ARG   0.0011     
MFN BRA  0.0928 0.2320 0.0871    
COMESA MAL   0.0060     
COMESA ZAM   0.0070     
COMESA ZIM   0.0060     
           
    MLI MOR MOZ NIG SAC SAF 
           
UEMOA COT 0.0253       
Domestic MLI 0.0355       
Domestic MOR  0.5008      
Domestic MOZ   0.1550     
Domestic NIG    0.0115    
Domestic SAF      1.6955 
UEMOA SEN 0.0416       
SACU SWA     0.2320   
MFN ARG  0.0200      
MFN BRA  0.8027  1.2126    
           
    SEN SRL SUD SWA TAN TOG 
           
Domestic SEN 0.0528       
Domestic SRL  0.0059      
Domestic SUD   0.8021     
Domestic SWA    0.0252    
Domestic TAN     0.2464   
COMESA ZIM   0.0227     
MFN ARG     0.0164   
MFN BRA 0.1372 0.0198   0.2101 0.0554 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex IV continued: Trade flows in the WTO Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    UGA ZAM ZIM BAR BEL CAN 
           
Domestic UGA 0.1838       
Domestic ZAM  0.1184      
COMESA/Domestic ZIM 0.0424  0.3217     
Domestic BAR    0.0181    
Domestic BEL     0.0126   
Domestic CAN      0.0750 
MFN CUB      0.2364 
MFN GUA      1.1058 
           
    COR CUB DOM ELS GUA HAI 
           
CARICOM BEL      0.0150 
Domestic COR 0.2548       
Domestic/MFN CUB  0.6689    0.1821 
Domestic DOM   0.3517     
Domestic ELS    0.2410    
Domestic GUA     0.7249   
           
    HON JAM MEX NIC PAN STK 
           
MFN CUB   0.1777     
Domestic HON 0.2725       
Domestic JAM  0.1294      
Domestic MEX   5.3864     
Domestic NIC    0.2091    
Domestic PAN     0.1315   
Domestic STK      0.0053 
MFN COL   0.2287     
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex IV continued: Trade flows in the WTO Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    TRI USA ARG BOL BRA CHL 
           
Domestic UB  2.2093      
Domestic UC  2.9669      
MFN COR  0.1137      
MFN HON  0.0859      
Domestic TRI 0.0265       
Domestic ARG   1.7494     
Domestic/MFN BOL    0.2756  0.0053 
MFN/Domestic BRA 0.0235 1.3276   11.1961   
Domestic CHL      0.4906 
MFN COL  0.3853    0.1437 
CARICOM GUY 0.0240       
MFN RCA  0.0440      
TRQ SAF  0.0625      
TRQ SWA  0.0436      
TRQ BEL  0.0185      
TRQ CAN  0.0328      
TRQ COR  0.0410    0.0015 
TRQ DOM  0.1415      
TRQ ELS  0.0709    0.0015 
TRQ GUA  0.1306    0.0215 
TRQ HON  0.0272      
TRQ NIC  0.0572      
TRQ PAN  0.0095      
TRQ ARG  0.1173    0.0346 
TRQ BOL  0.0135    0.0120 
TRQ BRA  0.3954    0.0177 
TRQ COL  0.0656    0.0162 
TRQ ECU  0.0301      
TRQ PER  0.0685      
TRQ PNG  0.0067      
TRQ THA  0.0381      
TRQ AUS  0.2266      
CAFTA COR  0.0119      
CAFTA DOM  0.0099      
CAFTA ELS  0.0297      
CAFTA GUA  0.0402      
CAFTA HON  0.0087      
CAFTA NIC  0.0239      
           
    COL ECU GUY PAR PER SUR 
           
Preferential BOL    0.0311    
Preferential BRA   0.0244   0.0181 
Domestic/ANDEAN COL 1.7428    0.1907   
Domestic ECU  0.4769      
Domestic PAR    0.1162    
Domestic PER     0.8096   
Domestic SUR      0.0050 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex IV continued: Trade flows in the WTO Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    URU VEN BAN CHN IND INS 
           
MFN SAF   0.7412     
MFN SWA   0.2123     
MFN ARG 0.1118       
MFN COL  0.2997      
Domestic URU 0.0081       
Domestic VEN  0.6506      
Domestic BAN   0.1350     
Domestic CHN    10.2325    
Domestic IND     21.9972   
Domestic INS      2.4297 
MFN THA    1.1477    
MFN AUS      1.7122 
TRQ CUB    0.4500    
           
    IRN JAP MLY NEP PAK PNG 
           
MFN SAF 0.0440    0.0018   
MFN SWA 0.0070   0.0010 0.0049   
MFN ELS  0.2687      
MFN NIC  0.2034      
MFN ARG 0.2898    0.0031   
MFN BRA    0.0013 0.8262   
Domestic IRN 1.3887       
Domestic MLY   0.0742     
Domestic NEP    0.1355    
Domestic PAK     3.9313   
MFN/Domestic PNG  0.0058    0.0367 
MFN THA  1.0119      
MFN AUS  0.8194 1.1827     
MFN REU 0.4989       
TRQ FIJ  0.0422      
           
    PHI SOK THA AUS FIJ REU 
           
Domestic PHI 2.2587       
MFN/Domestic THA  1.2241 2.4343     
Domestic AUS    1.2090    
Domestic FIJ     0.0632   
Domestic REU      2.2789 
           
    RNE RAF RCA RSA REA RSO 
           
MFN SAF    0.0432    
MFN SWA    0.0019    
MFN ARG  0.0108  0.0018    
MFN BRA 4.6323 0.4103  2.3478    
MFN THA     0.9132   
MFN AUS      1.1090 
Domestic RNE 0.1428       
Domestic RAF  0.5220      
Domestic RCA   0.0352     
Domestic RSA    0.1801    
Domestic REA     0.0940   
Domestic RSO      1.1717 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex V: Results of the EU Liberalization Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.1272     296      
BE 0.1964     296      
CZ 0.2485     296      
DK 0.0081     296      
ES       300      
FI 0.0238     296      
FR 1.3093     296      
GE 1.0839     296      
GR       345      
HU 0.1772     296      
IE              
IT       332      
LT 0.0227     296      
LV              
NL 0.2791     296      
PL 0.5647     296      
PT       327      
SI              
SK 0.0413     296      
SW 0.2619     296      
UK 0.6808     296      
ALB 0.0037   0.0922  329   344   
BOS     0.1394      421   
BUL 0.0015   0.2869  302   317   
EUR 5.025   19.1862      306   
NOR     0.1881      389   
ROM 0.0205   0.6248  302   317   
RUS 2.6377   6.028  392   407   
SER 0.3604   0.3604  321   336   
SWI 0.2023   0.4544  525   650   
TUR 2.1621   2.1621  611   626   
ALG     1.2223      328   
BEN 0.0035   0.0376  352   367   
BUR 0.0425   0.0719  427   442   
CDR 0.0649   0.0949  318   333   
CON 0.0587   0.0631  381   396   
COT 0.1438   0.2321  351   366   
EGY 1.764   2.771  329   344   
ETH 0.339   0.3021  299   314   
GAB 0.0222   0.0222  332   347   
GUI 0.0277   0.1186  351   366   
KEN 0.5954   0.7623  590   605   
MAD 0.0262   0.1421  353   368   
MAL 0.2531   0.1571  224   239   
MAU 0.4353   0.0455  289   304   
MLI 0.0364   0.1016  427   442   
MOR 0.512   1.3119  544   559   
MOZ 0.2625   0.1548  294   309   
NIG 0.0119   1.2132  437   452   
SAC     0.2221      643   
SAF 2.6891   1.5284  238   642   
SEN 0.0973   0.1883  351   366   
SRL 0.0061   0.0255  351   366   
SUD 0.8197   0.8197  352   367   
SWA 0.773   0.0215  168   775   
TAN 0.2682   0.4613  590   605   
TOG     0.0549       367   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex V continued: Results of the EU Liberalization Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1944   0.2229 514 522
ZAM 0.2805   0.1181  224   239   
ZIM 0.4869   0.3173  221   236   
BAR 0.0257   0.0187  234   249   
BEL 0.1093   0.0128  234   249   
CAN 0.1151   1.4107  302   312   
COR 0.4362   0.2525  230   245   
CUB 1.8001   0.663  229   244   
DOM 0.5366   0.3451  331   346   
ELS 0.6291   0.239  226   241   
GUA 2.0911   0.7184  227   242   
HAI     0.1994      308   
HON 0.4061   0.2703  230   245   
JAM 0.1298   0.1304  292   307   
MEX 5.6973   5.6973  470   485   
NIC 0.5083   0.2073  226   241   
PAN 0.1511   0.1289  336   351   
STK 0.0165   0.0055  234   249   
TRI 3.8379     391      
UB 3.2236     382      
UC 0.0254   0.075  291   306   
USA     8.7858      414   
ARG 2.4503   1.7299  228   243   
BOL 0.3497   0.2728  211   226   
BRA 37.2545   11.0829  229   244   
CHL 0.4718   0.732  304   400   
COL 3.176   1.7263  226   241   
ECU 0.5002   0.4788  249   264   
GUY 0.2758   0.0248  233   248   
PAR 0.1217   0.1453  350   365   
PER 0.9011   0.9927  285   300   
SUR 0.0048   0.0235  290   305   
URU 0.0084   0.1187  298   313   
VEN 0.6772   0.9392  329   344   
BAN 0.138   1.0811  376   391   
CHN 10.4307   11.7609  353   368   
IND 21.9972   21.9972  410   427   
INS 2.482   4.115  356   371   
IRN 1.4273   2.2098  366   381   
JAP 1.3118   2.1751  1148   1158   
MLY 0.0756   1.2495  326   341   
NEP 0.1373   0.1373  401   416   
PAK 4.042   4.7268  395   410   
PNG 0.0505   0.0364  236   251   
PHI 2.3749   2.2695  317   332   
SOK     1.2131      321   
THA 6.931   2.4162  241   292   
AUS 6.5993   1.1966  245   255   
FIJ 0.2979   0.0648  233   248   
REU 3.037   2.2408  238   253   
RNE 0.1472   4.7446  300   315   
RAF 0.5705   0.9253  354   369   
RCA 0.0814   0.0349  229   244   
RSA 0.1851   2.5523  306   321   
REA 0.0958   1.0011  296   311   
RSO 1.1968   2.2654   298   313   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex V continued: Trade flows in the EU Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination 
    ALB BOS EUR BUL ROM NOR 
           
Domestic ALB 0.0037       
Domestic EUR   4.7729     
Domestic BUL    0.0015    
Domestic ROM     0.0205   
MFN COR   0.0002     
MFN CUB   0.0052     
MFN NIC    0.0001 0.0001   
MFN BRA 0.0885 0.1394 13.5834 0.0798 0.0731   
MFN COL   0.8243     
MFN REU    0.1878 0.5202   
MFN RCA   0.0002 0.0177 0.0110   
GSP ETH      0.0369 
GSP MAL      0.0450 
GSP MOZ      0.1011 
GSP ZAM      0.0052 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex V continued: Trade flows in the EU Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    RUS SER SWI TUR ALG BEN 
           
MFN EUR   0.2521     
Domestic RUS 2.6377       
Domestic SER  0.3604      
Domestic SWI   0.2023     
Domestic TUR    2.1621    
Domestic BEN      0.0035 
MFN COR     0.1104   
MFN CUB     0.6510   
MFN BRA 3.3903    0.4609 0.0342 
           
    BUR CDR CON COT EGY ETH 
           
Domestic BUR 0.0425       
Domestic CDR  0.0649      
Domestic CON   0.0587     
UEMOA/Domestic COT 0.0295   0.1054    
Domestic EGY     1.7640   
Domestic ETH      0.3021 
COMESA ZAM  0.0300      
MFN BRA   0.0044 0.1267 1.0070   
           
    GAB GUI KEN MAD MAL MAU 
           
Domestic GAB 0.0222       
Domestic GUI  0.0277      
Domestic KEN   0.5954     
Domestic MAD    0.0262    
Domestic MAL     0.1571   
COMESA MAU    0.1159  0.0455 
EAC UGA   0.1058     
MFN ARG   0.0001     
MFN BRA  0.0909 0.0420     
COMESA MAL   0.0060     
COMESA ZAM   0.0070     
COMESA ZIM   0.0060     
           
    MLI MOR MOZ NIG SAC SAF 
           
UEMOA COT 0.0089       
Domestic MLI 0.0364       
Domestic MOR  0.5120      
Domestic MOZ   0.1548     
Domestic NIG    0.0119    
Domestic SAF      1.3907 
UEMOA SEN 0.0563       
SACU SWA     0.2221   
MFN ELS  0.2331      
MFN HON  0.0767      
MFN NIC  0.1960      
MFN ARG  0.1033      
MFN BRA  0.1338  1.2013    
MFN GUY  0.0394      
MFN RCA  0.0176      
SADC ZAM      0.0702 
SADC ZIM      0.0675 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex V continued: Trade flows in the EU Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    SEN SRL SUD SWA TAN TOG 
           
MFN MAL     0.0383   
Domestic SEN 0.0410       
Domestic SRL  0.0061      
Domestic SUD   0.8197     
Domestic SWA    0.0215    
Domestic TAN     0.2682   
EAC UGA     0.0886   
MFN ZAM     0.0500   
MFN ARG     0.0001   
MFN BRA 0.1473 0.0193   0.0161 0.0549 
    UGA ZAM ZIM BAR BEL CAN 
           
COMESA MAU 0.2229       
Domestic ZAM  0.1181      
Domestic ZIM   0.3173     
Domestic BAR    0.0187    
Domestic BEL     0.0128   
Domestic CAN      0.0772 
MFN ELS      0.0754 
MFN GUA      1.2179 
MFN NIC      0.0402 
           
    COR CUB DOM ELS GUA HAI 
           
Domestic/MFN COR 0.2578  0.0601     
Domestic/MFN CUB  0.6769 0.0263   0.1968 
Domestic DOM   0.2208     
Domestic ELS    0.2436    
Domestic GUA     0.7337   
MFN/Domestic HON   0.0437     
           
    HON JAM MEX NIC PAN STK 
           
CARICOM BEL  0.0074      
Domestic HON 0.2703       
Domestic JAM  0.1231      
Domestic MEX   5.6973     
Domestic NIC    0.2073    
Domestic PAN     0.1289   
Domestic STK      0.0055 
           
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
A-28 
Annex V continued: Trade flows in the EU Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    TRI USA ARG BOL BRA CHL 
           
Domestic UB  3.8379      
Domestic UC  3.2236      
MFN BAR 0.0070       
Domestic TRI 0.0254       
Domestic ARG   1.7299     
Domestic/MFN BOL    0.2728  0.0256 
Domestic BRA     11.0829   
Domestic CHL      0.4718 
MFN COL      0.1296 
CARICOM GUY 0.0426       
TRQ MAL  0.0067      
TRQ MOZ  0.0067      
TRQ SAF  0.0445      
TRQ SWA  0.0310      
TRQ ZIM  0.0232      
TRQ BEL  0.0214      
TRQ CAN  0.0379      
TRQ COR  0.0291    0.0015 
TRQ DOM  0.2730      
TRQ ELS  0.0504    0.0015 
TRQ GUA  0.0930    0.0215 
TRQ HON  0.0194      
TRQ JAM  0.0067      
TRQ NIC  0.0407      
TRQ PAN  0.0222      
TRQ STK  0.0067      
TRQ ARG  0.0834    0.0346 
TRQ BOL  0.0157    0.0120 
TRQ BRA  0.2809    0.0177 
TRQ COL  0.0465    0.0162 
TRQ ECU  0.0214      
TRQ GUY  0.0232      
TRQ PER  0.0794      
TRQ URU  0.0067      
TRQ PNG  0.0067      
TRQ PHI  0.1054      
TRQ THA  0.0270      
TRQ AUS  0.1611      
TRQ FIJ  0.0140      
TRQ REA  0.0150      
CAFTA COR  0.0119      
CAFTA DOM  0.0109      
CAFTA ELS  0.0297      
CAFTA GUA  0.0402      
CAFTA HON  0.0087      
CAFTA NIC  0.0239      
           
    COL ECU GUY PAR PER SUR 
           
MFN BOL    0.0236    
Domestic/ANDEAN COL 1.7263    0.1710   
Domestic ECU  0.4788      
Domestic/CARICOM GUY   0.0248   0.0186 
Domestic PAR    0.1217    
Domestic PER     0.8217   
Domestic SUR      0.0048 
           
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex V continued: Trade flows in the EU Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination 
    URU VEN BAN CHN IND INS 
           
MFN GUA  0.0001      
MFN ARG 0.1170       
MFN COL  0.2619      
Domestic URU 0.0017       
Domestic VEN  0.6772      
Domestic BAN   0.1380     
Domestic CHN    10.4307    
Domestic IND     21.9972   
Domestic INS      2.4820 
MFN THA   0.0969 0.8802    
MFN AUS   0.8462   1.6330 
TRQ CUB    0.4500    
           
    IRN JAP MLY NEP PAK PNG 
           
MFN SAF 0.0000    0.0000   
MFN SWA 0.1835    0.1497   
MFN ARG 0.1403    0.1126   
MFN BRA     0.1978   
Domestic IRN 1.4273       
Domestic JAP  1.3118      
Domestic MLY   0.0756     
Domestic NEP    0.1373    
Domestic PAK     4.0420   
MFN/Domestic PNG   0.0074   0.0364 
MFN THA 0.2055 0.7141   0.1345   
MFN AUS 0.1650  1.1248  0.0902   
MFN FIJ  0.1070 0.0416     
MFN REU 0.0882       
TRQ FIJ  0.0422      
           
    PHI SOK THA AUS FIJ REU 
           
Domestic PHI 2.2695       
MFN/Domestic THA  1.2131 2.4162     
Domestic AUS    1.1966    
Domestic FIJ     0.0648   
Domestic REU      2.2408 
           
    RNE RAF RCA RSA REA RSO 
           
MFN MAU  0.0510      
MFN SAF    1.2538    
MFN SWA    0.1652    
MFN ZIM  0.0729      
MFN ARG  0.0206  0.1084    
MFN BRA 4.5974 0.2103  0.1740    
MFN PNG      0.0000 
MFN THA    0.3233 0.9203   
MFN AUS    0.3423  1.0403 
MFN FIJ      0.0283 
Domestic RNE 0.1472       
Domestic RAF  0.5705      
Domestic RCA   0.0349     
Domestic RSA    0.1851    
Domestic REA     0.0808   
Domestic RSO      1.1968 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.2477     329      
BE 0.4801     329      
CZ 0.3445     329      
DK 0.1502     329      
ES 0.1952     329      
FI 0.0448     329      
FR 2.5315     329      
GE 2.2852     329      
GR       350      
HU 0.2752     329      
IE       329      
IT       337      
LT 0.0483     329      
LV       329      
NL 0.513     329      
PL 1.1316     329      
PT       330      
SI       329      
SK 0.0824     329      
SW 0.3357     329      
UK 0.9475     329      
ALB 0.0038   0.0921  333   348   
BOS     0.1395      418   
BUL 0.0019   0.2848  335   350   
EUR 9.6128   19.0122      339   
NOR     0.192      341   
ROM 0.0262   0.6201  335   350   
RUS 2.3772   6.0977  334   349   
SER 0.3648   0.3599  327   342   
SWI     0.5033  373   339   
TUR     2.2913  503   350   
ALG     1.2155      346   
BEN 0.0034   0.0379  328   343   
BUR 0.0415   0.0724  397   412   
CDR 0.0657   0.0946  329   344   
CON 0.0559   0.064  328   343   
COT 0.1405   0.2337  327   342   
EGY 1.7718   2.7675  333   348   
ETH 0.3487   0.2997  325   340   
GAB 0.0222   0.0223  329   344   
GUI 0.0271   0.1194  327   342   
KEN 0.4924   0.8055  333   348   
MAD 0.0257   0.143  332   347   
MAL 0.2636   0.1553  253   268   
MAU 0.4282   0.0457  275   290   
MLI 0.0356   0.1023  397   412   
MOR 0.4343   1.3357  331   346   
MOZ 0.2566   0.1558  274   289   
NIG 0.0108   1.2471  328   343   
SAC     0.2356      292   
SAF 2.809   1.6568  271   286   
SEN 0.0951   0.1896  327   342   
SRL 0.006   0.0256  327   342   
SUD 0.8103   0.8225  339   354   
SWA 0.821   0.0244  201   216   
TAN 0.2209   0.488  329   344   
TOG     0.0553       343   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI continued: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.179   0.228 401 416
ZAM 0.2922   0.1168  253   268   
ZIM 0.4741   0.3197  204   219   
BAR 0.0268   0.0184  267   282   
BEL 0.1145   0.0126  269   284   
CAN 0.1209   1.4058  327   337   
COR 0.4587   0.2489  268   283   
CUB 1.5728   0.6534  267   282   
DOM 0.5012   0.352  268   283   
ELS 0.662   0.2355  264   279   
GUA 2.1975   0.7082  264   279   
HAI     0.1973      341   
HON 0.4276   0.2663  269   284   
JAM 0.1303   0.1303  296   311   
MEX 5.0696   5.8972  328   343   
NIC 0.5356   0.2042  265   280   
PAN 0.1404   0.1316  268   283   
STK 0.0172   0.0054  267   282   
TRI 0.0263   0.0742  324   339   
UB 1.7567     327      
UC 2.8843     327      
USA     8.8697      337   
ARG 2.5617   1.7078  261   276   
BOL 0.3687   0.2686  248   263   
BRA 41.0943   10.9545  262   277   
CHL 0.4926   0.7442  324   339   
COL 3.3382   1.7017  263   278   
ECU 0.5114   0.4757  266   281   
GUY 0.2881   0.0244  266   281   
PAR 0.1187   0.1463  324   339   
PER 0.938   0.9812  322   337   
SUR 0.005   0.0232  323   338   
URU 0.0086   0.118  317   332   
VEN 0.6744   0.9403  324   339   
BAN 0.1334   1.0924  337   352   
CHN 10.2346   11.8294  332   347   
IND 20.7352   22.4126  339   354   
INS 2.4302   4.1417  332   347   
IRN 1.3981   2.2239  342   357   
JAP     2.3922  674   342   
MLY 0.0762   1.2467  333   348   
NEP 0.1373   0.1373  401   416   
PAK 3.8554   4.7958  339   354   
PNG 0.0528   0.036  271   286   
PHI 2.2937   2.2937  283   298   
SOK     1.1974      348   
THA 7.2423   2.416  277   292   
AUS 7.1594   1.177  279   289   
FIJ 0.3118   0.0639  269   284   
REU 3.3079   2.1977  271   286   
RNE 0.1524   4.7089  333   348   
RAF 0.5574   0.9299  330   345   
RCA 0.0858   0.0344  269   284   
RSA 0.1912   2.5259  339   354   
REA 0.0993   0.9895  332   347   
RSO 1.2383   2.2408   332   347   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI continued: Trade flows in the Full Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    ALB BOS EUR BUL ROM NOR 
           
Domestic ALB 0.0038       
Domestic EUR   9.1095     
Domestic BUL    0.0019    
Domestic ROM     0.0262   
MFN SER  0.0048      
MFN BRA 0.0884 0.1347 9.9027 0.2004 0.5236 0.1920 
MFN REU    0.0825 0.0703   
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI continued: Trade flows in the Full Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    RUS SER SWI TUR ALG BEN 
           
MFN EUR   0.5033     
Domestic RUS 2.3772       
Domestic SER  0.3599      
Domestic BEN      0.0034 
MFN BRA 3.7204   1.4857 1.2155 0.0345 
MFN REU    0.8056    
           
    BUR CDR CON COT EGY ETH 
           
Domestic BUR 0.0415       
Domestic CDR  0.0657      
Domestic CON   0.0559     
Domestic COT    0.1405    
Domestic EGY     1.7718   
Domestic ETH      0.2997 
MFN ZAM  0.0167      
MFN ARG  0.0121      
MFN BRA 0.0310  0.0081 0.0932 0.9957   
           
    GAB GUI KEN MAD MAL MAU 
           
Domestic GAB 0.0222       
Domestic GUI  0.0271      
Domestic KEN   0.4924     
Domestic MAD    0.0257    
Domestic MAL     0.1553   
Domestic MAU      0.0457 
MFN ARG 0.0001   0.0382    
MFN BRA  0.0923 0.3130 0.0791    
           
    MLI MOR MOZ NIG SAC SAF 
           
Domestic MLI 0.0356       
Domestic MOR  0.4343      
Domestic MOZ   0.1558     
Domestic NIG    0.0108    
Domestic SAF      1.6568 
Domestic SWA     0.2356   
MFN ARG  0.2848      
MFN BRA 0.0668 0.6070  1.2363    
MFN GUY  0.0096      
           
    SEN SRL SUD SWA TAN TOG 
           
MFN MAL     0.1084   
Domestic SEN 0.0951       
Domestic SRL  0.0060      
Domestic SUD   0.8103     
MFN/Domestic SWA   0.0096 0.0244    
Domestic TAN     0.2209   
MFN ZAM     0.1587   
MFN BRA 0.0945 0.0197    0.0553 
MFN REU   0.0026     
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI continued: Trade flows in the Full Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    UGA ZAM ZIM BAR BEL CAN 
           
MFN ETH 0.0490       
Domestic UGA 0.1790       
Domestic ZAM  0.1168      
Domestic ZIM   0.3197     
Domestic BAR    0.0184    
Domestic BEL     0.0126   
Domestic CAN      0.1209 
MFN GUA      1.2849 
           
    COR CUB DOM ELS GUA HAI 
           
MFN BAR      0.0040 
Domestic COR 0.2489       
Domestic/MFN CUB  0.6534    0.0918 
Domestic/MFN DOM   0.3520   0.0393 
Domestic ELS    0.2355    
Domestic GUA     0.7082   
MFN STK      0.0036 
MFN GUY      0.0586 
           
    HON JAM MEX NIC PAN STK 
           
MFN CUB   0.8276     
Domestic HON 0.2663       
Domestic JAM  0.1303      
Domestic MEX   5.0696     
Domestic NIC    0.2042    
Domestic PAN     0.1316   
Domestic STK      0.0054 
           
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI continued: Trade flows in the Full Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    TRI USA ARG BOL BRA CHL 
           
Domestic UB  1.7567      
Domestic UC  2.8843      
MFN BAR 0.0043       
MFN BEL  0.1019      
MFN COR  0.2098      
MFN DOM  0.1098      
MFN ELS  0.4265      
MFN GUA  0.1148      
MFN HON  0.1613      
MFN NIC  0.3314      
MFN PAN  0.0088      
MFN STK  0.0082      
Domestic TRI 0.0263       
Domestic ARG   1.7078     
Domestic BOL    0.2686  0.0725 
MFN/Domestic BRA  1.2975   10.9545   
Domestic CHL      0.4926 
MFN COL  1.2379    0.1792 
MFN ECU  0.0357      
MFN GUY 0.0436 0.1337      
MFN RCA  0.0514      
           
    COL ECU GUY PAR PER SUR 
           
MFN BOL    0.0276    
Domestic/MFN COL 1.7017    0.0432   
Domestic ECU  0.4757      
Domestic/MFN GUY   0.0244   0.0182 
Domestic PAR    0.1187    
Domestic PER     0.9380   
MFN SUR      0.0050 
           
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VI continued: Trade flows in the Full Liberalization Scenario 
Scheme Origin Destination
    URU VEN BAN CHN IND INS 
           
MFN SAF     0.4624   
MFN SWA     0.2137   
MFN GUA  0.0896      
MFN ARG 0.1094    0.2468   
MFN BRA     0.5993   
MFN COL  0.1763      
Domestic URU 0.0086       
Domestic VEN  0.6744      
Domestic BAN   0.1334     
Domestic CHN    10.2346    
Domestic IND     20.7352   
Domestic INS      2.4302 
MFN THA    1.5948    
MFN AUS   0.9590  0.1553 1.7115 
           
    IRN JAP MLY NEP PAK PNG 
           
MFN MAU 0.3825       
MFN MOZ 0.1008       
MFN SAF 0.0390    0.0343   
MFN SWA     0.1548   
MFN ZIM 0.1544       
MFN ARG     0.0021   
MFN BRA     0.7491   
Domestic IRN 1.3981       
Domestic MLY   0.0762     
Domestic NEP    0.1373    
Domestic PAK     3.8554   
MFN/Domestic PNG  0.0168    0.0360 
MFN THA  1.1440      
MFN AUS  0.9836 1.1705     
MFN FIJ  0.2478      
MFN REU 0.1492       
           
    PHI SOK THA AUS FIJ REU 
           
Domestic PHI 2.2937       
MFN/Domestic THA  1.1974 2.4160     
Domestic AUS    1.1770    
Domestic FIJ     0.0639   
Domestic REU      2.1977 
           
           
    RNE RAF RCA RSA REA RSO 
           
MFN SAF    0.6165    
MFN SWA    0.1828    
MFN ARG  0.0385  0.1219    
MFN BRA 4.5565 0.3341  1.4134    
MFN THA     0.8902   
MFN AUS      1.0024 
Domestic RNE 0.1524       
Domestic RAF  0.5574      
Domestic RCA   0.0344     
Domestic RSA    0.1912    
Domestic REA     0.0993   
Domestic RSO      1.2383 
                
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
A-37 
Annex VII: Results of the Baseline Scenario under the First Sensitivity Analy-
sis (BDI= 10,000) 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.3873     365      
BE 0.8198     362      
CZ 0.4549     365      
DK 0.4207     386      
ES 0.8809     440      
FI 0.122     440      
FR 4.0325     365      
GE 3.6555     360      
GR 0.1897     440      
HU 0.4017     370      
IE              
IT 0.7787     423      
LT 0.103     404      
LV              
NL 0.8646     369      
PL 1.6719     359      
PT 0.0445     427      
SI              
SK 0.2074     439      
SW 0.3257     321      
UK 1.1386     345      
ALB 0.0034   0.0931  290   305   
BOS     0.1405      382   
BUL 0.0031   0.2792  441   456   
EUR 16.4994   18.5448      450   
NOR     0.1861      416   
ROM 0.0472   0.608  441   456   
RUS 2.5641   6.047  376   391   
SER 0.3604   0.3604  321   336   
SWI 0.2023   0.4511  525   682   
TUR 2.1621   2.1621  611   626   
ALG     1.2346      296   
BEN 0.0034   0.0381  336   329   
BUR 0.0412   0.0726  389   404   
CDR 0.0661   0.095  335   329   
CON 0.0565   0.0638  339   354   
COT 0.1384   0.2347  313   328   
EGY 1.7306   2.7862  311   326   
ETH 0.3522   0.3034  335   302   
GAB 0.0223   0.0222  336   351   
GUI 0.0274   0.1199  338   328   
KEN 0.5733   0.7707  526   541   
MAD 0.0257   0.1435  332   334   
MAL 0.2663   0.1548  261   276   
MAU 0.4661   0.0447  355   361   
MLI 0.0353   0.1026  389   404   
MOR 0.5018   1.3225  512   527   
MOZ 0.2732   0.1532  331   344   
NIG 0.0114   1.2268  390   405   
SAC     0.2254      527   
SAF 2.5136   1.5588  194   527   
SEN 0.0962   0.1904  339   328   
SRL 0.0061   0.0258  338   328   
SUD 0.8197   0.8197  352   367   
SWA 0.6993   0.0221  124   578   
TAN 0.2582   0.4665  526   541   
TOG     0.0555       329   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VII continued: Results of the Baseline Liberalization Scenario under the 
First Sensitivity Analysis 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1957   0.2222 524 539
ZAM 0.2952   0.1164  261   276   
ZIM 0.4773   0.3191  209   224   
BAR 0.0295   0.0179  358   373   
BEL 0.1159   0.0126  280   295   
CAN 0.1088   1.4162  277   287   
COR 0.4037   0.2582  181   196   
CUB 1.7169   0.68  174   189   
DOM 0.5224   0.3478  305   320   
ELS 0.5802   0.2446  176   191   
GUA 1.9152   0.7367  173   188   
HAI     0.195      384   
HON 0.3752   0.2764  180   195   
JAM 0.1385   0.128  356   371   
MEX 5.6973   5.6973  470   485   
NIC 0.4688   0.2121  176   191   
PAN 0.1468   0.1299  308   323   
STK 0.019   0.0053  358   373   
TRI 0.0273   0.0733  366   381   
UB 3.8379     391      
UC 3.2236     382      
USA     8.7858      414   
ARG 2.2576   1.7708  177   192   
BOL 0.3381   0.2754  190   205   
BRA 29.8343   11.3748  168   183   
CHL 0.4493   0.7362  282   378   
COL 2.9184   1.7685  174   189   
ECU 0.5016   0.4784  251   266   
GUY 0.2921   0.0245  278   278   
PAR 0.1168   0.147  309   324   
PER 0.8793   0.9999  264   279   
SUR 0.0052   0.023  365   380   
URU 0.0082   0.1197  272   287   
VEN 0.6475   0.9516  286   301   
BAN 0.1342   1.0904  344   359   
CHN 10.1732   11.8512  326   341   
IND 21.9972   21.9972  410   427   
INS 2.4101   4.1522  324   339   
IRN 1.3842   2.2307  332   347   
JAP 1.1515   2.186  1076   1086   
MLY 0.0737   1.2597  299   314   
NEP 0.1349   0.138  379   394   
PAK 3.9095   4.7754  355   370   
PNG 0.0469   0.0372  187   202   
PHI 2.3171   2.2867  293   308   
SOK     1.2275      297   
THA 6.593   2.4547  206   251   
AUS 5.7345   1.2307  195   205   
FIJ 0.3355   0.0625  341   356   
REU 2.6073   2.319  188   203   
RNE 0.1444   4.764  283   298   
RAF 0.5494   0.9328  316   331   
RCA 0.0756   0.0357  182   197   
RSA 0.1791   2.5793  275   290   
REA 0.0935   1.009  274   289   
RSO 1.1623   2.2866   272   287   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VIII: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario under the First Sensitiv-
ity Analysis (BDI= 10,000) 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.2931     341      
BE 0.5933     341      
CZ 0.3806     341      
DK 0.2069     341      
ES 0.279     341      
FI 0.0539     341      
FR 3.0033     341      
GE 2.7666     341      
GR       350      
HU 0.3119     341      
IE              
IT 0.0404     341      
LT 0.0577     341      
LV              
NL 0.6107     341      
PL 1.3417     341      
PT 0.0056     341      
SI              
SK 0.0977     341      
SW 0.3648     341      
UK 1.057     341      
ALB 0.0038   0.092  340   355   
BOS     0.1393      425   
BUL 0.0022   0.2834  359   374   
EUR 11.4643   18.9533      351   
NOR     0.1909      353   
ROM 0.031   0.6172  359   374   
RUS 2.4878   6.0672  359   374   
SER 0.3692   0.3594  334   349   
SWI     0.5006  373   351   
TUR     2.2767  503   374   
ALG     1.2116      358   
BEN 0.0034   0.0378  338   353   
BUR 0.0418   0.0723  407   422   
CDR 0.0663   0.0943  338   353   
CON 0.0564   0.0638  338   353   
COT 0.1418   0.2331  337   352   
EGY 1.8135   2.749  358   373   
ETH 0.3487   0.2997  325   340   
GAB 0.0222   0.0222  332   347   
GUI 0.0273   0.1191  337   352   
KEN 0.4969   0.8034  343   358   
MAD 0.0259   0.1426  342   357   
MAL 0.2664   0.1548  262   277   
MAU 0.4209   0.0459  262   277   
MLI 0.0359   0.1021  407   422   
MOR 0.4416   1.3293  349   364   
MOZ 0.2519   0.1566  260   275   
NIG 0.0109   1.2438  338   353   
SAC     0.2358      290   
SAF 2.7992   1.6584  269   284   
SEN 0.096   0.1891  337   352   
SRL 0.006   0.0256  337   352   
SUD 0.819   0.8199  351   366   
SWA 0.8171   0.0245  199   214   
TAN 0.2227   0.4869  338   353   
TOG     0.0552       353   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex VIII continued: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario under the 
First Sensitivity Analysis 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.179   0.228 401 416
ZAM 0.2953   0.1164  262   277   
ZIM 0.4648   0.3215  193   208   
BAR 0.0265   0.0185  258   273   
BEL 0.1125   0.0127  256   271   
CAN 0.1235   1.4037  338   348   
COR 0.452   0.25  257   272   
CUB 1.5378   0.6576  250   265   
DOM 0.4945   0.3534  258   273   
ELS 0.6514   0.2367  252   267   
GUA 2.1509   0.7126  248   263   
HAI     0.1965      357   
HON 0.4203   0.2676  256   271   
JAM 0.1303   0.1303  296   311   
MEX 5.1349   5.8751  342   357   
NIC 0.5263   0.2052  252   267   
PAN 0.1382   0.1323  256   271   
STK 0.017   0.0055  258   273   
TRI 0.0266   0.0739  339   354   
UB 1.8323     329      
UC 2.898     329      
USA     8.8671      339   
ARG 2.5299   1.714  252   267   
BOL 0.3764   0.2671  265   280   
BRA 38.8263   11.0287  243   258   
CHL 0.5084   0.7408  341   356   
COL 3.2757   1.711  249   264   
ECU 0.5019   0.4783  252   267   
GUY 0.285   0.0245  258   273   
PAR 0.118   0.1466  319   334   
PER 0.9531   0.9766  339   354   
SUR 0.0051   0.0231  338   353   
URU 0.0087   0.1174  334   349   
VEN 0.6752   0.94  326   341   
BAN 0.1346   1.0893  348   363   
CHN 10.3314   11.7954  343   358   
IND 20.9273   22.3494  350   365   
INS 2.4487   4.1321  341   356   
IRN 1.4134   2.2164  355   370   
JAP     2.3862  674   353   
MLY 0.0768   1.2439  342   357   
NEP 0.1373   0.1373  401   416   
PAK 3.8911   4.7823  350   365   
PNG 0.0518   0.0362  256   271   
PHI 2.2937   2.2937  283   298   
SOK     1.192      359   
THA 7.219   2.4185  275   290   
AUS 6.9207   1.1851  264   274   
FIJ 0.3063   0.0643  255   270   
REU 3.2452   2.2073  264   279   
RNE 0.156   4.6853  358   373   
RAF 0.5625   0.9281  340   355   
RCA 0.0846   0.0345  258   273   
RSA 0.193   2.5184  350   365   
REA 0.1003   0.9865  343   358   
RSO 1.2478   2.2353   341   356   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex IX: Results of the Baseline Scenario under the Second Sensitivity 
Analysis (ε*2) 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.3873     365      
BE 0.8198     362      
CZ 0.4549     365      
DK 0.4207     386      
ES 0.6932     405      
FI 0.1017     405      
FR 4.0325     365      
GE 3.6555     360      
GR 0.126     405      
HU 0.4017     370      
IE              
IT 0.6415     405      
LT 0.103     404      
LV              
NL 0.8646     369      
PL 1.6719     359      
PT 0.0358     405      
SI              
SK 0.1738     405      
SW 0.3257     321      
UK 1.1386     345      
ALB 0.0034   0.0937  265   280   
BOS     0.1412      357   
BUL 0.0028   0.2808  408   423   
EUR 16.0482   18.6747      415   
NOR     0.1883      386   
ROM 0.0416   0.6114  408   423   
RUS 2.3366   6.0983  334   349   
SER 0.3592   0.3592  337   352   
SWI 0.2023   0.4542  525   652   
TUR 1.9775   2.1811  559   574   
ALG     1.2479      266   
BEN 0.0028   0.0385  331   297   
BUR 0.0407   0.0732  357   372   
CDR 0.0712   0.0959  329   298   
CON 0.0557   0.0645  305   320   
COT 0.1364   0.2371  281   296   
EGY 1.6751   2.8287  265   280   
ETH 0.3881   0.3063  330   274   
GAB 0.0233   0.0224  330   321   
GUI 0.0294   0.1212  332   296   
KEN 0.5649   0.7788  473   488   
MAD 0.0272   0.145  326   302   
MAL 0.3032   0.1552  255   270   
MAU 0.3816   0.0452  349   326   
MLI 0.0349   0.1034  357   372   
MOR 0.4803   1.3398  465   480   
MOZ 0.3008   0.1542  325   321   
NIG 0.0113   1.2396  350   365   
SAC     0.2266      491   
SAF 2.5171   1.5698  181   491   
SEN 0.1034   0.1924  333   296   
SRL 0.0065   0.026  332   296   
SUD 0.826   0.8245  331   346   
SWA 0.7022   0.0224  111   516   
TAN 0.2549   0.4713  473   488   
TOG     0.0561       297   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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 Annex IX continued: Results of the Baseline Scenario under the Second Sen-
sitivity Analysis  
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1938   0.2243 475 490
ZAM 0.3361   0.1167  255   270   
ZIM 0.4865   0.3214  193   208   
BAR 0.024   0.0181  355   340   
BEL 0.1167   0.0126  264   279   
CAN 0.1045   1.4234  247   257   
COR 0.4093   0.2591  175   190   
CUB 1.6696   0.6802  174   189   
DOM 0.5118   0.3522  267   282   
ELS 0.5925   0.2448  175   190   
GUA 1.9604   0.7373  172   187   
HAI     0.1976      337   
HON 0.3818   0.2772  175   190   
JAM 0.1283   0.1292  353   337   
MEX 5.7118   5.7118  458   473   
NIC 0.4779   0.2124  174   189   
PAN 0.1383   0.1288  336   351   
STK 0.0176   0.0053  355   338   
TRI 0.0221   0.0742  354   340   
UB 3.8379     391      
UC 3.2202     405      
USA     8.7853      415   
ARG 2.2804   1.777  171   186   
BOL 0.3347   0.2775  176   191   
BRA 31.8173   11.3614  171   186   
CHL 0.4242   0.7442  243   340   
COL 2.9537   1.7738  169   184   
ECU 0.4928   0.4834  225   240   
GUY 0.2955   0.0247  267   249   
PAR 0.1179   0.1471  307   322   
PER 0.8542   1.014  228   243   
SUR 0.0051   0.0232  323   338   
URU 0.008   0.1213  238   253   
VEN 0.643   0.9594  263   278   
BAN 0.1363   1.101  324   326   
CHN 10.0114   11.9732  293   308   
IND 22.0723   22.0723  396   413   
INS 2.3804   4.192  293   308   
IRN 1.3649   2.2538  298   313   
JAP 0.9214   2.2018  981   991   
MLY 0.0723   1.2704  274   289   
NEP 0.1335   0.1391  349   364   
PAK 3.8584   4.8244  319   334   
PNG 0.0478   0.0373  185   200   
PHI 2.3611   2.2692  317   332   
SOK     1.2471      269   
THA 6.5665   2.4727  191   234   
AUS 5.9241   1.2329  192   202   
FIJ 0.3307   0.0632  302   317   
REU 2.6683   2.3329  181   196   
RNE 0.1398   4.8179  242   257   
RAF 0.5422   0.9399  285   300   
RCA 0.0759   0.0359  172   187   
RSA 0.1768   2.6065  248   263   
REA 0.092   1.0198  246   261   
RSO 1.1481   2.3093   246   261   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex X: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario under the Second Sensi-
tivity Analysis (ε*2) 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.1253     298      
BE 0.1773     298      
CZ 0.2472     298      
DK       299      
ES       302      
FI 0.0203     298      
FR 1.2676     298      
GE 0.988     298      
GR       350      
HU 0.1763     298      
IE              
IT       337      
LT 0.0231     298      
LV              
NL 0.2506     298      
PL 0.5679     298      
PT       330      
SI              
SK 0.0412     298      
SW 0.2574     298      
UK 0.6538     298      
ALB 0.004   0.0928  303   318   
BOS     0.1403      388   
BUL 0.0015   0.2868  305   320   
EUR 4.7958   19.1718      308   
NOR     0.1949      310   
ROM 0.0193   0.6244  305   320   
RUS 2.0644   6.1399  304   319   
SER 0.3592   0.3592  337   352   
SWI     0.5109  373   308   
TUR     2.3124  503   320   
ALG     1.2268      316   
BEN 0.0026   0.0383  298   313   
BUR 0.0414   0.073  367   382   
CDR 0.0667   0.0955  299   314   
CON 0.0548   0.0646  298   313   
COT 0.1414   0.2359  297   312   
EGY 1.8306   2.7931  303   318   
ETH 0.3616   0.3024  297   312   
GAB 0.0218   0.0225  299   314   
GUI 0.0272   0.1205  297   312   
KEN 0.4196   0.8129  303   318   
MAD 0.0258   0.1443  302   317   
MAL 0.2771   0.1572  223   238   
MAU 0.3012   0.0462  245   260   
MLI 0.0355   0.1031  367   382   
MOR 0.3594   1.3482  301   316   
MOZ 0.2484   0.1576  244   259   
NIG 0.0101   1.2589  298   313   
SAC     0.2376      262   
SAF 3.0455   1.6757  241   256   
SEN 0.0957   0.1914  297   312   
SRL 0.006   0.0259  297   312   
SUD 0.7887   0.83  309   324   
SWA 0.9364   0.0248  171   186   
TAN 0.1876   0.4926  299   314   
TOG     0.0558       313   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
A-44 
Annex X continued: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario under the Sec-
ond Sensitivity Analysis 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1648   0.2296 373 388
ZAM 0.3072   0.1182  223   238   
ZIM 0.4537   0.3246  174   189   
BAR 0.0186   0.0186  240   255   
BEL 0.1093   0.0128  239   254   
CAN 0.1315   1.412  296   306   
COR 0.5001   0.2518  238   253   
CUB 1.2954   0.6609  237   252   
DOM 0.4741   0.3561  238   253   
ELS 0.7159   0.2383  234   249   
GUA 2.3959   0.7165  234   249   
HAI     0.1992      311   
HON 0.4678   0.2693  239   254   
JAM 0.1142   0.1303  296   311   
MEX 4.315   5.9527  298   313   
NIC 0.5813   0.2066  235   250   
PAN 0.1261   0.1306  292   307   
STK 0.0135   0.0055  237   252   
TRI 0.0195   0.0749  294   309   
UB 0.6282     296      
UC 2.0544     296      
USA     8.9087      306   
ARG 2.7741   1.7281  231   246   
BOL 0.3849   0.272  218   233   
BRA 49.4172   11.0721  232   247   
CHL 0.5432   0.7513  294   309   
COL 3.6413   1.7217  233   248   
ECU 0.5083   0.4812  236   251   
GUY 0.2728   0.0247  236   251   
PAR 0.1146   0.1477  294   309   
PER 0.9922   0.9922  287   302   
SUR 0.0048   0.0234  293   308   
URU 0.009   0.1191  287   302   
VEN 0.6915   0.9493  294   309   
BAN 0.1317   1.1024  307   322   
CHN 10.1994   11.9394  302   317   
IND 18.898   22.6167  309   324   
INS 2.4251   4.1802  302   317   
IRN 1.4049   2.2439  312   327   
JAP     2.4098  674   311   
MLY 0.077   1.2583  303   318   
NEP 0.1383   0.1383  369   384   
PAK 3.78   4.8395  309   324   
PNG 0.0564   0.0364  241   256   
PHI 2.2811   2.2811  300   315   
SOK     1.2149      318   
THA 7.7123   2.4443  247   262   
AUS 8.1288   1.1944  248   258   
FIJ 0.2856   0.0647  239   254   
REU 3.875   2.2372  241   256   
RNE 0.1623   4.7416  303   318   
RAF 0.5614   0.9364  300   315   
RCA 0.0941   0.0348  239   254   
RSA 0.2029   2.5501  309   324   
REA 0.1046   0.9992  302   317   
RSO 1.3052   2.2626   302   317   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex XI: Results of the Baseline Scenario under the Third Sensitivity Analy-
sis (ε*½) 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.3873     365      
BE 0.8198     362      
CZ 0.4549     365      
DK 0.4207     386      
ES 0.835     431      
FI 0.117     431      
FR 4.0325     365      
GE 3.6555     360      
GR 0.1741     431      
HU 0.4017     370      
IE       702      
IT 0.7787     423      
LT 0.103     404      
LV       702      
NL 0.8646     369      
PL 1.6719     359      
PT 0.0445     427      
SI       702      
SK 0.1999     431      
SW 0.3257     321      
UK 1.1386     345      
ALB 0.0033   0.093  292   307   
BOS     0.1404      384   
BUL 0.003   0.2796  434   449   
EUR 16.4254   18.5764      441   
NOR     0.1865      410   
ROM 0.046   0.6087  434   449   
RUS 2.4507   6.0672  359   374   
SER 0.3693   0.361  314   329   
SWI 0.2023   0.4516  525   677   
TUR 2.1621   2.1621  611   626   
ALG     1.2364      292   
BEN 0.0039   0.0381  357   327   
BUR 0.0402   0.0726  386   401   
CDR 0.0639   0.095  355   328   
CON 0.0549   0.0639  337   352   
COT 0.1343   0.2349  310   325   
EGY 1.651   2.8027  292   307   
ETH 0.337   0.3036  356   299   
GAB 0.022   0.0222  356   353   
GUI 0.0265   0.12  358   325   
KEN 0.5566   0.7713  522   537   
MAD 0.025   0.1437  352   331   
MAL 0.2505   0.1538  281   296   
MAU 0.5091   0.0448  343   358   
MLI 0.0345   0.1026  386   401   
MOR 0.4946   1.3273  498   513   
MOZ 0.2611   0.1524  351   362   
NIG 0.0111   1.2277  387   402   
SAC     0.2245      556   
SAF 2.4745   1.5505  205   556   
SEN 0.0931   0.1906  359   325   
SRL 0.0059   0.0258  358   325   
SUD 0.8028   0.8183  358   373   
SWA 0.681   0.022  135   627   
TAN 0.2506   0.4668  522   537   
TOG     0.0556       327   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex XI continued: Results of the Baseline Scenario under the Third Sensi-
tivity Analysis 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1898   0.2226 515 530
ZAM 0.2777   0.1157  281   296   
ZIM 0.4668   0.3167  226   241   
BAR 0.0329   0.0179  381   373   
BEL 0.1144   0.0125  297   312   
CAN 0.1026   1.4176  271   281   
COR 0.4019   0.2561  198   213   
CUB 1.7582   0.6723  197   212   
DOM 0.5028   0.349  294   309   
ELS 0.584   0.2419  199   214   
GUA 1.9243   0.7286  195   210   
HAI     0.1958      370   
HON 0.3738   0.274  198   213   
JAM 0.1433   0.128  355   370   
MEX 5.6765   5.6765  488   503   
NIC 0.471   0.2098  198   213   
PAN 0.158   0.1289  336   351   
STK 0.0196   0.0053  356   371   
TRI 0.0303   0.0735  380   373   
UB 3.8379     391      
UC 3.2236     339      
USA     8.7858      414   
ARG 2.2539   1.7551  195   210   
BOL 0.3317   0.2751  193   208   
BRA 30.7934   11.2337  195   210   
CHL 0.4136   0.7387  269   366   
COL 2.9189   1.7517  193   208   
ECU 0.4876   0.4787  249   264   
GUY 0.29   0.0245  300   273   
PAR 0.1172   0.1462  328   343   
PER 0.8433   1.0043  252   267   
SUR 0.005   0.023  357   372   
URU 0.0079   0.1201  263   278   
VEN 0.6334   0.9502  291   306   
BAN 0.131   1.0911  350   357   
CHN 9.8981   11.8642  322   337   
IND 21.8901   21.8901  431   449   
INS 2.3487   4.1539  322   337   
IRN 1.3445   2.2338  327   342   
JAP 1.1197   2.1882  1063   1073   
MLY 0.0723   1.2601  298   313   
NEP 0.1319   0.1381  376   391   
PAK 3.7996   4.7805  351   366   
PNG 0.0472   0.0368  209   224   
PHI 2.3831   2.2695  317   332   
SOK     1.2296      294   
THA 6.5024   2.4434  215   263   
AUS 5.7812   1.2146  217   227   
FIJ 0.301   0.0655  207   222   
REU 2.5805   2.29  205   220   
RNE 0.1378   4.785  266   281   
RAF 0.5331   0.9333  314   329   
RCA 0.0748   0.0354  196   211   
RSA 0.1741   2.5822  272   287   
REA 0.091   1.0102  270   285   
RSO 1.1329   2.2875   270   285   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex XII: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario under the Third Sensitiv-
ity Analysis (ε*½) 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
        
AT 0.3529     358      
BE 0.7434     358      
CZ 0.4282     358      
DK 0.282     358      
ES 0.3895     358      
FI 0.0659     358      
FR 3.6277     358      
GE 3.4013     358      
GR 0.0179     358      
HU 0.3603     358      
IE       358      
IT 0.1943     358      
LT 0.07     358      
LV       358      
NL 0.74     358      
PL 1.6197     358      
PT 0.0136     358      
SI       358      
SK 0.1179     358      
SW 0.4031     358      
UK 1.2017     358      
ALB 0.0035   0.0916  362   377   
BOS     0.1388      447   
BUL 0.0022   0.2831  364   379   
EUR 14.0293   18.8761      368   
NOR     0.1896      370   
ROM 0.0321   0.6165  364   379   
RUS 2.4612   6.0615  363   378   
SER 0.3849   0.3578  356   371   
SWI     0.4969  373   368   
TUR     2.2733  503   379   
ALG     1.2058      375   
BEN 0.0039   0.0376  357   372   
BUR 0.0409   0.0719  426   441   
CDR 0.064   0.0938  358   373   
CON 0.0554   0.0635  357   372   
COT 0.1374   0.2318  356   371   
EGY 1.7114   2.7455  362   377   
ETH 0.3371   0.2971  356   371   
GAB 0.022   0.0221  358   373   
GUI 0.0265   0.1184  356   371   
KEN 0.5237   0.7991  362   377   
MAD 0.0252   0.1418  361   376   
MAL 0.2508   0.1537  282   297   
MAU 0.499   0.0453  304   319   
MLI 0.0351   0.1017  426   441   
MOR 0.4686   1.3251  360   375   
MOZ 0.2548   0.1543  303   318   
NIG 0.011   1.2371  357   372   
SAC     0.234      321   
SAF 2.636   1.641  300   315   
SEN 0.093   0.1881  356   371   
SRL 0.0059   0.0254  356   371   
SUD 0.8066   0.8161  368   383   
SWA 0.7439   0.0241  230   245   
TAN 0.2353   0.4841  358   373   
TOG     0.0549       372   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex XII continued: Results of the Full Liberalization Scenario under the 
Third Sensitivity Analysis 
  Supply Demand Producer Price Consumer Price
  mill MT   mill MT   €/ ton   €/ ton   
UGA 0.1843   0.2264 432 447
ZAM 0.278   0.1156  282   297   
ZIM 0.4693   0.3158  233   248   
BAR 0.0316   0.0183  296   311   
BEL 0.1145   0.0125  298   313   
CAN 0.1118   1.4005  356   366   
COR 0.4293   0.2465  297   312   
CUB 1.6925   0.6473  295   310   
DOM 0.5036   0.3487  297   312   
ELS 0.6222   0.2332  294   309   
GUA 2.056   0.7013  293   308   
HAI     0.1958      369   
HON 0.3995   0.2637  298   313   
JAM 0.1393   0.1302  298   313   
MEX 5.3929   5.8514  356   371   
NIC 0.5023   0.2022  294   309   
PAN 0.1549   0.1304  297   312   
STK 0.019   0.0054  296   311   
TRI 0.0299   0.0736  353   368   
UB 2.735     356      
UC 3.2816     356      
USA     8.8362      366   
ARG 2.4041   1.691  290   305   
BOL 0.3519   0.2659  277   292   
BRA 35.5671   10.8564  291   306   
CHL 0.452   0.7382  353   368   
COL 3.1221   1.685  292   307   
ECU 0.5012   0.4711  295   310   
GUY 0.2893   0.0242  295   310   
PAR 0.1186   0.1451  353   368   
PER 0.89   0.9732  351   366   
SUR 0.005   0.023  352   367   
URU 0.0083   0.117  346   361   
VEN 0.6537   0.9327  353   368   
BAN 0.1322   1.0827  370   385   
CHN 10.0935   11.7231  365   380   
IND 21.3551   22.238  368   383   
INS 2.3951   4.1044  365   380   
IRN 1.3715   2.2067  371   386   
JAP     2.3752  674   375   
MLY 0.0746   1.2356  366   381   
NEP 0.1352   0.1361  438   453   
PAK 3.8283   4.7585  368   383   
PNG 0.0501   0.0356  304   319   
PHI 2.373   2.2754  308   323   
SOK     1.1806      381   
THA 6.8846   2.3892  310   325   
AUS 6.4695   1.1607  312   322   
FIJ 0.3193   0.0632  302   317   
REU 2.9206   2.1648  300   315   
RNE 0.145   4.6809  362   377   
RAF 0.5452   0.9244  359   374   
RCA 0.0801   0.0341  298   313   
RSA 0.1825   2.5053  368   383   
REA 0.0953   0.9802  365   380   
RSO 1.1875   2.2196   365   380   
Source: Own Simulations; All quantities are expressed in million metric tons WSE. 
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Annex XIII: Regression Results for Ocean Freight Rates 
Full Sample       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.7867211      
R Square 0.6189302      
Adjusted R Square 0.6187940      
Standard Error 8.6140763      
Observations 11197      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Significance F   
Regression 4 1348845.5 337211.4 4544.5 0  
Residual 11192 830472.3 74.2    
Total 11196 2179317.7         
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Schnittpunkt 2.34071 0.36632 6.38985 0.00000 1.62267 3.05876 
BDI 0.00598 0.00008 78.29510 0.00000 0.00583 0.00613 
Distance 0.00301 0.00003 98.41417 0.00000 0.00295 0.00307 
PANAMA 1.49369 0.18202 8.20601 0.00000 1.13689 1.85049 
SUEZ 5.27049 0.24481 21.52853 0.00000 4.79061 5.75037 
Sources: ISO (various years); own calculations. 
All Coefficients in Annex XIII refer to ocean freight rates for raw sugar in US$ per ton. 
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Annex XIII continued: Regression Results for Exporting Regions 
  Cuba Northern Brazil Santos 
Constant -4.613053684 *** (1.4892) -2.818142722 *** (0.6872) -7.679694947 *** (0.7684) 
BDI 0.008313834 *** (0.0003) 0.007086638 *** (0.0002) 0.007269771 *** (0.0002) 
Distance 0.002944772 *** (0.0002) 0.003363236 *** (0.0001) 0.003719908 *** (0.0001) 
Panama 7.637006269 *** (1.3198) -  - -  - 
Suez 17.28445651 *** (1.2789) 15.14819084 *** (0.5394) 15.89365308 *** (0.5489) 
R2     0.7852029     0.817657173     0.7960275 
   793.25585   2654.63169    2310.3523 
F Test 
   (0.0000)   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    873     1,780     1,780 
 
  Puerto Quetzal (GUA) Buenaventura (COL) Thailand 
Constant -0.873130823  (0.8419) -2.415953967 ** (1.1520) 10.82876814 *** (0.5790) 
BDI 0.006210648 *** (0.0001) 0.006034012 *** (0.0001) 0.003434191 *** (0.0001) 
Distance 0.003688335 *** (0.0001) 0.003659923 *** (0.0001) 0.002143591 *** (0.0000) 
Panama -  - 4.994579041 *** (0.5289) -  - 
Suez 4.814028017 *** (0.6377) 5.527554454 *** (0.7322) -   - 
R2     0.716339     0.725072074     0.6899523 
   1494.998   1170.309386    1977.188 F Test 
   (0.0000)   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    1,780     1,780     1,780 
 
  Durban (SAF) 
Constant 23.26103336 *** (0.8092) 
BDI 0.004053154 *** (0.0001) 
Distance 0.000748388 *** (0.0001) 
Panama -  - 
Suez 1.047327445 ** (0.4483) 
R2 
    
0.39495
82 
   
308.981
73 
F Test 
   (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    1,424 
Sources: ISO (various years); own calculations. 
* significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Annex XIII continued: Regression Results for Importing Regions 
  Venezuela U.S. Gulf Baltic 
Constant 10.93245146 *** (0.6700) 16.01600551 *** (0.6858) 13.54573358 *** (2.1727) 
BDI 0.004050043 *** (0.0002) 0.00449259 *** (0.0002) 0.007111354 *** (0.0001) 
Distance 0.001548332 *** (0.0000) 0.001160372 *** (0.0000) 0.000360337   (0.0004) 
Panama -  - 0.601210262 * (0.3247) 6.297487275 *** (0.4043) 
Suez -   - -  - 0.744451836   (1.6288) 
R2     0.6261622     0.587782713     0.7282933 
   824.07894   505.7209926    658.04781 F Test 
   (0.0000)   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    987     1,068     987 
    
  Morocco Egypt Black Sea 
Constant 14.08799525 *** (0.8550) 10.38770027 *** (1.8006) 9.814111429 *** (1.9994) 
BDI 0.00571694 *** (0.0002) 0.006547164 *** (0.0002) 0.006579271 *** (0.0002) 
Distance 0.000741939 *** (0.0001) 0.001283308 *** (0.0003) 0.001446148 *** (0.0003) 
Panama 6.28092828 *** (0.3607) 4.840144017 *** (0.5245) 5.555598565 *** (0.5423) 
Suez -   - -  - 0.713519983 * (0.4173) 
R2     0.5919195     0.652341012     0.6501116 
   561.34219   726.1597739    538.83576 F Test 
   (0.0000)   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    1,165     1,165     1,165 
    
  Southern China Japan South Korea 
Constant -8.791031601 *** (0.8967) -5.1894745 *** (1.0717) -8.739948684 *** (0.9409) 
BDI 0.006525947 *** (0.0002) 0.006213817 *** (0.0002) 0.006283173 *** (0.0002) 
Distance 0.004084398 *** (0.0001) 0.004103911 *** (0.0001) 0.004134427 *** (0.0001) 
Panama 1.884018491 ** (0.7422) 9.649549876 *** (0.8300) 8.355290906 *** (0.7365) 
Suez -   - -  - -  - 
R2     0.8283981     0.769850907     0.8145041 
   1868.22   1294.518684    1699.299 F Test 
   (0.0000)   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    1,165     1,165     1,165 
  
  Southern China 
Constant -8.791031601 *** (0.8967) 
BDI 0.006525947 *** (0.0002) 
Distance 0.004084398 *** (0.0001) 
Panama 1.884018491 ** (0.7422) 
Suez -   - 
R2     0.8283981 
   1868.22 F Test 
   (0.0000) 
Number of 
Observations 
    1,165 
Sources: ISO (various years); own calculations. 
* significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
